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AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS: THE
PARADOX OF TODAY'S ARBITRARY AND MANDATORY
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT SCHEME
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier"
Over twenty years ago, the United States Supreme Court held that both
mandatory capital sentencing schemes and total discretionary capital sen-
tencing schemes violate the Eighth Amendment. According to Jeffrey
Kirchmeier, the "guided discretion" capital sentencing scheme of sentencing
factors that has developed, however, has the constitutional problems of both
mandatory death penalties and unlimited discretion death penalties.
Justices Scalia, Blaclnun, and Thomas have noted that the mandate of
unlimited mitigating circumstances has resulted in an arbitrary system.
Kirchmeier argues that today's sentencing scheme is arbitrary also because
of undefined aggravating factors, unlimited nonstatutory aggravating fac-
tors, and victim impact evidence. According to Kirchmeier, the death penal-
ty scheme also has moved toward a mandatory scheme as legislatures ex-
pand death penalty statutes and the Court sanctions other expansions of the
application of the penalty. Thus, argues Kirchmeier, the paradox of the
present system is that it is both arbitrary and mandatory.
Focusing on the Court's decisions regarding aggravating and mitigating
factors, this Article discusses the arbitrary and mandatory aspects of the
current system and then examines five options for addressing those constitu-
tional problems: keeping the present system, narrowing the application of
the death penalty, returning to unguided discretion statutes, returning to
mandatory death penalty schemes, or, as Justices Blackanun and Powell
have suggested, abandoning the death penalty.
This Article concludes that a mandatory death penalty scheme is the
only way to potentially apply the death penalty in an evenhanded manner.
The mandatory aspects of the current scheme and the historical experience
with mandatory death penalty schemes, however, illustrate that no human
system for selecting defendants for the ultimate punishment can be both fair
and nonarbitrary.
Associate Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law. J.D.,
Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 1989; B.A., Case Western Reserve
University, 1984. The author thanks Professor Jonathan Entin for comments on an earli-
er draft. He also thanks his research assistants: Corey DuFresne, Yannis Macheras,
Miriam O'Neil, and Adam Slavin. Mil gracias, mi hermano.
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para-dox (par'a daks') N... a statement that seems con-
tradictory, unbelievable, or absurd but that may be true in
fact.'
"There's no use trying," she said: "one can't believe impos-
sible things."
"I daresay you haven't had much practice," said the Queen.
"When I was your age, I always did it for half-an-hour a
day. Why, sometimes I've believed as many as six impossi-
ble things before breakfast."2
A little over twenty years ago, the modern era of capital punishment in
the United States began when the Supreme Court, having struck down death
penalty statutes four years earlier, upheld several states' new capital statuto-
ry schemes.3 Thus began the Court's attempt to develop a reasoned, consis-
tent, and nonarbitrary system of inflicting the punishment of death.
In the Supreme Court's drive to eliminate arbitrary discretion from the
use of capital punishment in America, the Court has struggled to create a
fair system. In this struggle, the Court has defined two important Eighth
Amendment principles: (1) the requirement that the discretion of a capital
sentencer be channeled and the group of defendants eligible for death be
narrowed;4 and (2) the requirement that a sentencer be able to consider any
aspect of a defendant's crime or character that is mitigating, thus providing
for individualized sentencing.5 In embracing these two principles, the Court
has rejected both mandatory death penalty schemes and schemes that give
total unbridled discretion to the sentencer.6 The Court instead has attempted
' WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 979 (3d ed. 1988).
2 LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASs 65 (MacMillan Co. 1963)
(1872).
' See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
4 See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (striking down the vague
application of an aggravating circumstance).
. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (holding that the Eighth Amend-
ment requires that the sentencer "not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of
the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death").
6 In addition to capital sentencing by juries, a judge may perform capital sentenc-
ing. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990); see also Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 242. In
most states today, capital sentencing is done by a jury, but some states have judge sen-
tencing. Three states-Arizona, Idaho, and Montana-have statutes that allow a single
judge to do capital sentencing. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(B) (West 1989 &
Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(c) (1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301
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to walk the line between such systems.
Individual Supreme Court Justices have reasoned that the two principles
are inconsistent and that allowing individual sentencing-and the consider-
ation of any mitigating factor the defendant argues-undermines any at-
tempts by the Court to eliminate arbitrariness.7 While Justices Scalia and
Blackmun both have argued that these two principles are incompatible, they
each propound a different solution. Justice Blackmun agreed with the
Court's decisions in prior cases that both principles are necessary to a con-
stitutional death penalty.8 Therefore, because the goals cannot both be satis-
fied, he reasoned, the death penalty is unconstitutional.9 Former Justice
Powell came to a similar conclusion after his retirement."0
Justice Scalia, however, concluded that the mitigation principle was not
as important as the channeled discretion requirement and, therefore, could be
eliminated." In short, Justice Scalia stated that the principle of Furman v.
Georgia'2-- that arbitrariness must be eliminated in capital sentencing-is
(1997). Nebraska's statute allows for a single judge or a three-judge panel to do the
sentencing, while Colorado's new statute provides for a panel of three judges to conduct
a sentencing hearing. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-
11-103(1)(a) (Supp. 1996). Florida, Alabama, Indiana, and Delaware have a pure jury
override statute, which allows a trial judge to override a jury's sentencing decision,
while Ohio and Kentucky have a variation on the jury override scheme, which allows a
trial judge only to reduce a jury recommendation of death to a life sentence. See
Roxane J. Perruso, And Then There Were Three: Colorado's New Death Penalty Sen-
tencing Statute, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 189, 215-16 (1997). Generally, the points made in
this Article apply equally to jury sentencing states and judge sentencing states.
" See infra notes 9, 14.
See infra note 9.
9 Justice Blackmun dissented in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and was
among the majority of Justices that voted to uphold the Georgia death penalty statute in
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See Furman, 408 U.S. at 405 (1972)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 227 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Over twenty years after Furman was decided, however, Justice Blackmun wrote that
"the inevitability of factual, legal, and moral error gives us a system that we know must
wrongly kill some defendants, a system that fails to deliver the fair, consistent, and
reliable sentences of death required by the Constitution." Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S.
1141, 1145-46 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from the denial of the petition for writ
of certiorari). Justice Blackmun subsequently dissented in all cases upholding capital
sentences for the short time that he remained on the bench.
10 After his retirement, Justice Powell, who, like Justice Blackmun, was among the
dissent in Furman, see Furman, 408 U.S. at 414 (Powell, J., dissenting), and among the
majority in Gregg, see Gregg, 428 U.S. at 158, stated that he regretted upholding the
death penalty. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY
451 (1994); John C. Jeffries, Jr., A Change of Mind that Came Too Late, N.Y. TIMES,
June 23, 1994, at A23.
' See infra note 14.
' 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
1998] 347
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
the only requirement of the Eighth Amendment."B Thus, he has held that
mitigating factors, like aggravating factors, must be specifically designated
by the legislatures, or perhaps even eliminated. 4 Justice Thomas has come
to a similar conclusion. 5
This Article is an evaluation of the Court's jurisprudence regarding the
criteria-generally in the form of aggravating and mitigating factors-for
selecting which defendants are sentenced to death and which ones are not.
The Article begins by briefly addressing the historical developments leading
up to the Court's decisions in Furman6 and Gregg v. Georgia," as well
as the development of the goals of eliminating arbitrariness and of providing
individualized sentencing. Examining the Court's progression, this Article
reasons that the Court, while rejecting mandatory and unbridled discretion-
ary sentencing schemes, paradoxically has created a system of aggravating
and mitigating factors that embraces the evils of both systems. The Court
has moved toward a mandatory death penalty by limiting the use of miti-
gating circumstances and by permitting expansive aggravating factor stat-
utes. Simultaneously, the Court has retreated from concerns about arbitrari-
ness by permitting capital sentencers to consider several arbitrary factors.
Finally, this Article discusses various proposals by the Justices and other
commentators for addressing the problems created by the Court's current
13 See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 669-73 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
"' Justice Scalia initially embraced the principles underlying mitigation evidence and
the necessity of individualized sentencing in capital cases in Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481
U.S. 393 (1987) (Scalia, J., majority opinion) (holding that a Florida statute unconsti-
tutionally limited consideration of mitigating evidence). However, in 1990, for some of
the same reasons that Justice Blackmun began finding the death penalty unconstitution-
al, Justice Scalia began rejecting the doctrine upheld in Hitchcock. See Walton v. Arizo-
na, 497 U.S. 639, 672-73 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (holding that Arizona's method
of allocating the burden to the defendant to prove mitigating circumstances did not
violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because the State's burden of proving
aggravating circumstances was not lessened). The doctrine upheld in Hitchcock goes
back to cases decided the same day as Gregg. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976) (holding that a mandatory death penalty is unconstitutional); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (holding that Florida's sentencing procedure did not vio-
late the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because it provided trial judges specific
and detailed guidance in weighing the eight statutory aggravating factors against the
seven statutory mitigating factors to determine whether to impose the death penalty);
see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (holding that the sentencer should
not be precluded from considering mitigating factors).
IS See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 487-500 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).
16 408 U.S. 237 (1972) (holding that the imposition of the death penalty in the cases
before the Court violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as "cruel and unusual
punishment").
7 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty and of a
guided discretion statute).
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jurisprudence, including Justice Scalia's proposal that the individualized
sentencing requirement be jettisoned from the Court's death penalty scheme.
While Justice Scalia's proposal has the benefit of being evenhanded, none of
the proposals for fixing the scheme results in a system that is both fair and
evenhanded. Even if the Court were to adopt Justice Scalia's view that man-
datory death sentences are the only fair sentences, the present foundation for
such a scheme still allows for arbitrariness through the use of vague statuto-
ry aggravating factors, nonstatutory aggravating factors, and victim impact
statements. While a true mandatory scheme might eliminate most of those
problems, such a harsh system has several historical problems. Perhaps the
lesson to be learned, therefore, is the same one learned by Justices
Blackmun and Powell after many years: The death penalty cannot be applied
in a fair, evenhanded, and constitutional manner.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF GUIDED DISCRETION AND
INDIVIDUALIZED SENTENCING IN CAPITAL CASES
[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sen-
tence of imprisonment, however long .... Because of that
qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in
the need for reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment in a specific case.'
A. The Constitutionality of Various Death Penalty Schemes
The modem era of death penalty jurisprudence began in 1972,'9 al-
though some background information prior to that is informative. In 1791,
when the Eighth Amendment was adopted, all of the states followed the
common law practice of making death the mandatory sentence for certain
offenses.2" A narrowing of the group of murderers sentenced to death oc-
curred in 1794, when Pennsylvania abolished the death penalty for all
crimes except "murder of first degree," that is, premeditated killing, for
which the death penalty was mandatory.2" Although other states followed
Pennsylvania's lead, the degree system did not work well in Pennsylvania,
and the distinction between degrees of murder in that state practically disap-
peared.22
' Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (plurality opinion).
'9 See Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
20 See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 289 (citing H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMER-
ICA 5-6, 15, 27-28 (rev. ed. 1967)).
21 See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 198 (1971) (citing 1794 Pa. Laws
1777).
' See id.
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One problem with the mandatory death penalty was that juries, fearful
that guilty but sympathetic defendants would be put to death, often would
ignore the law and find such defendants not guilty. As the Supreme Court
has noted, "[A]t least since the Revolution, American jurors have, with
some regularity, disregarded their oaths and refused to convict defendants
where a death sentence was the automatic consequence of a guilty ver-
dict., 23 To address this problem, Tennessee, during the 1837-38 legislative
session, became the first state to give juries sentencing discretion in capital
cases once they found a defendant guilty of murder.' Other states and the
federal government followed Tennessee's lead.25 On January 15, 1897,
Congress passed an act that gave capital juries discretion to qualify a guilty
verdict by adding "without capital punishment" to the verdict.26 By 1963,
every state that allowed juries to impose a sentence of death also gave the
juries discretion to give mercy to a defendant convicted of a capital
crime.'
In the middle of the twentieth century, however, states began abandon-
ing the use of the death penalty. Executions in the United 'States "declined
from a highpoint of 199 in 1935" to two in 1967.28 Part of this decline re-
sulted from an increasing reluctance of judges and juries to impose death
sentences, 29 but another reason was that courts became more willing to re-
view capital cases, resulting in increased pressure on the United States Su-
preme Court to address the constitutionality of the death penalty.3" Also,
because of a growing concern about the unfairness of the application of the
death penalty, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund ("Fund") mounted a direct
judicial assault on capital punishment in 1966.31
Up to this point, the Supreme Court never had directly addressed the
constitutionality of the death penalty, although it had upheld a sentence of
public execution by shooting in Wilkerson v. Utah32 in 1879, and it unani-
2 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 293.
2 See McGautha, 402 U.S. at 199-200.
5 See id. at 200.
26 See Act of Jan. 15, 1897, ch. 29, § 1, 29 Stat. 487 (1897).
27 See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY 217 (1994). In fact, in 1949, the Court
stated:
The belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal category calls for
an identical punishment without regard to the past life and habits of a particular
offender. This whole country has traveled far from the period in which the death
sentence was an automatic and commonplace result of convictions ....
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
28 WILLIAM J. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA,
1864-1982, at 25-26 (1984).
29 See id. at 15.
30 See id. at 16.
See id.
32 99 U.S. 130 (1879).
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mously had upheld electrocution as a method of execution in In re
Kemmler33 in 1890. The Court addressed the question of jury discretion in
1899 when it reversed a murder conviction because the trial judge limited
the jury's discretion by instructing that the jury should not recommend mer-
cy unless it found mitigating circumstances. 34 In the late 1960s, however,
the Fund began broad attacks on death penalty issues on various constitu-
tional grounds.35
The Court finally addressed the constitutionality of the capital punish-
ment system in McGautha v. California.6 The Court, like all of the lower
courts that had addressed the issue regarding jury discretion, 37 rejected the
defendants' claim that the Fourteenth Amendment is violated by the absence
of standards to guide the jury's discretion in determining whether to impose
the death penalty.38 The Court held that due process does not require states
to hold separate proceedings in capital cases to determine guilt and punish-
ment or to provide sentencing standards to capital juries.39 Writing for the
Court, Justice Harlan stated, "To identify before the fact those characteristics
of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty,
and to express these characteristics in language which can be fairly under-
stood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are
beyond present human ability."4
After McGautha, the Fund brought a number of other cases and argued
that death sentences were cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment
because of the arbitrary and discriminatory manner in which the death pen-
alty was imposed.4' Then, in 1972 in Furman v. Georgia42a five-to-four
decision that contained nine separate opinions and that was the Court's lon-
gest decision ever 43-the Court held that the imposition of the death penal-
ty in the three cases before it constituted "cruel and unusual punishment in
3 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
34 See Winston v. United States, 172 U.S. 303, 313 (1899).
"' See BOWERS, supra note 28, at 17; see also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238
(1969) (raising the issue that imposing the death penalty for the crime of robbery violat-
ed the Eighth Amendment, but remanding the case on other grounds); Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (holding that the blanket exclusion of potential jurors who
were opposed to the death penalty violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
36 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
37 See id. at 203.
3 See id. at 196.
3 See id. at 221.
40 Id. at 204.
41 See BOWERS, supra note 28, at 18.
42 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
43 See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SU-
PREME COURT 260 (1981) ("The nine separate opinions totaled 50,000 words, 243 pag-
es-the longest decision in the Court's history.").
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violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."" Along with Justices
Brennan and Marshall, who both concluded that the death penalty per se
violates the Constitution,45 the three other Justices in the majority wrote
opinions finding capital punishment unconstitutional as it was being admin-
istered in America. Justice Douglas held that the system was unconstitution-
al because it allowed discrimination based on racial and other improper
reasons: "The high service rendered by the 'cruel and unusual' punishment
clause ... is to require legislatures to write penal laws that are even-handed,
nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and to require judges to see to it that general
laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopular
groups."46 Justice Stewart compared the selection of who receives a sen-
tence of death in America to being struck by lightning4 7 and reasoned that
the Eighth Amendment does not allow the death penalty "to be so wantonly
and so freakishly imposed."48 Justice White found the death penalty uncon-
stitutional because under the system at the time, the death penalty was so
infrequently imposed that it was not of substantial service to criminal jus-
tice.49
In Furman, the Court reversed the imposition of the death sentences in
the three cases before it, and entered similar orders in 120 other death pen-
alty appeals.50 In effect, the Court's decision prevented the execution of all
of the prisoners on death rows in the United States at the time.51
Because Furman did not abolish capital punishment per se, the state
legislatures responded to the decision by attempting to develop new death
penalty statutes that would pass constitutional muster. Some states respond-
ed with mandatory death penalty statutes, again making the death penalty
automatic upon the conviction of a specifically defined capital crime.52
"" Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40.
45 In Furman, Justices Brennan and Marshall both concluded that the death penalty
violates the Eighth Amendment, and throughout their terms on the bench they continued
to dissent in every subsequent case that upheld a death sentence. See id. at 305-06
(Brennan, J., concurring); id at 358-59, 360 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Brennan,
who died on July 25, 1997, continued to criticize the death penalty even after he retired
from the bench. In one of his last public appearances, he denounced the death penalty
as "barbaric and inhuman punishment that violates our Constitution." Linda Greenhouse,
William Brennan, 91, Dies; Gave Court Liberal Vision, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1997, at
B6 (quoting Justice Brennan).
416 Furman, 408 U.S. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
4- See id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
41 Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
49 See id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
50 See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDAN HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
AMERICAN AGENDA 37 (1989).
5' See id.
52 See BOWERS, supra note 28, at 174. Prior to Furman, every state had abandoned
mandatory capital sentencing procedures. See Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 71
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Other states responded by passing "guided discretion" statutes that provided
sentencing guidelines, which, for example, permitted sentencers to consider
explicit aggravating and mitigating circumstances before imposing the death
penalty.53 When legal challenges to these schemes reached the Supreme
Court in several cases in 1976, the Court struck down the mandatory
schemes54 and upheld the guided discretion statutes.55
In one of these guided discretion cases, Gregg v. Georgia,56 the plurali-
ty began by noting that any interpretation of the Eighth Amendment must
consider contemporary values because "[t]he Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society. 57 The plurality then held that the death penalty per se
does not violate the Constitution and upheld Georgia's guided discretion
statute.5" The plurality reasoned that the statute satisfied Furman's require-
ment that "discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to mini-
mize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."59 The plurality
held that Georgia's statute, which was a bifurcated system that contained
specific aggravating and mitigating circumstances for juries to consider,
provided "clear and objective standards" and gave adequate guidance to the
sentencing authority.'
The petitioner argued that Georgia's sentencing scheme still allowed
unfettered discretion by means of prosecutorial discretion, a jury's ability to
convict of a lesser included offense, and commutation by the governor.6'
The plurality, however, noted that those situations involved removing some-
one from consideration as a candidate for the death penalty, while Furman
was concerned with the decision to impose the death penalty.62
(1987).
5 See BOWERS, supra note 28, at 174.
5 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325 (1976).
' See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
56 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Powell and Stevens,
wrote the main opinion in Gregg. See id.
17 Id. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). "[T]he Clause for-
bidding 'cruel and unusual' punishments 'is not fastened to the obsolete but may ac-
quire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice."' Id. at 171
(quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910)).
5 See id. at 169.
59 Id. at 189.
60 Id. at 196-98.
61 See id. at 199.
62 See id.
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Nothing in any of our cases suggests that the decision to
afford an individual defendant mercy violates the Constitu-
tion. Furman held only that, in order to minimize the risk
that the death penalty would be imposed on a capriciously
selected group of offenders, the decision to impose it had to
be guided by standards so that the sentencing authority
would focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime
and the defendant.63
On the same day, the Court upheld other guided sentencing statutes in Jurek
v. Texas' and Proffitt v. Florida.65
In striking down North Carolina's mandatory statute in Woodson v.
North Carolina,66 the same plurality67 began by looking at the history of
mandatory death penalty statutes in this country and noted again that "[i]t is
now well established that the Eighth Amendment draws much of its mean-
ing from 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."'" The history of mandatory death penalty statutes, in-
cluding the regular practice of jury nullification under such statutes, revealed
"that the practice of sentencing to death all persons convicted of a particular
offense has been rejected as unduly harsh and unworkably rigid., 69 Further,
the extreme nature of the punishment of death requires that a sentencer
consider the defendant as a unique human being.7" The plurality thus struck
63 Id. Still, it is difficult for one to distinguish between discretion to impose a death
sentence and discretion not to impose a death sentence.
428 U.S. 262 (1976).
65 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
66 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
67 As in Gregg, the guiding opinion in Woodson was written by Justice Stewart and
joined by Justices Powell and Stevens. See id. Justices Brennan and Marshall, maintain-
ing that the death penalty is unconstitutional per se, provided the other votes to find
North Carolina's statute unconstitutional. See id.
61 Id. at 301 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
69 Id. at 293. The plurality further reasoned that mandatory statutes do not address
the arbitrariness concerns raised in Furman because mandatory statutes often will result
in juries using their unbridled discretion by means of jury nullification. See id. at 302-
03. In dissent, then Justice Rehnquist criticized the plurality's reasoning by noting that
the discretion in such a situation is no more arbitrary than the discretion in the guided
discretion statutes that the plurality voted to uphold in Gregg. See id. at 314-15
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the concern in Furman
"arose not from the perception that so many capital sentences were being imposed but
from the perception that so few were being imposed." Id. at 315 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing).
70 The Woodson plurality explained:
A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and
[Vol. 6:2354
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down the mandatory statute7' and held that in capital cases "the evolving
standards of decency" of the Eighth Amendment "require[] consideration of
the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of
the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process
of inflicting the penalty of death."'72 On the same day, the Court also struck
down Louisiana's mandatory death penalty statute in Roberts v. Louisi-
ana.73 The Court reaffirmed these decisions over ten years later in Sumner
v. Shuman.74
B. The Court's Attempt to Eliminate Arbitrariness and Require
Individualized Sentencing
1. Eliminating Arbitrariness and Narrowing the Group Eligible for the Death
Penalty
The Court's concern with the arbitrary use of the death penalty began, to
a large extent, with the three Justices in Furman who voted to strike down
the statutes, not because the death penalty was per se unconstitutional, but
because of the unfairness of the penalty in practice. Justice Douglas, for
example, did not argue that the defendants before the Court did not deserve
the death penalty. Instead, his concern was that the death penalty was used
unfairly on minorities and the poor.75 Similarly, Justice Stewart was con-
cerned that being selected for execution was analogous to being struck by
lightning.76
record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense
excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possi-
bility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties
of humankind. It treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not as
uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated
mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.
Id. at 304.
71 See id. at 305.
2 d. at 304. The foundation for this requirement of individualized sentencing in
capital cases, the plurality reasoned, is "that the penalty of death is qualitatively differ-
ent from a sentence of imprisonment, however long .... Because of that qualitative
difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determi-
nation that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." Id. at 305.
428 U.S. 325 (1976).
7 483 U.S. 66 (1987) (holding that a mandatory death. sentence for a prison inmate
who was convicted of murder while serving a life sentence without possibility of parole
violated the Constitution).
"' See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
76 See id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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The principles of Gregg and Woodson were elaborated in later cases.
Following Gregg, in Godfrey v. Georgia," the Court struck down an appli-
cation of Georgia's death penalty statute because the state court did not give
an adequate limiting instruction to the aggravating circumstance that the
offense "was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it
involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the vic-
tim."" The plurality quoted Justice White's concurring opinion in Furman
by stating that "[a] capital sentencing scheme must, in short, provide a'meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is
imposed from the many cases .in which it is not."' 79 The plurality explained
that a state "must channel the sentencer's discretion by 'clear and objective
standards' that provide 'specific and detailed guidance,' and that 'make
rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death."'' 0
Thus, Gregg and Godfrey established the role of aggravating circumstances
as providing clear standards for determining who may receive a death sen-
tence. If those standards are vague, as they were in Godfrey,"1 they are un-
constitutional.
In several other cases, the Court has stressed its concern that "the death
penalty is not meted out arbitrarily or capriciously." 2 The Court also has
stressed that "unbridled discretion" violates the Constitution, 3 and that
states "must administer [the death] penalty in a way that can rationally dis-
tinguish between those individuals for whom death is an appropriate sanc-
tion and those for whom it is not."' The Court also has asserted that
"death penalty statutes [must] be structured so as to prevent the penalty
from being administered in an arbitrary and unpredictable fashion.""
Although the Court has emphasized its concern with arbitrariness in
several cases, the Court has retreated from this concern in practice. With
respect to aggravating circumstances, the Court most recently has stressed
" 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
78 Id. at 422 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(7) (1978)).
Id. at 427-28 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (quoting
Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring))).
Io d. at 428 (citations omitted).
81 See id. at 428-29.
82 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 999 (1983).
83 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 326 (1989).
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 (1984).
85 California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987). The Court has stressed this con-
cern in several cases. See, e.g., Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 374 (1988) (holding
that unclear jury instructions, which may have precluded sentencers from considering
mitigating factors and resulted in arbitrariness, qualified the case to be remanded for
sentencing); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) (holding that any mitigat-
ing factor must be given some weight in consideration of a death sentence because "a
consistency produced by ignoring individual differences is a false consistency").
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the "narrowing" aspect of aggravating circumstances. 6 In other words, as
long as not all defendants convicted of murder do not receive death sentenc-
es, a statutory scheme probably is constitutional. Similarly, in Pulley v.
Harris,87 the Court displayed less concern with arbitrariness by holding
that, in capital cases, state courts are not constitutionally required to com-
pare the sentences awarded to similarly situated defendants.8 8 The Court,
however, did indicate that proportionality review might be required if a
capital sentencing scheme did not have other constitutional safeguards.89
In Zant v. Stephens,' the Court emphasized that the purpose behind the
use of aggravating circumstances was only to narrow the group of those
eligible for the death penalty. In that case, the Court upheld a death sentence
that was based upon two valid aggravating factors and one unconstitutional-
ly vague aggravating factor.9 Under Georgia's capital statute, once a valid
aggravating factor was found, the jury had complete discretion to consider
other factors in deciding whether to impose the death sentence.92 The Court
noted that, under Georgia's statute, finding an aggravating factor "does not
play any role in guiding the sentencing body in the exercise of its discretion,
apart from its function of narrowing the class of persons convicted of mur-
der who are eligible for the death penalty."9 3 In dissent, Justice Marshall
86 See, e.g., Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2635 (1994) (holding that
California's death penalty special circumstances, which required sentencers to consider
the circumstances of the crime, the defendant's prior criminal activity, and the
defendant's age at the time of the crime, were not unconstitutionally vague). In
Tuilaepa, the Court stated:
As we have explained, the aggravating circumstance must meet two require-
ments. First, the circumstance may not apply to every defendant convicted of a
murder; it must apply only to a subclass of defendants convicted of murder ....
Second, the aggravating circumstance may- not be unconstitutionally vague.
Id.
465 U.S. 37 (1984).
88 See id. at 50-51.
89 See id. at 51-54.
462 U.S. 862 (1983).
91 See id. at 890-91.
2 See id. at 878-80.
9' Id. at 874. Zant involved a state with a "nonweighing" statute. In "nonweighing"
states, the sentencer must find statutory aggravating circumstances but does not have to
balance these specific factors against mitigating factors. See, e.g., id. at 870-72. Some
states, however, have a capital sentencing statute that requires the sentencer to "weigh"
the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances together. Under such a
weighing statute, nonstatutory aggravating factors and vague aggravating factors cannot
be weighed in the sentencing decision. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 754
(1990) (holding that when sentencing error occurs in weighing states, the appellate court
must reweigh or perform a harmless-error analysis); see also Stephen Hornbuckle, Note,
Capital Sentencing Procedure: A Lethal Oddity in the Supreme Court's Case Law, 73
TEX. L. REV. 441, 447-50 (1994) (discussing the weighing/non-weighing distinction).
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called the decision a return to unfettered discretion.94
In Lowenfield v. Phelps,95 a Louisiana petitioner argued that his death
sentence should be reversed because the sole aggravating factor was identi-
cal to an element of capital murder that "the offender knowingly created a
risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person. 9 6 The Court
affirmed the death sentence because a constitutionally sufficient narrowing
was accomplished at the guilt phase of the trial. 7 Thus, as long as the nar-
rowing occurred at some point in the process, the aggravating factors, in
effect, were irrelevant.
Some commentators have noted that the Court, by embracing the nar-
rowing function of aggravating factors, has abandoned its concern with
whether such factors "channel" or guide the sentencer's discretion.98 As
discussed below, this overall trend of the Court to focus on narrowing in-
stead of on arbitrariness is consistent with the Court's progression toward a
more arbitrary death penalty.
2. The Individualized Sentencing Requirement
In several cases, the Court followed Woodson by reaffirming the impor-
tance of mitigating factors. In Roberts v. Louisiana,99 the Court held that
the crime of intentional murder of a police officer could not result in a
mandatory death sentence, and in Sumner v. Shuman,"° the Court held that
a mandatory death sentence for a murder committed by an inmate serving a
life sentence was unconstitutional.
Mr. Hornbuckle notes that of the 36 jurisdictions with the death penalty, 21 are
weighing states. See id. at 448 n.38. He includes Arizona as a nonweighing state, see id.
at 447 n.35, but courts have held that Arizona actually is a weighing state. See, e.g.,
Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 47 (1992) ("Read most naturally, [the Arizona death
penalty sentencing statute] requires the sentencer to weigh aggravating and mitigating
circumstances-to determine the relative 'substan[ce]' of the two kinds of factors.").
" See Zant, 462 U.S. at 910 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Once a threshold finding is
made, "the jurors can be left completely at large, with nothing to guide them but their
whims and prejudices.... Their sentencing decision is to be the product of their dis-
cretion and of nothing else." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
9' 484 U.S. 231 (1988).
Id. at 243 (quoting LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(d) (West 1984)).
7 See id. at 246.
98 See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflec-
tions on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 355, 384 (1995). "The Supreme Court has emphatically disclaimed any separate
requirement to channel discretion apart from the requirement that states narrow the class
of death-eligible offenders." Id. at 379.
428 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1976).
483 U.S. 66, 78 (1987).
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The principles of Woodson were further elaborated upon in Lockett v.
Ohio,' in which the Court found Ohio's death penalty statute unconstitu-
tional because it limited the mitigating factors that sentencers could con-
sider. In Lockett, the plurality stressed that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments require individualized consideration of mitigating factors." 2
The sentencer must "not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating fac-
tor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circum-
stances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence
less than death."'0 3 Similarly, in Eddings v. Oklahoma," the Court
struck down a death sentence stemming from a situation in which the judge
thought that he could not give mitigating weight to a defendant's troubled
youth.0 5  "[T]he rule in Lockett recognizes that 'jus-
tice ... requires ... that there be taken into account the circumstances of
the offense together with the character and propensities of the offend-er.,,,l106
Legislatures thus cannot limit the mitigating factors that a sentencer can
consider. As discussed below, however, the present scheme of sentencing
factors has progressed toward a limit on mitigating factors and a mandatory
death penalty system.
C. The Emergence of a New Jurisprudence
Throughout these capital cases runs the underlying theme that "there is a
significant constitutional difference between the death penalty and lesser
punishments."'0 7 These early cases of modern death penalty jurisprudence
thus established two important constitutional principles for capital cases: (1)
the sentencing authority must be given clear and objective standards to de-
0 438 U.S. 586, 608-09 (1978); see also Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1
(1986) (holding that the exclusion of evidence that a defendant had adjusted well to
incarceration violated Lockett).
102 See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 606.
103 Id. at 604. In Lockett, the plurality left open the possibility that a rare capital case
may arise in which mitigating factors would need not be considered, such as the case of
a prisoner who commits a murder while serving a life sentence. See id. at 604 n.11. The
Court, however, later held that even in such a situation, mitigating factors must be con-
sidered. See Sumner, 483 U.S. at 76.
104 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
o See id. at 112-13.
116 Id. at 112 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937)) (omissions in
original). The Court added that "[b]y holding that the sentencer in capital cases must be
permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor, the rule in Lockett recognizes that a
consistency produced by ignoring individual differences is a false consistency." Id.
107 Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
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termine who is eligible for the death penalty and to narrow that group;"
and (2) the sentencer must be able to consider, as mitigating factors, all
aspects of a defendant's character and record as well as the circumstances of
the offense."°
These two principles, channeled discretion and individualized sentenc-
ing, have been criticized as being incompatible."0 The main problem,
however, is that, in its attempts to follow both principles while reacting to
perhaps unanticipated legislative responses, the Court has retreated from
both principles. Thus, as discussed throughout this Article, the Court has
created a system that has the paradoxical problems of a constitutional sen-
tencing scheme that is somehow both mandatory and arbitrary.
II. THE PROGRESSION TOWARD AN ARBITRARY DEATH PENALTY
There is... no Fundamental, but that every Supre[me] Pow-
er must be Arbitrary."'
Of course, all first-degree murders are horrible. Yet, because the Court
has rejected a mandatory death penalty scheme, the Court has attempted to
develop a fair system for evaluating each first-degree murder and defendant
to determine which defendants receive the death penalty and which ones
receive life in prison.
108 See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990).
109 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305-06 (1987) (summarizing the
extent of discretion allowed in death penalty cases). In McCleskey, the Court stated:
In sum, our decisions since Furman have identified a constitutionally permis-
sible range of discretion in imposing the death penalty. First, there is a required
threshold below which the death penalty cannot be imposed. In this context, the
State must establish rational criteria that narrow the decisionmaker's judgment as
to whether the circumstances of a particular defendant's case meet the threshold.
Moreover, a societal consensus that the death penalty is disproportionate to a
particular offense prevents a State from imposing the death penalty for that of-
fense. Second, States cannot limit the sentencer's consideration of any relevant
circumstance that could cause it to decline to impose the penalty. In this respect,
the State cannot channel the sentencer's discretion, but must allow it to consider
any relevant information offered by the defendant.
Id.
"' See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144 (1994) (mem.) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 657-66 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also
Markus Dirk Dubber, Regulating the Tender Heart When the Axe is Ready to Strike, 41
BUFF. L. REv. 85, 98 (1993) (discussing the tension between the two principles).
"I GEORGE SAVILE, MARQUESS OF HALIFAX, Political Thoughts and Reflections, in
THE COMPLETE WORKS OF GEORGE SAVILE, MARQUESS OF HALIFAX 214 (Walter Ra-
leigh ed., 1912).
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As noted above, in Godfrey, the plurality stated that under the Eighth
Amendment, "[a] capital sentencing scheme must ... provide a 'meaningful
basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed
from the many cases in which it is not. ' ' 2 Since Godfrey and the
Furman/Gregg line of cases, in which the Court clearly was concerned
about the arbitrary use of the death penalty, the Court has retreated from
this concern. After initially appearing to strictly regulate the use of capital
punishment, the Court has withdrawn from its early statements in this area
and has permitted a growing arbitrariness that appears inconsistent with the
fundamental concerns of Gregg and Furman. In short, the Court no longer
seems concerned with whether the determination of who receives the death
penalty parallels getting struck by lightning. This trend is illustrated by the
Court's increasing tolerance of vague statutory aggravating factors and
open-ended nonstatutory aggravating factors, including victim impact state-
ments.
Several of the Justices have noted continuing problems with arbitrariness
in the present capital punishment scheme. Justice Blackmun, who voted to
uphold the death penalty in both Furman and Gregg, eventually concluded
that the arbitrariness in imposing the death penalty could not be fixed and
that, therefore, the death penalty was unconstitutional." 3 As discussed be-
low, Justice Scalia agreed with Justice Blackmun's conclusion about arbi-
trariness, but not about the cure.
A. Unlimited Mitigating Circumstances Create an Unlimited Number of
Variables
In a concurring opinion in Walton v. Arizona,"4 Justice Scalia con-
cluded that the two underlying principles of modem death penalty jurispru-
dence-guided discretion and individualized sentencing-are incompati-
ble."5 While accepting the concerns of Furman, Justice Scalia rejected the
holdings of Woodson and Lockett that provided for individualized sentencing
by requiring that the defendant be allowed to introduce any mitigating evi-
dence."6 He noted that the mitigation requirement "quite obviously de-
112 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-28 (1980) (quoting Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring)); accord Lewis, 497 U.S. at 774. The
Court repeatedly has stressed that the states must narrow the class of defendants eligible
for the death penalty in a Way that "reasonably justifies] the imposition of a more
severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." Zant v.
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862; 877 (1983).
113 See Callins, 510 U.S. at 1143 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from the denial of the
petition for writ of certiorari).
114 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
's See id. at 656 (Scalia, J., concurring).
116 See id. at 671-73. Justice Scalia noted his concern about whether even Furman
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stroys whatever rationality and predictability the [requirement that states
channel the sentencer's discretion with clear and objective standards] was
designed to achieve."'' 7 Thus, he concluded that "[t]he mandatory imposi-
tion of death-without sentencing discretion-for a crime which States have
traditionally punished with death cannot possibly violate the Eighth Amend-
ment... 8  He announced he would no longer follow Lockett and
Woodson."9 Although Justice Scalia's position is far from commanding a
majority of the Court, Justice Thomas has expressed similar concerns."
As discussed above, although the Court has explained the importance of
prohibiting courts from limiting mitigating factors, Justice Scalia is correct
that the requirement of unlimited mitigating factors does allow a great deal
of sentencing discretion.' As the Court has noted in the context of the
was mandated by the Eighth Amendment, but concluded that he was
willing to adhere to the precedent established by [the] Furman line of cases, and
to hold that when a State adopts capital punishment for a given crime but does
not make it mandatory, the Eighth Amendment bars it from giving the sentencer
unfettered discretion to select the recipients, but requires it to establish in ad-
vance, and convey to the sentencer, a governing standard.
Id. at 671 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988);
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980)).
"" Id. at 664-65 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Stevens responded to Justice Scalia's
argument by analogizing a state's homicide law to a pyramid with the homicides toward
the top being the most serious. See id. at 716-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
A rule that forbids unguided discretion at the base is completely consistent with
one that requires discretion at the apex. After narrowing the class of cases to
those at the tip of the pyramid, it is then appropriate to allow the sentencer discre-
tion to show mercy based on individual mitigating circumstances in the cases that
remain.
Id. at 718 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In other words, Justice Stevens reasoned that the use
of aggravating circumstances serves the constitutional function of narrowing the group
of defendants eligible for the death penalty. Once that process is complete, discretion is
not prohibited.
1Id. at 671 (Scalia, J., concurring).
"9 See id. at 673 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 493-500 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).
1 The difficulty with Justice Scalia's position, however, is that the discretion that is
given to the sentencing authority is not limited to the fact that a defendant must be able
to present unlimited mitigating factors. In fact, in several decisions since Walton, Justice
Scalia's vote has been inconsistent with his opinion in Walton. Although he has main-
tained that mitigating factors are not constitutionally necessary, Justice Scalia has voted
to allow consideration of vague aggravating factors and victim impact statements. In
voting that the Eighth Amendment does not bar consideration of victim impact state-
ments, Justice Scalia noted that even if the Court were to abandon the requirement that
all relevant mitigating evidence be admitted, he still would vote to allow the use of
victim impact evidence. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 833 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
[Vol. 6:2
ARBITRARY AND MANDATORY CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
issue of racial discrimination in capital sentencing, "Of course, 'the power to
be lenient [also] is the power to discriminate."''
B. Overbroad and Vague Aggravating Factors
Another area of arbitrariness in today's death penalty scheme is the use
of vague and broad aggravating circumstances to determine whether an
individual should receive a death sentence. The Court has stated that not
only must aggravating factors "genuinely narrow the class of persons eligi-
ble for the death penalty," 23 they must furnish "'clear and objective
standards' that provide 'specific and detailed guidance."' The Court has
held that aggravating factors cannot be vague, although when a statutory
aggravating factor is facially vague, the state courts may determine a consti-
tutional interpretation and apply it in individual cases. 25 Since the Court's
attempt in Godfrey to uphold the tenets of Gregg by requiring that a
sentencer's discretion be guided with "clear and objective standards,""
the Court gradually has retreated from this position by tolerating more
vagueness than it has in the past. This tendency is best illustrated by the
Court's growing tolerance of the much-criticized variations of the "heinous,
atrocious, or cruel" aggravating factor and the "future danger" aggravating
factor.
122 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987) (quoting KENNETH C. DAVIS,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 170 (1973)) (alteration in original).
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
124 Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990) (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.
420, 428 (1980)).
125 See Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976). In
addition to the Eighth Amendment problems with vague aggravating circumstances,
there is a possible Fourteenth Amendment due process problem because prior to the
crime, vague aggravating factors may not give adequate notice to the defendant that
they may be used. See Coleman v. McCormick, 874 F.2d 1280, 1286-88 (9th Cir.) (en
banc) (holding that defense counsel needs to be aware of the aspects of the crime that
are being used as aggravating circumstances to support the death sentence in order to
have a meaningful opportunity to refute them at trial), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944
(1989); see also Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110 (1991) (holding that due process was
violated when defense counsel did not have adequate notice that the judge might sen-
tence the defendant to death); cf Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (not
directly addressing the issue, but containing the State's argument that the purpose of
aggravating circumstances is to guide the discretion of the sentencer, not to give notice,
and that adequate notice is given by the homicide statute itself).
126 Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428; see also Lewis, 497 U.S. at 774 (using the Godfrey
analysis to evaluate sentencer discretion); Zant, 462 U.S. at 878 n.16 (analyzing aggra-
vating circumstances in Godfrey).
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1. Heinous, Atrocious, or Cruel Aggravating Factor
Most states with the death penalty require sentencers to consider the
aggravating factor, or a variation thereof, that the murder was committed in
an "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" manner.'27 Although in Gregg
and Proffitt the Court initially was satisfied that Georgia and Florida, re-
spectively, were applying the "heinousness" factor constitutionally," the
Court noted in both of those cases that the factor potentially was unconstitu-
tionally arbitrary."9
In order for the jury's sentencing discretion to be constitutional, it must
be guided in such a way that the jurors are not given unfettered discre-
tion. '3 In Godfrey, the Court found that the aggravating factor that the of-
fense "was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it
involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the vic-
tim, '  without further definition, was unconstitutionally vague."' Simi-
larly, in Maynard v. Cartwright,' the Court unanimously found that
Oklahoma's application of its "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggra-
vating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague."M Although a vague ag-
gravating factor may be made constitutional by a clarifying court defini-
tion,"'35 the Court found that the Oklahoma circumstance remained vague
127 See infra note 348 (listing statutes that contain this aggravating circumstance).
See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 201 (noting that Georgia had limited the factor to "horri-
fying torture murder"); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255 (noting that Florida had limited the
factor to "the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the
victim"). The Court in Proffitt, in upholding the death sentence, also noted that the
Florida Supreme Court had reviewed the decision by conducting a proportionality re-
view-comparing the circumstances of the case with other capital cases. See id. at 259.
129 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 201; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255-56.
130 The Court upheld Florida's "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating factor in
Proffitt during the same term it decided Gregg and Woodson. Significant is the fact that
in Proffitt, the Court held, as it had in Gregg with respect to Georgia's heinousness fac-
tor, that the "initial approval [of Florida's factor] was tentative, contingent upon the
state courts' adopting constructions narrowing the broad language, and, presumably,
contingent upon the state courts' ability to communicate that narrowing construction to
capital sentencers in individual cases." Michael Mello & Nell Joslin Medlin, Espinosa
v. Florida: Constitutional Hurricane, Lambent Breeze, or Idiot Wind?, 22 STETSON L.
REV. 907, 934 (1993).
131 GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(7) (1978) (current version at GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-10-30(b)(7) (1997)).
132 Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 432-33; see also Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 1081
(1992) (holding Florida's factor too vague); Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1, 2 (1990)
(reaching the same result with the Mississippi statute); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.
639, 654 (1990) (finding Arizona's version of the same factor unconstitutionally vague).
133 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
134 Id. at 360.
131 See Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198.
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despite the trial court's attempt to define it, in part, as "extremely wicked"
or "pitiless, or designed to inflict a high degree of pain, utter indifference to,
or enjoyment of, the sufferings of others."'" In Maynard, the Court reas-
serted that "[s]ince Furman, our cases have insisted that the channeling and
limiting of the sentencer's discretion in imposing the death penalty is a
fundamental constitutional requirement for sufficiently minimizing the risk
of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."'37
In other more recent cases, however, the Court has upheld applications
of the heinousness factor. In 1990, in Walton v. Arizona," the Court held
that Arizona's "'especially heinous, cruel or depraved' aggravating factor"
was unconstitutionally vague.139 The Court, however, held that a limiting
construction given to the aggravating factor by the Arizona courts provided
sufficient guidance. 40 Although the Arizona Supreme Court's construction,
which the United States Supreme Court approved, explained the vague terms
to a degree, the terms of the definitions-including phrases such as "relish-
ing of the murder," "gratuitous violence," and "senselessness of the mur-
ders"..4 -remain open to broad interpretation. Further, the Arizona courts
have not consistently followed the approved definitions, reasoning that the
approved narrowing definitions are not exclusive and that new ones may be
added by the courts. 42 Finally, since the decision in Walton, the state
courts and the lower federal courts have tolerated broad applications of
136 Maynard, 486 U.S. at 361-64; see Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1488
(10th Cir. 1987) (quoting the jury instructions given on the aggravating circumstance),
aff'd, 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
137 Maynard, 486 U.S. at 362.
138 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
139 Id. at 654 (quoting ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(6) (1989)) (current ver-
sion at ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(6) (West Supp. 1997)).
140 See id. at 652-55; see also Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 47 (1992) (summa-
rizing the evaluation of the Arizona statute in Walton); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764,
777-78 (1990) (defending reliance on Walton in a later case). The limiting construction
was given to the "heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravating circumstance, ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(6) (West Supp. 1997), by the Arizona Supreme Court in 1983
in State v. Gretzler, 659 P.2d 1 (Ariz. 1983). The Arizona courts interpreted "cruel" to
mean that the victim consciously suffered physical pain or mental distress. See, e.g.,
State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 800 P.2d 1260, 1285 (Ariz. 1990). In Gretzler, the Arizona Su-
preme Court explained the factors that constitute "heinous and depraved": "The factors
are: (1) whether the killer relished the murder; (2) whether the killer inflicted gratuitous
violence on the victim beyond that necessary to kill; (3) whether the killer needlessly
mutilated the victim; (4) whether the crime was senseless; and (5).whether the victim
was helpless." State v. Detrich, 932 P.2d 1328, 1339 (Ariz. 1997) (citing Gretzler, 659
P.2d at 10-11).
141 Gretzler, 659 P.2d at 11.
142 See, e.g., State v. Milke, 865 P.2d 779, 787 (Ariz. 1993) (holding that the murder
of a child by his parent was heinous and depraved).
1998] 365
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Arizona's "heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravating factor that occurred
prior to the creation of the narrowing construction approved in Walton.14 3
In 1993, the Court further retreated from its early concerns about arbi-
trariness by upholding a definition that was extremely similar to other defi-
nitions the Court previously had found unconstitutionally vague. Arave v.
Creech'" involved Idaho's aggravating factor that "[b]y the murder, or cir-
cumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited utter disre-
gard for human life."'45 The Idaho Supreme Court applied a limiting in-
struction that required a showing of "the highest, the utmost, callous disre-
gard for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded, pitiless slayer." '46 The United
States Supreme Court held that the narrowing construction of the factor was
constitutional.'47 The Court noted that although "pitiless" alone may not
sufficiently narrow the factor, the term "cold-blooded" did provide sufficient
narrowing.' The Court reasoned that "cold-blooded" means "emotionless"
and that some first-degree murderers do exhibit feelings, such as anger;
therefore, the aggravating factor was sufficiently narrow.'49
143 The inconsistency of the opinions of the United States Supreme Court regarding
vague aggravating factors is illustrated by several cases in Arizona. Although the Court
has upheld the post-1983 application of Arizona's section 13-703(F)(6) aggravating
factor, the Arizona courts had given contradictory opinions regarding the constitution-
ality of the aggravating circumstance prior to the 1983 Gretzler opinion.
In 1994, the Arizona Supreme Court stated that the (F)(6) factor "had not yet been
adequately narrowed .... until State v. Gretzler." State v. Richmond, 886 P.2d 1329,
1332 n.1 (Ariz. 1994); see Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 52 (1992) (concluding that
Arizona's "especially heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravating factor was unconstitution-
ally vague in 1980). Less than one and one-half years later, however, the Arizona Su-
preme Court in State v. Mata held that the aggravating factor was narrowed prior to
Gretzler, although the court did not say when it was narrowed. In Mata, the court relied
mainly upon post-Gretzler cases-decided after 1983-in its finding that the statute was
sufficiently narrowed when the defendant was sentenced in 1978. See State v. Mata,
916 P.2d 1035, 1038-45 (Ariz. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 20 (1996).
Further, the confusion regarding the (F)(6) factor is not limited to the state courts.
As one Arizona Supreme Court justice noted, the issue "is hardly one about which there
has been agreement from the federal bench." Id. at 1056 (Zlaket, J., dissenting in part);
see, e.g., Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 1246, 1248-49 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding pre-
Gretzler applications of Arizona's "heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravating factor). The
confusion in Arizona is representative of the problems associated with defining vague
terms with other broad terms.
'- 507 U.S. 463 (1993).
145 IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(h)(6) (1997).
146 Creech, 507 U.S. at 468 (quoting State v. Osborn, 631 P.2d 187, 200 (Idaho
1981)).
147 See id. at 475-76.
148 See id.
149 See id. at 476.
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One may wonder why "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer""15 supplies suffi-
cient constitutional narrowing while "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated
battery to the victim"'' does not. Similarly, in Arizona, it is unclear how"senselessness of the murders"'52 provides a constitutional narrowing.
In earlier cases, the Supreme Court seemed more concerned about giving
proper guidance to juries to ensure that the application of an aggravating
factor provided clear guidelines. The Court was concerned about vague
aggravating factors because they could lead to the arbitrary infliction of the
death penalty. Arave, however, illustrates a shift in the Court's concern.153
The Court practically has abandoned its attempts to eliminate arbitrariness
and instead only requires that an aggravating factor potentially eliminate
some first-degree murderers.
The "heinous, cruel, or depraved" aggravating factor has been applied
broadly. For example, courts have found the aggravating factor present both
where the victim died slowly 4-- because the victim suffered-and where
the defendant used excessive force in killing the victim quickly.'55 Such
reasoning leads one to conclude that unless a defendant uses exactly the
proper amount of force to kill, then the "heinousness" aggravating factor is
satisfied.5 6 In those cases, however, the aggravating factor often is found
11o Id. at 468.
5 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 422-32 (1980).
152 State v. Gretzler, 659 P.2d 1, 11 (Ariz. 1983).
153 In 1992, however, the Supreme Court concluded that Florida's heinousness aggra-
vating factor was facially vague and that the state's jury instruction on heinousness
("especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" means "especially wicked, evil, atrocious or
cruel") was unconstitutionally vague. Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 1080-81
(1992) (per curiam) (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(h) (West Supp. 1997)).
154 See Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Sufficiency of Evidence, For Purposes of
Death Penalty, To Establish Statutory Aggravating Circumstance that Murder was Hei-
nous, Cruel, Deprave4 or the Like-Post-Gregg Cases, 63 A.L.R.4th 478, 597-614
(1988).
s5 See id. at 502-75.
156 As one state supreme court chief justice noted:
One becomes death eligible if, hand trembling because of fear, mental illness, or
drug use, one fails to aim accurately or kill with the first blow and the victim
fortuitously suffers and dies slowly. [See State v. Chaney, 686 P.2d 1265, 1282
(Ariz. 1984)] (affirming death penalty in case where the defendant's gunfire did
not kill the victim instantaneously, but, instead, the victim suffered for thirty min-
utes before losing consciousness and dying). The assassin who senselessly shoots
with steady hand and kills in cold blood or uses a weapon with ruthless efficiency
and dispatch and causes immediate death does not kill cruelly and may not be
death eligible. [See State v. Johnson, 710 P.2d 1050, 1052, 1055-56 (Ariz. 1985)]
(cruelty not even considered where the defendant shot his sleeping victim, who"rapidly bled to death"). If this, too, is "real science," its logic escapes me.
State v. Salazar, 844 P.2d 566, 586 (Ariz. 1992) (Feldman, C.J., concurring).
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to be present where the victim anticipated his or her fate.'57 Such applica-
tions are consistent with common sense-because all murders are hei-
nous-but such applications are not consistent with the Eighth Amendment
objectives of eliminating arbitrariness and narrowing the group of defen-
dants eligible for the death penalty.
Other commentators have noted that the heinousness factor is so broad
that it can apply to almost every type of capital homicide. One study con-
cluded that Florida's "heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravating circumstance
as applied "covers virtually every kind of first degree murder imaginable"
and that, "to the extent that [limiting principles have been developed], those
principles are inconsistently applied" by the state courts. 5' Another com-
mentator has noted the inconsistent application of Arizona's "especially
heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravating circumstance.'59 For example, in
one case the Arizona Supreme Court found "depravity" based upon the
defendant's bragging that the killing showed his "machismo,"' 60 but found.
no "depravity" in another case in which a defendant bragged that the victim"squealed like a rabbit.' 6 As the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme
Court confessed, "If there is some 'real science' to separating 'especially'
heinous, cruel, or depraved killers from 'ordinary' heinous, cruel, or de-
praved killers, it escapes me. It also has escaped the court."'62
2. Future Danger Aggravating Factor
Some jurisdictions employ another sweeping aggravating factor--one
that asks the capital sentencer to predict whether the defendant is a future
1 See Fleming, supra note 154, at 575-97.
"' Michael Mello, Florida's "Heinous, Atrocious or Cruel" Aggravating Circum-
stance: Narrowing the Class of Death-Eligible Cases Without Making' It Smaller, 13
STETSON L. REV. 523, 551 (1984).
59 See Terrill Pollman, Maynard v. Cartwright: Channeling Arizona's Use of the
Heinous, Cruel or Depraved Aggravating Circumstance to Impose the Death Penalty,
32 ARIz. L. REV. 193, 204-06 (1990).
160 State v. Martinez-Villareal, 702 P.2d 670, 680 (Ariz. 1985). See generally
Pollman, supra note 159 (comparing the heinousness provisions of Arizona and Oklaho-
ma).
161 State v. Graham, 660 P.2d 460, 463 (Ariz. 1983).
162 State v. Salazar, 844 P.2d 566, 586 (Ariz. 1992) (Feldman, C.J., concurring). For
a further discussion of the application of the "especially heinous" aggravating circum-
stance, see Richard A. Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in
Capital Cases-The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. REV. 941, 988-89 (1986) ("The
circumstance's terms are too vague, too broad, and too subjective to provide any real
guidance to a sentencer or a court.").
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danger.163 Such an aggravating factor has been upheld by the United States
Supreme Court.
In Jurek v. Texas,"M a Texas capital jury was asked to determine"whether the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that there was
a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society.' ' 165 Because the jury an-
swered "yes" to that question as well as to another sentencing question, the
judge sentenced the defendant to death. 166 The Court rejected the
defendant's argument that Texas's statutory scheme did not eliminate the"arbitrariness and caprice of the system held in Furman to violate the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments.' ' 167 With respect to the "continuing threat"
question, the Court reasoned that the jury's task in answering the question
was "basically no different from the task performed countless times each
day throughout the American system of criminal justice.' 61
Similarly, in Barefoot v. Estelle,69 the Court rejected the claim that
expert testimony on the future dangerousness of the defendant should be
excluded from capital trials, noting that "relevant, unprivileged evidence
should be admitted and its weight left to the factfinder." 7° Additionally,
the Court held that such testimony does not require an examination of the
defendant and that it may be given in the form of an answer to a hypotheti-
cal.171
At the sentencing hearing in Barefoot, the State called Doctors Holbrook
and Grigson, neither of whom had examined the defendant or had requested
to do so. Both experts testified that they were qualified to predict future
dangerousness, and that they were given a hypothetical about Barefoot's
background, which included four nonviolent prior offenses, an escape from
jail, and the events surrounding the murder for which he was on trial. 73
Dr. Holbrook testified that for the "Barefoot" in the hypothetical, there was
a probability that he would commit criminal acts of violence, and Dr.
163 See infra note 373 (listing states with "future danger" aggravating circumstances).
164 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
165 Id. at 267-68. Texas's capital sentencing statute did not contain a list of statutory
aggravating circumstances. See id. at 270; TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 37.071 (West
Supp. 1975-76). Instead, the sentencing jury was asked to answer specific statutory
questions and if their answers were "yes," then the death sentence would be imposed.
See Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269.
'6 See id2 at 268.
167 Id. at 274.
' Id. at 276.
169 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
170 Id. at 898.
17' See id. at 902-03.
'7 See id. at 917 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
3 See id. at 918 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Grigson testified that there was a "one hundred percent and absolute"
chance that "Barefoot" would commit future acts of criminal violence.174
Although the Court noted "professional doubts about the usefulness of psy-
chiatric predictions," it reasoned that in the adversary process, juries would
be able "to separate the wheat from the chaff."'75
Recently, in the context of civil proceedings, the Supreme Court af-
firmed its belief that future dangerousness may be predicted. 76 The con-
cept of predicting "future dangerousness" in capital sentencing proceedings,
however, has been criticized by judges,'77 legal commentators, 78 mental
health professionals, 179 and the American Psychiatric Association.' One
174 Id. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
175 Id. at 901 n.7.
176 In Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997), the Court upheld Kansas's Sexu-
ally Violent Predator Act, which provides for the civil commitment of people with a"mental abnormality" or "personality disorder" that are "likely to engage in predatory
acts of sexual violence." Id. at 2076 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 et seq.
(1994)).
177 See, e.g., Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); White v. Estelle,
554 F. Supp. 851, 858 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (expressing "serious reservations about the use
of psychiatric predictions based on hypotheticals"); People v. Murtishaw, 631 P.2d 446,
466 (Cal. 1981) (holding that the trial court erred in permitting a psycho-pharmacologist
to testify concerning a capital defendant's future conduct in prison because expert pre-
dictions of future dangerousness are unreliable and prejudicial); see also Williamson v.
Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1569-71 (E.D. Okla. 1995) (granting writ of habeas cor-
pus in a capital case in which the statutory aggravating circumstance of future danger-
ousness, without guidance on the definition of the language of the statute, was unconsti-
tutionally vague), modified on other grounds, 110 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1997).
171 See George E. Dix, Expert Prediction Testimony in Capital Sentencing: Evidentia-
ry and Constitutional Considerations, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1 (1981) (concluding that
the use of psychiatric predictions in capital sentencing proceedings presents problems of
reliability assessment for juries and violates evidentiary and constitutional standards);
William Green, Capital Punishment, Psychiatric Experts, and Predictions of Danger-
ousness, 13 CAP. U. L. REV. 533 (1984) (arguing that psychiatric predictions of future
dangerousness are unreliable because experts are not in agreement on how to define
dangerousness); Shelley Clarke, Note, A Reasoned Moral Response: Rethinking Texas's
Capital Sentencing Statute After Penry v. Lynaugh, 69 TEX. L. REv. 407 (1990) (stating
that future dangerousness is an inappropriate consideration because it rests on predicting
human behavior).
179 See, e.g., Mark David Albertson, Can Violence Be Predicted? Future dangerous-
ness: The testimony of experts in capital cases, 3 CRIM. JUST., Winter 1989, at 18, 20-
21 (noting that in a survey of several hundred practicing psychiatrists, clinical psycholo-
gists, and mental health lawyers, the mean estimate of the percentage of accurate dan-
gerousness predictions was less than half) (citing Lynn R. Kahle & Bruce D. Sales, Due
Process of Law and the Attitudes of Professionals Toward Involuntary CivilCommit-
ment, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH (Paul D. Lipsett & Bruce D.
Sales eds., 1980)).
Is In Barefoot, the American Psychiatric Association filed an amicus curiae brief
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prosecutor has noted that "[t]he clinical research on prediction of future
violence has consistently demonstrated that psychiatrists and other mental
health professionals are very poor at predicting future dangerousness." 8'
One psychologist, because of the unreliability of such predictions, proposed
an ethical ban on predictions of dangerousness by psychiatrists and psychol-
ogists in the capital sentencing context.18 2
The use of the "future danger" aggravating factor as a tool for determin-
ing who receives the death penalty is highly suspect. Jurors tend to trust
experts, and it is questionable whether they really are able to "separate the
wheat from the chaff" 3 on this issue. Even ignoring the potential unreli-
ability of testimony from mental health professionals, every first-degree
noting that "[t]he unreliability of psychiatric predictions of long-term future dangerous-
ness is by now an established fact within the profession." Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 920
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Amicus Curiae Brief for the American Psychiatric
Association at 12, Barefoot (No. 82-6080)). Justice Blackmun noted that "[t]he APA's
best estimate is that two out of three predictions of long-term future violence made by
psychiatrists are wrong." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Further, "[t]he American Psychiatric Association's Task Force on Clinical Aspects
of the Violent Individual has said that, 'the state of the art regarding predictions of
violence is very unsatisfactory. The ability of psychiatrists or any other professionals to
reliably predict future violence is unproved."' Albertson, supra, note 179, at 18-20
(citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT INDIVIDU-
AL 30 (1974)).
181 Albertson, supra note 179, at 20. "Professor John Monahan surveyed the major
studies of clinical prediction of future dangerousness and found the results to show that
psychiatrists had about a one in three chance of predicting future dangerousness correct-
ly." Id. (citing JOHN MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF
CLINICAL TECHNIQUES 1 (1981)).
..2 See Charles P. Ewing, "Dr. Death" and The Case for an Ethical Ban on Psychi-
atric and Psychological Predictions of Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing Proceed-
ings, 8 AM. J.L. & MED. 407 (1983). A psychology professor also noted the potential
ethical problem:
First, it is conceivable that the legal system might ask mental health profes-
sionals to offer such predictions [of dangerousness] even knowing that they have
no special predictive abilities or expertise. In this case, however, mental health
professionals would be ethically prohibited from offering such predictions or
assessing risk ....
Less clear, however, is whether mental health professionals are ethically pro-
scribed from engaging in such assessments and offering opinions to the courts
where mental health professionals have some predictive ability, but when such
predictions or assessments are subject to significant error, as the research suggests
is the case.
Randy K. Otto, On the Ability of Mental Health Professionals to "Predict Dangerous-
ness": A Commentary on Interpretations of the "Dangerousness" Literature, 18 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 43, 66-67 (1994).
183 Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 901 n.7.
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murder defendant reasonably could be found to be a future danger because
he has been convicted of murder.
Two specific examples highlight some of the problems with the future
danger aggravating factor. Dr. James Grigson, who was one of the experts
who testified in Barefoot, has been strongly criticized for his testimony in
Texas cases that he is "one-hundred percent" accurate in predicting future
dangerousness even where he has not examined the individuals in ques-
tion."8 Because of alleged ethics violations arising from his testimony re-
garding future dangerousness, Dr. Grigson was expelled from the American
Psychiatric Association and from the Texas Society of Psychiatric Physi-
cians in 1995.185 The expulsion, perhaps, was too late for many defen-
dants. Between 1966 and 1994, Dr. Grigson had appeared in capital cases
approximately 150 times for the state and eight times for the defense."'
By 1989, he had testified regarding the future dangerousness issue in the
cases of one-third of all Texas death row inmates. 7
The second specific example of some of the problems with predicting
future dangerousness is the case of Wilbert Evans. In March 1984, Wilbert
Evans was resentenced to death in Virginia for the shooting death of a dep-
uty sheriff.'88 At the hearing, in support of the aggravating factor of future
dangerousness,8 9 the prosecution submitted charges, which had never been
tried, that Evans had shot a man in an argument over .a card game and had
held a disciplinary committee at bay with a knife.' In response, the de-
fense presented evidence from others, including prison guards and officials,
that Evans was well-behaved, hardworking, and cooperative.1 91 After delib-
184 See Laura Beil, Groups Expel Psychiatrist Known for Murder Cases; Witness
Nicknamed "Dr. Death" Says License to Practice Won't Be Affected by Ethics Allega-
tions, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 26, 1995, at 21A.
18 See id. The American Psychiatric Association issued a statement saying that Dr.
Grigson violated the group's ethics code by "arriving at a psychiatric diagnosis without
first having examined the individuals in question, and for indicating, while testifying in
court as an expert witness, that he could predict with 100 percent certainty that the
individuals would engage in future violent acts." Id.; see also Richard H. Underwood,
"X-Spurt" Witnesses, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 343, 386 (1995) (citing Paul C.
Giannelli, "Junk Science": The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105,
114 (1993)).
186 See Bruce Vincent, Dr. Death's Demise?-Prosecutors Shun Death Penalty Ex-
pert, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 1, 1996, at 4. Dr. Grigson's record in helping prosecutors
obtain death sentences earned him the nickname, "Dr. Death." See id.
187 See id. Dr. Grigson also testified in "the notorious case of Randall Dale Adams,
whose wrongful conviction for killing a police officer in 1976 inspired the documentary
'The Thin Blue Line."' id.
18 See Stuart Taylor, Jr., We Will Kill You Anyway, AM. LAW., Dec. 1990, at 54.
'89 See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264(C) (Michie 1990).
'9o See Taylor, supra note 188, at 60-61.
191 See id.
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erations, the jury sentenced Evans to death based only upon the aggravating
circumstance of future dangerousness.192
A few months after the sentencing, however, an event occurred that
revealed that the jurors may have made an inaccurate prediction. At the
prison where Wilbert Evans was held, six other Virginia death row inmates
attempted to escape, taking hostage twelve prison guards and two female
nurses.' 93 "According to uncontested affidavits presented by guards taken
hostage during the uprising, Evans took decisive steps to calm the riot, sav-
ing the lives of several hostages, and preventing the rape of one of the nurs-
es." 194 Several guards noted that they owed their lives to Evans, who
worked to calm the situation, warning the prisoners not to hurt the hostages,
and releasing the hostages once the escapees left. 9 The courts, however,
192 See Evans v. Muncy, 498 U.S. 927, 927 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1 See id at 928 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
194 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
195 See Taylor, supra note 188, at 56-57.
Typical of the accounts appended to Evans's last appeal were these:
* A state police report quoted a nurse saying Evans had appeared and "ordered"
two prisoners to stop after they had made her strip, tied her to a bed, and begun
to assault her sexually. They stopped....
* A guard named Ricardo Holmes said in an affidavit that the ringleaders had
talked of killing him and other hostages. "Had it not been for Evans, I might not
be here today," Holmes maintained.
* Guard Harold Crutchfield said in an affidavit that Evans "was doing what he
could to aid the hostages .... It is also my firm belief that if Evans had not been
present during the escape, things may have blown up and people may have been
harmed.... Evans is a model inmate.... He poses no risk of harm to any cor-
rectional officer."
* Lieutenant Milton Crutchfield told state police, "None of us might [have] been
alive today" but for the efforts of four inmates, including Evans, who "played a
great part in our safety and release."
* A former prison food service supervisor named Edgar Brummell, who spoke to
hostages right after the escape, said in an affidavit that "Evans put his life on the
line in May 1984 when he stuck his neck out for the hostages" and that otherwise
they "probably would have been killed."
* E.B. Harris, a sergeant at Mecklenburg, wrote Governor Wilder last month that
Evans "saved some of the officers from harm and almost certain death" during
the 1984 escape, and "has shown me and the majority of the staff nothing but re-
-spect" over the years.
* Willie Lloyd Turner, a prisoner who joined Evans in protecting the hostages,
told state police that Evans had warned those seeking to escape, "There will be no
killing and there will be no raping. You have gotten what you want, now go."
Id. at 57. Evans's attorneys had substantial difficulties in obtaining corroboration of the
events that occurred during the breakout because the State blocked their attempts to
obtain the State's investigative reports. See id. Evans's lawyers finally were able to
obtain the reports from another inmate's lawyer 23 hours before Evans was executed.
See idJ
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would not consider the challenge to the future dangerousness finding based
upon evidence that arose after the sentencing. 9 6 On October 17, 1990,
Wilbert Evans died in Virginia's electric chair.19 7
There are arguments favoring the execution of Mr. Evans and disregard-
ing his actions during the escape. On the one hand, he was convicted of
murder.198 If courts were to permit consideration of post-sentence evi-
dence, executions would never occur because people continuously change.
Courts constantly would be forced to reevaluate death sentences. 9 9 On the
other hand, Wilbert Evans showed that he was condemned to death based
upon an incorrect finding by the jury that he was a future danger.
This illustration is consistent with what several mental health experts
conclude about the arbitrariness of the future danger aggravating factor. One
may ask who was right about whether Wilbert Evans constituted a future
danger-the sentencing jury or the people he saved a few months later. In
the end, perhaps they both were correct to some extent, but the disparity
illustrates the problem with predicting someone's future behavior and using
that as a basis for determining whether that person should be locked up for
the rest of his life or executed. Because "future danger" is such a broad
aggravating circumstance, society should question whether a prediction of a
defendant's "future danger" should play a role in a capital punishment sen-
tencing scheme that must avoid arbitrariness.
3. Conclusion
Although statutory aggravating factors must be well defined, in practice,
some of them have resulted in inconsistent application of the death penalty.
One commentator has claimed that "the evolution of the role of the statutory
aggravating factor has been concomitant with the creation and realization of
a tangible, viable constitutional construct for states to follow when effectuat-
ing capital punishment policy. '2 °" As discussed above, however, such a
conclusion seems contrary to practice.20'
196 See Evans, 498 U.S. at 930 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See Taylor, supra note 188, at 55-56.198 Every murder, however, cannot satisfy the "future danger" aggravating circum-
stance because then no narrowing would occur as required. See, e.g., McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305 (1987) (stating that "the State must establish rational criteria
that narrow the decisionmaker's judgment as to whether the circumstances of a particu-
lar defendant's case meet the threshold").
199 See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, Personal Identity and Punishment, 70 B.U. L. REV.
395, 396 (1990) ("Determining when someone is the same person now as a person who
existed before is a central philosophical problem.").
20 Christian D. Marr, Note, Criminal Law: An Evolutionary Analysis of the Role of
Statutory Aggravating Factors in Contemporary Death Penalty Jurisprudence-From
Furman to Blystone, 32 WASHBURN L.J. 77, 103 (1992).201 See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 98, at 373-75 (arguing that death-eligibility is
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C. Nonstatutory Aggravating Factors
The federal government2' and some states2 3 allow the sentencing
authority to consider nonstatutory aggravating factors, that is, aggravating
factors approved by the individual court in a specific case but not listed in
the jurisdiction's death penalty statute. Although at least one statutory aggra-
vating factor also must be present before a defendant may be sentenced to
death, the consideration of nonstatutory aggravating factors increases the
potential for arbitrariness in capital cases by allowing an unlimited number
of considerations to be presented to the sentencing authority.
In Barclay v. Florida,' the Court held that
[a]lthough a death sentence may not rest solely on a nonstat-
utory aggravating factor,... the Constitution does not pro-
hibit consideration at the sentencing phase of information not
directly related to either statutory aggravating or statutory
mitigating factors, as long as that information is relevant to
the character of the defendant or the circumstances of the
crime. 5
In Barclay, the Florida judge considered the defendant's criminal record a
nonstatutory aggravating factor. 6 The Supreme Court concluded that
while the consideration of that factor may have violated state law, it did not
violate the defendant's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 7
In Zant v. Stephens,"' in addressing the use of an invalid aggravating
factor, the Court noted that the use of nonstatutory aggravating factors is
broad under the current scheme because of broad aggravating factors and because the
Court has placed no limit on the number of aggravating factors). "[T]he continuing
failure of states to narrow the class of the death-eligible invites the possibility that some
defendants will receive the death penalty in circumstances in which it is not deserved
according to wider community standards . . . ." Id. at 375.
202 See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c) (1994).
203 Some states, however, are "weighing" states, and sentencers in those states may
not consider nonstatutory aggravating factors. See Hornbuckle, supra note 93 (discuss-
ing the weighing/nonweighing distinction and listing states with each type of statute).
Also, in the "weighing" states, the sentencer may not consider an invalid aggravating
factor. See Espinoza v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992); see also discussion supra note
93.
463 U.S. 939 (1983).
205 Id. at 966-67 (citation omitted).
206 See id. at 944-45.
207 See id. at 956.
208 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
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permissible to provide for individualized sentencing.2 9 The Court ex-
plained that statutory aggravating factors "play a constitutionally necessary
function"21 in determining the class of persons eligible for the death pen-
alty, "[b]ut the Constitution does not require the jury to ignore other possi-
ble aggravating factors in the process of selecting, from among that class,
those defendants who will actually be sentenced to death. '..
Since Barclay and Zant, courts have permitted sentencers to consider a
wide range of nonstatutory factors. For example, a number of courts permit
the sentencing body to weigh the "nature and circumstances of the
crime. ' The sentencer may consider an unlimited range of events under
such a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance. For example, in State v.
Clark,213 the sentencing judge wrote several pages about the particular cir-
cumstances and details surrounding the deaths of the victims in upholding
this nonstatutory aggravating circumstance.214 In State v. Manley,2"5 the
Delaware Superior Court permitted the use of several nonstatutory aggravat-
ing circumstances, including the fact that one of the defendant's motives for
committing the robbery that led to the murder was to pay a debt that he
owed to a Philadelphia gang.216 In 'Mathenia v. Delo,217 the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals upheld the jury's consideration of several nonstatutory
aggravating factors, including the fact that the defendant was a twenty-five-
year-old male and the two victims were females over seventy years old.2"
In United States v. McCullah,"9 a federal capital case, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the use of the nonstatutory
' See id. at 879.
210 Id. at 878.
211 Id.
212 See State v. Gumm, 653 N.E.2d 253, 262 (Ohio 1995) (holding that a court may
rely upon the nature and circumstances of the crime as a reason for supporting a finding
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 1275 (1996); State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 731 (Tenn. 1994) (holding
that the jury's consideration of "'the nature and circumstances of the crime,"' as al-
lowed by the state statute, was proper) (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(c)
(1997)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1114 (1995); Tamme v. Commonwealth, 759 S.W.2d 51,
54-55 (Ky. 1988) (holding that a court's consideration, in reviewing a jury's sentencing
decision, of nonstatutory aggravating factors that the "murders were heinous" and
"prompted by greed and lust" was allowed).
213 No. IN94-06-0543, 1995 Del. Super. LEXIS 25 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 1995)
(affirming a sentence of death and upholding the consideration of six nonstatutory ag-
gravating circumstances).
214 See id at *9-27.
213 No. 9511007022, 1997 Del. Super. LEXIS 5 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 1997).
216 See id. at *22, *43.
217 975 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1992).
218 See id at 451.
219 76 F.3d 1087 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1699 (1997).
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aggravating circumstance of "use of a deadly weapon."2" The court rea-
soned that because not all murders are committed with a deadly weapon,
"this factor genuinely narrows the class of defendants eligible for the death
penalty and aids in individualized sentencing."22'
Courts also have upheld the use of "lack of remorse" as a nonstatutory
aggravating circumstance.' As one court has explained, however, "[i]ack
of remorse is a subjective state of mind, difficult to gage [sic] objectively
since behavior and words don't necessarily correlate with internal feel-
ings."223 Further, "[iln a criminal context, [lack of remorse] is particularly
ambiguous since guilty persons have a constitutional right to be silent, to
rest -on a presumption of innocence and to require the government to prove
their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."'224 For example, the aggravating
factor may be misapplied if a truly remorseful defendant did not testify at
trial, but, to protect himself when placed in a threatening jail environment,
boasted to another inmate, who did testify.
Perhaps the broadest of the nonstatutory aggravating factors relating to
the offense is the factor of whether the defendant "committed the offenses
charged in the indictment," which was upheld in McCullah.22 In that case,
the court recognized that the factor allowed the jury to consider the circum-
stances surrounding the crime, including the fact that the "murder was com-
mitted in furtherance of an illegal drug operation."' The court in
McCullah noted that the Supreme Court in Lowenfield v. Phelps 7 held
that it was "permissible to count an element of the underlying offense as an
See id. at 1107; see also United States v. Bradley, 880 F. Supp. 271, 284, 287
(M.D. Pa. 1994) (upholding the nonstatutory aggravating circumstance that a deadly
weapon (a handgun) was used during the commission of the crime: "Once again, the
court is not convinced that aggravating factors must per se perform a narrowing func-
tion.").
" McCullah, 76 F.3d at 1107 (citations omitted).
2 See United States v. Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. 1525, 1541-42 (D. Kan. 1996) (up-
holding the use of lack of remorse as a nonstatutory aggravating factor while cautioning
trial courts that the factor must not implicate the defendant's constitutional right to
remain silent).
3 United States v. Davis, 912 F. Supp. 938, 946 (E.D. La. 1996) (holding that evi-
dence regarding lack of remorse was insufficient in that case without addressing wheth-
er lack of remorse is "per se an inappropriate [nonstatutory aggravating] factor").
2 Id. at 946.
2 McCullah, 76 F.3d at 1108 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(7) (1994)). Although the
court found that this nonstatutory aggravating factor, by itself, did not violate the Con-
stitution, it did find that the factor was duplicative of the statutory aggravating factor of
whether the defendant "intentionally engaged in conduct intending that the victim be
killed or that lethal force be employed against the victim, which resulted in death of the
victim." Id. at 1111 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(1)(C) (1994)).
Id. at 1108.
-7 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988).
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aggravating factor where the 'narrowing' function is performed at the guilt
phase."'2 Thus, the court in McCullah reasoned, "an aggravating factor
that does not add anything above and beyond the offense is constitutionally
permissible provided that the statute itself narrows the class of death-eligible
defendants."229
In addition to the various circumstances surrounding the offense, courts
have permitted the consideration of other nonstatutory aggravating circum-
stances. Several courts have permitted the consideration of the defendant's
prior record-including juvenile convictions and crimes for which the defen-
dant was never convicted-as a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance.23
For example, in Wright v. State,"' the Delaware Supreme Court held that
the defendant's occupation as a drug dealer for several years was admissible
as a nonstatutory aggravating factor, along with two other such factors.2
In addition to looking at prior acts, some courts have permitted the con-
sideration of the defendant as a future threat to society as a nonstatutory
aggravating factor.233 Several of the problems with "future danger" as an
McCullah, 76 F.3d at 1107 (citing Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 246).
229 Id. at 1108 (citing Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 246).
230 See id. at 1106 (citing the nonstatutory aggravating factor of previous convictions
of "two or more state or federal offenses punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year"); United States v. Bradley, 880 F. Supp. 271, 284, 286-87 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (up-
holding the nonstatutory aggravating factor of two prior unindicted murders allegedly
committed by the defendant); State v. Pirtle, 904 P.2d 245, 267 (Wash. 1995) (holding
that "juvenile convictions for both misdemeanors and felonies may be admitted as non-
statutory aggravating evidence in the sentencing phase of a capital trial"), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 2568 (1996); State v. Parker, 886 S.W.2d 908, 924 (Mo. 1994) (holding that
the defendant's prior guilty plea to assault, including surrounding facts regarding a
sexual abuse charge that was dropped, is admissible as a nonstatutory aggravating fac-
tor), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1098 (1995); Wright v. State, 633 A.2d 329, 341 (Del.
1993) (upholding the nonstatutory aggravating factor of defendant's arrest for assault in
shooting a young boy even though the defendant was not convicted of that crime), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 2509 (1996); State v. Jones, 396 S.E.2d 309, 317 (N.C. 1990) (hold-
ing that criminal offenses punishable by more than 60 days of confinement allegedly
committed by the defendant could be considered as nonstatutory aggravating factors
even though the defendant had never been tried or convicted of those crimes), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1003 (1994).
23 633 A.2d 329 (Del. 1993).
232 See id. at 340.
23 See United States v. Spivey, 958 F. Supp. 1523, 1534 (D.N.M. 1997) (denying a
motion to strike nonstatutory aggravating factors and allowing the consideration of the
nonstatutory aggravating factor of future dangerousness based upon the defendant's
"criminal record, other acts and threats of violence and his low potential for rehabilita-
tion"); United States v. Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. 1525, 1542 (D. Kan. 1996) (in federal
death penalty case, upholding the use of the nonstatutory aggravating factor that "t]he
defendant represents a continuing danger to the lives and safety of others in the fu-
ture"); United States v. Perry, No. 92-474, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20462, at *15 n.8
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aggravating factor are discussed above in the context of the statutory version
of this factor."M
The number of categories of potential nonstatutory aggravating factors is
unlimited. In State v. Gattis,2 35 the Delaware Superior Court sentenced the
defendant to death after considering several nonstatutory aggravating cir-
cumstances, including the defendant's lack of respect toward authority as
shown by his military record and his behavior while on probation for plead-
ing guilty to assault charges.236 In McCullah,237 the court upheld the con-
sideration of several nonstatutory aggravating circumstances, including the
fact that repeated attempts to rehabilitate the defendant were unsuccess-
ful.238 In United States v. Bradley," one of the nonstatutory aggravating
factors presented was that the government was "unaware of any evidence
which would constitute 'mitigating factors."' 0
Courts have considered numerous nonstatutory aggravating circumstanc-
es. These factors generally have some relevance in sentencing, and courts
that permit consideration of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances require
findings of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance.24' Also, unlike
the McGautha days, the use of unlimited nonstatutory aggravating and non-
statutory mitigating circumstances-because they are defined by the trial
(D.D.C. Jan. 11, 1994) (in federal death penalty case, rejecting defendant's challenges
to 11 nonstatutory aggravating factors, including that "there is a probability that the
defendant would commit additional criminal acts of violence so that he would constitute
a continuing threat to society in the future").
14 See supra notes 163-99 and accompanying text.
" No. IN90-05-1017, 1992 Del. Super. LEXIS 474 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 1992).
236 See id. at *22-24.
237 76 F.3d 1087 (10th Cir. 1996).
238 See id. at 1108. "The fact that Mr. McCullah continued to commit crimes after his
release from prison indicates that prison failed to deter Mr. McCullah's future criminal
conduct." Id.; see also State v. Clark, No. IN94-06-0543, 1995 Del. Super. LEXIS 25,
at *53, *62 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 1995) (affirming a sentence of death and upholding
the consideration of five nonstatutory aggravating circumstances, including the
defendant's record while incarcerated, which "is clearly not the kind of prison record
reflective of one who is bent on rehabilitation and self-improvement"); cf Nguyen, 928
F. Supp. at 1543-44 (holding that the "low potential for rehabilitation" nonstatutory
aggravating factor was duplicative of the "future dangerousness" factor).
" 880 F. Supp. 271 (M.D. Penn. 1994).
240 Id. at 284.
24 See Barclay v. Florida, 463 .U.S. 939, 966-67 (1983) (holding that the Constitution
did not prohibit consideration of nonstatutory aggravating factors although a death sen-
tence could not "rest solely on a nonstatutory aggravating factor"); Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862 (1983) (suggesting that statutory aggravating factors define the class of
persons eligible for the death penalty and that a jury may consider nonstatutory aggra-
vating factors to determine which defendants within that class will be sentenced to
death).
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court-results in the sentencing body having a list of specific factors to
consider.
The problem, however, is that open-ended consideration of relevant
nonstatutory aggravating factors adds a substantial amount of arbitrariness to
the equation. First, unlike statutory aggravating factors, nonstatutory factors
are not determined by the elected legislatures, so nonstatutory factors are not
applied in the cases of all capital defendants in the state. Instead, much
depends on the creativity of the prosecutor to raise and style the nonstatuto-
ry aggravating circumstances. Depending on the prosecutor and the court, a
prior juvenile record of a twenty-two-year-old defendant may be raised as a
nonstatutory aggravating circumstance of prior record, failed attempts to
rehabilitate, and/or future dangerousness. Second, the addition of more fac-
tors to an already large pool of statutory aggravating circumstances has
given juries and sentencing judges broad discretion in imposing the death
penalty, in contrast with the focused and channeled discretion foreseen in
Gregg and Godfrey.242
One of the justifications for allowing a prosecutor to present nonstatuto-
ry aggravating factors is that if the Constitution requires that a defendant's
presentation of mitigating factors not be limited, then aggravating factors
should not be so limited. u3 It is important to note, however, that while the
Constitution requires that a defendant be able to present all mitigating fac-
tors, the Court has not held that the Constitution requires that the prosecutor
be able to present all possible aggravating factors. The Court's holding in
Barclay was only that states may permit the prosecutor to present nonstatu-
tory aggravating factors.2" The Court thus has reasoned that nonstatutory
aggravating factors, which are permitted, are not as constitutionally signifi-
cant as nonstatutory mitigating factors, which are required. 5
2 Indeed, in several of the cases in which courts have permitted consideration of
nonstatutory aggravating circumstances, the courts have allowed a large number of such
factors to be considered. See, e.g., Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. at 1538 (five nonstatutory
aggravating factors); Bradley, 880 F. Supp. at 271 (finding two out of seven proposed
nonstatutory aggravating factors duplicative of statutory aggravating factors); United
States v. Perry, No. 92-474, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20462, at *15 (D.D.C. Jan. 11,
1994) (in a federal death penalty case, the Government argued 11 nonstatutory aggra-
vating factors); State v. Manley, No. 9511007022, 1997 Del. Super. LEXIS 5, at *22
(Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 1997) (eight nonstatutory aggravating circumstances).
See Barclay, 463 U.S. at 966-67.
See id. In fact, the Court's distinction between which statutes allow for nonstatu-
tory aggravating factors ("nonweighing statutes") and those that do not ("weighing stat-
utes") is somewhat technical, and it is difficult to believe that the legislators intentional-
ly drafted statutes to allow or not to allow nonstatutory aggravating factors. See Marcia
A. Widder, Comment, Hanging Life in the Balance: The Supreme Court and the Meta-
phor of Weighing in the Penalty Phase of the Capital Trial, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1341,
1.356-71 (1994); see also supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
" See Barclay, 463 U.S. at 966-67.
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Although there is no constitutional basis for requiring nonstatutory ag-
gravating factors, there is a constitutional basis for prohibiting the use of
nonstatutory aggravating factors: Furman and Gregg, which held that the
Constitution abhors arbitrariness in capital sentencing. 6 Justice Scalia has
stated that the requirement that sentencing bodies be permitted to consider
all nonstatutory mitigating factors "quite obviously destroys whatever ratio-
nality and predictability" Furman attempted to achieve.247 That prpblem is
exacerbated by also permitting consideration of nonstatutory aggravating
factors. By allowing an unlimited number of potential nonstatutory aggra-
vating factors, courts are approaching the days of unfettered jury discretion.
D. Victim Impact Statements
A variation of the use of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances' is the
admission of victim impact statements. One of the most extreme digressions
from the Court's early concern about arbitrariness in capital cases involves
its rulings regarding victim impact statements. In a period of only two years,
the Court reversed its position on the admissibility of victim impact state-
ments at sentencing.
In 1987, the Court held in Booth v. Maryland24 that it violated the
Constitution to allow victim impact statements of: (1) personal characteris-
tics of victims and the emotional impact of the crimes on victims' families;
and (2) family members' opinions and characterizations of the crimes and
the defendant. At trial, the prosecutor read a written victim impact statement
that included comments from family members of the elderly victims. 9
The victims were described as loving parents and grandparents, and a son
and a daughter stated how they had been unable to sleep since the murders
and discussed other effects of the murders." °
The Court in Booth concluded that to the extent that victim impact evi-
dence presents information about which the defendant was unaware and that
did not affect the decision to kill, such evidence has nothing to do with the
"blameworthiness of a particular defendant."'" In finding the admission of
such evidence unconstitutional, the Court stressed that -such evidence dis-
tracts the jury from the evidence surrounding the defendant and the circum-
stances of the crime and "creates an impermissible risk that the capital sen-
tencing decision will be made in an arbitrary manner." 2 The Court also
246 See discussion supra notes 42-63 and accompanying text.
247 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 664-65 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
2 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
249 See id. at 499-500.
See id. at 500-01.
251 Id. at 505.
252 Id. at 504.
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expressed concern that the focus of the sentencing hearing could shift from
the defendant to a "mini-trial" of the victim's character. 3
The Court reaffirmed Booth in 1989 in South Carolina v. Gathers."'
In Gathers, during the capital sentencing phase, the prosecutor read to the
jury from a religious tract the victim was carrying called "The Game Guy's
Prayer." " The prosecutor then commented on the tract and a voter regis-
tration card the victim carried, inferring personal qualities about the vic-
tim. 6 The Supreme Court held that the contents of the cards were not rel-
evant to the circumstances of the crime: "As in Booth, '[a]llowing the jury
to rely on [this information] ... could result in imposing the death sentence
because of factors about which the defendant was unaware, and that were
irrelevant to the decision to kill. '' 57
In 1991, however, the Court overruled a major portion of Booth and
Gathers in Payne v. Tennessee,28 holding that the Eighth Amendment did
not bar the admission of evidence about the victim's personal characteristics
and the emotional impact of the murder on the victim's family. 2 9 In
Payne, the petitioner was convicted of murdering a woman and her two-
year-old daughter.' During the sentencing phase of the trial, the State
called the grandmother of the woman's three-year-old son to testify that the
child missed his mother and sister."6 During argument, the prosecutor
commented on the murder's continuing effects on the child and the victim's
family. 2
This time, the Supreme Court rejected the holdings of Booth and Gath-
ers, reasoning that "[v]ictim impact evidence is simply another form or
method of informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused
by the crime in question, evidence of a general type long considered by
sentencing authorities.""2 3 The Court stressed that the State has a legiti-
mate interest in countering the defendant's mitigating evidence by showing
that the victim also is an individual and "a unique loss to society. ' '2' The
2 See id. at 507.
490 U.S. 805 (1989).
s See id. at 808-09.
26 See id
Id. at 811 (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 505).
28 501 U.S. 808 (1991). In Payne, the Court did not address the admissibility of
victim statements about the crime and the appropriate punishment for the defendant.
Under Booth, therefore, the Eighth Amendment still prohibits the admission of such
evidence in capital cases. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 508-09.
'9 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
260 See id at 808.
261 See id
262 See id.
263 Id. at 825.
26 Id. (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting)).
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Court concluded that it was "now of the view that a State may properly
conclude that for the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant's moral
culpability and blameworthiness, it should have before it at the sentencing
phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant." 5 The
Court thus held that "the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar" to such
evidence.'
The Court's quick reversal on this issue further supports the argument
that the Court has retreated from its concern about general arbitrariness. The
Court stated its reasoning in terms of a concern for individualized sentenc-
ing,267 and individualized sentencing concerns generally sway the capital
punishment scheme toward arbitrariness. This time, however, the Court's
individualized sentencing concerns overly shifted the scheme toward arbi-
trariness. Although society obviously should have concern for victims of
violent crime, the criminal justice system is not served when the sentencing
of a criminal defendant can be substantially affected by differentiating the
value of different victims.
For example, by allowing victim impact evidence, it is more likely that a
defendant who killed a popular person with a large family would receive the
death penalty than would a defendant who killed a homeless person. The
Court was unpersuasive in trying to address this argument."6 The whole
purpose of individualizing the defendant in capital cases is to invite such
comparisons among defendants in determining whether they deserve the
death penalty. Similarly, individualizing the victim in capital cases in large
part serves the same purpose in inviting such comparisons among vic-
265 Id.
'" Id. at 827. Payne was a 6-3 decision that included some strong language by the
Justices in their opinions. Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice
Blackmun, criticized the majority for disregarding precedent only because the personnel
of the Court had changed since Booth: "Power, not reason, is the new currency of this
Court's decisionmaking." Id. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, in a dis-
senting opinion also joined by Justice Blackmun, criticized the Court's new rule be-
cause it "permits the sentencer to rely on irrelevant evidence in an arbitrary and capri-
cious manner." Id. at 863 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens concluded by refer-
ring to the pressure of public opinion on the Court and stating, "Today is a sad day for
a great institution." Id. at 867 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
267 See id. at 820-21.
268 The Court stated:
As a general matter, however, victim impact evidence is not offered to encourage
comparative judgments of this kind-for instance, that the killer of a hardworking,
devoted parent deserves the death penalty, but that the murderer of a reprobate
does not. It is designed to show instead each victim's "uniqueness as an individu-
al human being," whatever the jury might think the loss to the community result-
ing from his death might be.
Id. at 823. By focusing on the "uniqueness" of the victim, however, the Court does
encourage a disparity in sentencing based upon the qualities of the victim.
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tims.269 Further, especially in light of studies that show that defendants ac-
cused of killing white victims are more likely to receive a death sentence
than those who kill minorities,' ° the Court should have been more con-
cerned about permitting comparisons among victims.
The Court's analogy-that victim impact evidence should be admitted
because mitigating evidence is admitted27-fails. It is difficult for jurors
to understand why a person would commit a horrible murder. Mitigating
factors introduced by the defendant help to attempt to explain what led the
defendant to commit the crime. Because of jurors' natural revulsion to such
2169 "Evidence offered to prove such differences [among victims] can only be intended
to identify some victims as more worthy of protection than others." Id. at 866 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). As one commentator noted:
Victim impact statements permit, and indeed encourage, invidious distinctions
about the personal worth of victims. In this capacity, they are at odds with the
principle that every person's life is equally precious, and that the criminal law
will value each life equally when punishing those who grievously assault human
dignity.
Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
361, 406 (1996).
270 See generally McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (recognizing a study that
indicated that the Georgia death penalty was imposed more often on black defendants
who killed white victims than on others). Also, a study by the federal government
found:
Our synthesis of the 28 studies shows a pattern of evidence indicating racial dis-
parities in the charging, sentencing, and imposition of the death penalty after the
Furman decision.
In 82 percent of the studies, race of victim was found to influence the likelihood
of being charged with capital murder or receiving the death penalty, i.e., those
who murdered whites were found to be more likely to be sentenced to death than
those who murdered blacks. This finding was remarkably consistent across data
sets, states, data collection methods, and analytic techniques.
The evidence for the influence of the race of defendant on death penalty outcomes
was equivocal. Although more than half of the studies found that race of defen-
dant influenced the likelihood of being charged with a capital crime or receiving
the death penalty, the relationship between race of defendant and outcome varied
across studies.
To summarize, the synthesis supports a strong race of victim influence. The race
of offender influence is not as clear cut and varies across a number of dimen-
sions. Although there are limitations to the studies' methodologies, they are of
sufficient quality to support the synthesis findings.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES
PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES, United States General Accounting Office Report to
Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary (GAO/GGD-90-57) 5-6 (Feb. 1990)
(footnotes omitted).
271 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 825.
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crimes, it is necessary to allow the defendant the full opportunity to explain
his actions and their causes. Ultimately, the jurors must go through the logi-
cal process of weighing the importance of such information to determine the
full culpability of the capital defendant. Victim impact evidence, however, is
different. Such evidence is highly emotional and, naturally, causes people to
have an automatic desire for revenge.
Further, most victim impact evidence will have no logical connection to
a defendant's culpability because the defendant likely does not know about
such information before committing the crime.272 Yes, the murderer should
know that a victim may have loved ones who will suffer from the loss of
the victim. The jury will know that general information also. The murderer,
however, often does not know the specific information about the victim, so
such specific information is not relevant to the defendant's culpability.273
As Justice Stevens noted in dissent in Payne, in cases where victim impact
evidence makes a difference,
defendants will be sentenced arbitrarily to death on the basis
of evidence that would not otherwise be admissible because
it is irrelevant to the defendants' moral culpability. The
Constitution's proscription against the arbitrary imposition of
the death penalty must necessarily proscribe the admission of
evidence that serves no purpose other than to result in such
arbitrary sentences.274
272 Victim impact evidence encompasses a broad range of information. The Virginia
Supreme Court recently held that victim impact evidence is not limited to evidence
from the victim's family members. In Beck v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 898 (1997),
the trial court received in evidence letters from the victim's coworkers, as well as news
stories and essays about the death penalty. The court stated that "the circumstances of
the individual case will dictate what evidence will be necessary and relevant, and from
what sources it may be drawn." Id. at 905.
273 Furthermore, victim impact evidence does not further the sentencing goals of
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation. See William Hauptman, Lethal
Reflection: New York's New Death Penalty and Victim Impact Statements, 97 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 439, 478-79 (1997). The Court's decision in Payne has generated
considerable criticism. See, e.g., Abraham Abramovsky, Victim Impact Statements:
Adversely Impacting Upon Judicial Fairness, 8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 21
(1992) (asserting that victim impact statements detract from the fairness of the sentenc-
ing process); Aida Alaka, Victim Impact Evidence, Arbitrariness, and the Death Penal-
ty: The Supreme Court Flipflops in Payne v. Tennessee, 23 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 581
(1992) (opposing the Court's ruling in Payne); Hauptman, supra, at 475-84. But see
Martha Hoffman, Note, Victim Impact Statement, 10 W. ST. U. L. REV. 221, 227 (1983)
(asserting that victim impact statements help victims).
274 Payne, 501 U.S. at 866 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Alaka, supra note 273, at
582; Bandes, supra note 269, at 406.
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For example, suppose a defendant were to shoot and kill a convenience
store clerk during a robbery. There would be little doubt that the defendant's
chance of receiving the death penalty would be much greater if the victim
were a church-going, Boy Scout leader with three children than if the victim
were an unmarried orphan with a criminal record.
Not only does the admission of victim impact statements increase the
arbitrariness of the death penalty, it also broadens the death penalty and
contributes to the Court's progression toward a mandatory death penalty.
Because one must be in favor of the death penalty to serve as a juror,"5 it
is hard to imagine such a juror not being moved to vote for the death penal-
ty if the focus shifts to surviving family members.276 Once again, under
the Court's present aggravating and mitigating factor scheme, arbitrariness is
further tolerated in the sense that it broadens the application of the death
penalty. 77
E. An Additional Note: Arbitrariness Between Jurisdictions
Because each jurisdiction creates its own death penalty statute, each
statute is unique. The result is that-not only does punishment differ be-
tween death penalty jurisdictions and jurisdictions without the death penal-
ty-significant discrepancies exist among the death penalty jurisdictions.
The list of aggravating circumstances in one state may differ substantially
from the list in other states. For example, Virginia has two aggravating
factors278 while Pennsylvania has seventeen.279 In some states, but not in
others, a person becomes death eligible for killing a child." °
275 See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (reversing a death sentence
where the jury was chosen by excluding for cause veniremen with general objections to
the death penalty); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (holding that jurors may
be excluded if their opposition to capital punishment substantially impairs the perfor-
mance of their duties).
27 There are several arguments in favor of allowing victim impact evidence, includ-
ing giving the victim's family an outlet and reminding society of the life that was taken.
Not one of these reasons, however, supports the abandonment of Eighth Amendment
principles regarding a fair sentencing hearing.
277 For example, while holding that victim evidence is admissible, the Court also has
held that the trial judge may instruct the jury not to give in to its sympathy for the
defendant. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541-43 (1987) (upholding a jury
instruction that the jury must not "be swayed by 'mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy,
passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling"); see also Bandes, supra note 269,
at 410.
278 See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1995).
279 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (West Supp. 1997).
28 See infra note 378 (citing statutes that make a defendant eligible for the death
penalty if the victim is under a certain age).
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Furthermore, similar aggravating circumstances may differ or states may
interpret them differently. Even in those states with aggravating circum-
stances for killing children, the aggravating circumstances vary with regard
to the age that the child must be for the aggravating circumstance to be
considered. In New Jersey, an aggravating factor applies when the victim is
under fourteen years old,"' while in South Carolina, the victim must be
eleven years old or younger for the aggravating factor to apply. 2
One may imagine a defendant who commits ten different types of mur-
ders in ten different states. Depending on which murder occurred in which
state, the defendant could end up being eligible for anywhere from zero to
ten death sentences.
The Supreme Court, however, has never indicated that the Eighth
Amendment requires consistency among the states in their use of the death
penalty. It is unlikely that the Court would consider the differences between
states in evaluating the arbitrariness of the death penalty, yet it is not un-
precedented for the Court to review what the state legislatures are doing
with respect to capital punishment. In several cases, in examining the consti-
tutionality of applying the death penalty to certain classes of defendants, the
Court has used the legislative enactments of the states to interpret "evolving
standards of decency" for Eighth Amendment purposes. 3 For example, in
determining whether it violates the Eighth Amendment to impose the death
penalty upon a certain type of offender, such as defendants under a certain
age, the Court has considered the number of states that apply .the death
penalty to that type of offender.' Still, it appears that the Court would be
concerned about differences between the states only if the differences were
severe and if the differences applied to an entire class of defendants. At
present, it appears that the Court finds no constitutional significance in the
fact that state legislatures have designated different crimes as deserving of
the death penalty.
2 1 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West Supp. 1997).
282 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996).
213 See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (applying the death penalty to
felony murder defendants with reckless indifference to the value of human life);
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (applying the death penalty to a felony murder
defendant who did not kill or intend that a killing take place); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584 (1977) (applying the death penalty to a defendant convicted of rape but not of
murder).
14 See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (applying the death penalty
to defendants who were 16 and 17 years old at the time of the offenses); Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (applying the death penalty to a defendant who was 15
years old at the time of the offense).
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F. Conclusion
Arguments that the death penalty is arbitrary have focused greatly on the
constitutional requirement that mitigating factors not be limited."8 As dis-
cussed above, however, several arbitrary factors, i.e., aggravating factors,
enter into the equation on the other side of the scale. 6
The Court has become increasingly less concerned with the arbitrariness
of the death penalty. The Supreme Court death penalty cases, beginning
with Furman and Gregg, have placed heavy emphasis on the constitutional
requirement that the death penalty not be imposed arbitrarily. The Court,
however, perhaps because of a realization that its goals of eliminating arbi-
trariness cannot be met without a mandatory death penalty scheme, began
tolerating more and more arbitrariness.
Perhaps the decision in which the Court most clearly illustrated its re-
treat from its concerns about arbitrary infliction of the death penalty is
McCleskey v. Kemp, 7 in which the Court held that the Constitution toler-
ates general racial discrimination in capital sentencing. In that case, Warren
McCleskey, who was black, was convicted of killing a white police officer
during a robbery. 8 During habeas corpus proceedings, McCleskey sub-
mitted a statistical study that showed a disparity in the imposition of the
death penalty in Georgia based on the race of the murder victim and, to a
lesser extent, on the race of the defendant. 9 Considering various factors,
the study concluded that defendants charged with killing white victims were
4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence than were defendants charged
with killing black victims.2"
The Court rejected McCleskey's claim that the Georgia capital punish-
ment system was arbitrary and capricious in application and therefore vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment.29' The Court reasoned that the procedures
for determining a defendant's guilt and sentence were fair, while stressing
the necessity for jury discretion.292 The Court stated that "it is the jury's
25 See, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144-45 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting from the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari); Graham v. Collins, 506
U.S. 461, 479-84 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,
664-65 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Betty B. Fletcher, The Death Penalty in
America: Can Justice Be Done?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 811, 827 (1995) ("Although we
can determine objectively whether a person has committed the acts that make him eligi-
ble for the death penalty, whether actually to impose it is a subjective decision.").
28. See supra Parts II.B-E.
287 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
288 See id. at 283.
29 See id. at 286-87.
290 See id. at 287.
291 See id. at 308.
29 See id. at 313 ("Where the discretion that is fundamental to our criminal process
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function to make the difficult and uniquely human judgments that defy codi-
fication and that 'buil[d] discretion, equity, and flexibility into a legal sys-
tem. 293
In upholding the apparent arbitrariness of the death penalty, the Court in
McCleskey focused on the fact that the discrepancy in sentencing resulted
from discretionary leniency, i.e., the fact that mitigating factors cannot be
limited.294 The discretion discussed in this Article, however, is not limited
to discretionary leniency, but includes discretion to impose the death sen-
tence. Apparently, therefore, while the Court's decisions increasingly have
tolerated all types of discretion, the only type of discretion that the Court
has explicitly embraced is discretion not to impose the death sentence. It is
only through these case-by-case decisions that the Court has allowed in-
creased discretion that is inconsistent with the principles of Furman and
Gregg.
As will be discussed later, one commentator has argued that the Court
has never been concerned with arbitrariness per se in capital cases.295 This
commentator is correct in that recent decisions, in effect, illustrate the
Court's decreasing attempts to eliminate arbitrariness. Later cases progres-
sively have stressed "narrowing" as opposed to eliminating arbitrariness.296
In McCleskey, for example, without mentioning arbitrariness, the Court
stressed that there were two guiding Eighth Amendment principles in capital
cases:
First, there is a required threshold below which the death
penalty cannot be imposed. In this context, the State must
establish rational criteria that narrow the decisionmaker's
judgment as to whether the circumstances of a particular
defendant's case meet the threshold .... Second, States can-
not limit the sentencer's consideration of any relevant cir-
is involved, we decline to assume that what is unexplained is invidious.").
293 Id. at 311 (quoting HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY
498 (1966)).
294 The Court stressed that one of the principles determining the "constitutionally
permissible range of discretion" is that "[s]tates cannot limit the sentencer's consider-
ation of any relevant circumstance that could cause it to decline to impose the penalty."
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 305-06. In McCleskey, the Court also noted that the Court in
Gregg stressed that inherent discretion is a result of "opportunities for discretionary
leniency." Id. at 307 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976)).
29 See David McCord, Judging the Effectiveness of the Supreme Court's Death Pen-
alty Jurisprudence According to the Court's Own Goals: Mild Success or Major Di-
saster?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 545, 548 (1997) ("The correct view, I will contend, is
that the Court has had only one primary goal for its regulation of capital punishment:
decreasing overinclusion .... ).
296 See infra notes 398, 433-36 and accompanying text.
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cumstance that could cause it to decline to impose the
penalty.297
Still, beginning with Furman, the Court did stress its concerns with arbi-
trariness.29 Today, the Court still acknowledges a concern about arbi-
trariness, and it is mainly in its results that the Court has appeared to aban-
don such a concern. In other words, as long as not all murderers are con-
demned, the Court has divorced itself from regulating whether the death
penalty is applied consistently.
The post-Furman cases have not solved the problem of the pre-Furman
death penalty System in theory or in practice. As one commentator has not-
ed: "New capital punishment laws, supposedly designed to prevent arbitrari-
ness and discrimination, were upheld by the Supreme Court in 1976. But
race and poverty continue to determine who dies."299
Arbitrariness in the scheme of sentencing factors is not caused by any
one problem, but by a combination of factors, including vague sentencing
guidelines and practically unlimited sentencing discretion. It is the accumu-
lation of these problems, as well as others, that undermines the system."
297 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 305-06 (emphasis added).
298 See, e.g., Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 70 (1987) (noting that Furman struck
down unguided discretion statutes because they "resulted in the death penalty's being
arbitrarily and capriciously imposed, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments").
299 Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial
Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433, 434
(1995) (footnote omitted). This criticism of the death penalty even has appeared in
popular song. See STEVE EARLE AND THE DUKES, Billy Austin, on THE HARD WAY
(MCA Records 1990):
But there's twenty-seven men here
Mostly black, brown and poor
Most of 'em are guilty
Who are you to say for sure?
00 This Article focuses on the capital sentencing scheme of aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors developed by the Court, but other commentators argue that there are other
problems contributing to the arbitrariness of who is selected to be executed. Because the
punishment is not administered fairly and impartially, the American Bar Association,
for example, recently called for a nationwide moratorium on the use of the death penal-
ty until
jurisdiction[s] implement policies and procedures that are consistent
with ... longstanding American Bar Association policies intended to (1) ensure
that death penalty cases are administered fairly and impartially, and in accordance
with due process, and (2) minimize the risk that innocent persons may be execut-
ed.
See SECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
RESOLUTION 107 RECOMMENDATION para. 1 (1997) (as approved by the ABA House of
Delegates February 3, 1997). The ABA called for the moratorium for several reasons,
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The Court has not adequately addressed individual problems and has ig-
nored system-wide problems. The Supreme Court's failure to require state
legislatures and courts to develop clear lines has resulted in the modem
arbitrary use of capital punishment.
III. THE PROGRESSION TOWARD A MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY
[W]hoever has committed Murder, must die .... 2°"
Although today the death penalty is arbitrarily applied in various ways,
the death penalty system also is moving closer to a mandatory scheme. The
death penalty is not applied to every murderer, but the death penalty system
is creeping closer and closer to such a goal, through political pressures and
through the Court's failure to address the trend.
The Supreme Court clearly has held that mandatory death penalty
schemes are unconstitutional.3 °2 The trend in legislatures to broaden death
penalty statutes, as well as some of the Court's more recent cases, however,
including the poor quality of legal representation of indigent capital defendants and the
discrimination in capital sentencing on the basis of race, and because Congress and the
Court have substantially limited capital defendants' access to the courts. See id; see also
Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1137-38 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from the
denial of the petition for writ of certiorari) (noting that federal courts have abandoned
their role in reviewing death sentences); Louis D. Bilionis & Richard A. Rosen, Law-
yers, Arbitrariness, and the Eighth Amendment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1315 (1997)
("Modern capital punishment practice presents opportunities for arbitrary variations in
outcome owing to the relative skill and performance of defense counsel that are, quite
literally, extraordinary."); Stephen B. Bright, Death by Lottery---Procedural Bar of
Constitutional Claims in Capital Cases Due to Inadequate Representation of Indigent
Defendants, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 679 (1990) (noting that poor representation and proce-
dural bars to review have resulted in the arbitrary infliction of the death penalty);
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drinks, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to
Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L.
REV. 425 (1996) (citing examples of capital defense attorneys who were impaired by
alcohol or drugs during trial); Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indi-
gent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 333
(1995) (noting "the chronic and severe underfunding of indigent defense services by
state and local governments throughout the United States"); Marcia Coyle et al., Trial
and Error in the Nation's Death Belt: Fatal Defense Fatal Flaws, NAT'L L.J., June 11,
1990, at 30 (discussing poor representation in capital cases); supra note 270 (quoting a
recent study by the federal government about the effects of race in capital sentencing).
301 IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 198 (W. Hastie trans., Augustus M.
Kelley Publishers 1974) (1887), quoted in Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 752 n.6
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
302 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 (1976) (plurality opinion);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333-36 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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illustrate a progression toward a mandatory system of capital punishment.
Although it is a paradox to claim that the growing arbitrariness of the appli-
cation of the death penalty is resulting in a progression toward a mandatory
system, that is precisely what is happening. It appears that the Court has
become exhausted with regulating this area of the law and therefore has
allowed a broadening of the application of the death penalty. This trend is
illustrated by the Court's willingness to allow mitigating factors to be limit-
ed and by the Court's tolerance for broad statutes that include numerous and
open-ended sentencing factors.
A. Limitations on Mitigating Factors
In the early Supreme Court opinions that addressed limitations on the
consideration of mitigating factors, the Court's language was sweeping in
the condemnation of limits put upon consideration of mitigating evidence
offered by defendants.3"3 The Court, however, retreated from this position
in Johnson v. Texas.'
In Johnson, the Court addressed Texas's capital sentencing statute,
which does not list aggravating and mitigating factors.3 5 Instead, the jury
in Johnson was asked during the capital sentencing'phase to answer two
special issues in accordance with the statute: (1) whether Johnson's conduct
was "committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the
death of the deceased or another would result,"3" and (2) whether there
was a probability that Johnson "would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society."' The court instructed the
jury that if it answered "yes" to both questions, the court would sentence
3 In Woodson, the Court stated that "the fundamental respect for humanity underly-
ing the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of the character and record of the
individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally
indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death." Woodson, 428 U.S.
at 304. Two years later, the Court reiterated the important role of mitigating circum-
stances: "To meet constitutional requirements, a death penalty statute must not preclude
consideration of relevant mitigating factors." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978)
(Burger, C.J., plurality opinion). Lockett was reaffirmed three years later: "Just as the
State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor,
neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating
evidence." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982).
1- 509 U.S. 350 (1993).
305 See TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 37-0711(b) (West 1981). The statute has since
been amended to allow for consideration of mitigating factors. See TEX. CRIM. P. CODE
ANN. § 37.071(b)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
3' Johnson, 509 U.S. at 354.
307 Id.
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Johnson to death; otherwise, the court would sentence him to life in pris-
on."1 Both answers were "yes," and Johnson was sentenced to death."
Johnson was nineteen at the time of the murder,31 and the issue before
the Supreme Court was "whether the Texas special issues allowed adequate
consideration of petitioner's youth. ' .' Looking at previous decisions in
which the Court had addressed Texas's special issues,"' the Court held
that under the future dangerousness issue, there was "no reasonable likeli-
hood that the jury would have found itself foreclosed from considering the
relevant aspects of petitioner's youth."3"3 Although the jury could factor
Johnson's age into the future danger question, Johnson argued that the jury's
consideration of the mitigating factor was unconstitutionally limited because
the jury was not allowed to consider how youth affected his culpability.314
The Court, however, upheld the death sentence. 15 It reasoned that
Lockett and Eddings require only "that a jury be able to consider in some
manner all of a defendant's relevant mitigating evidence," '316 not that "a
jury be able to give effect to mitigating evidence in every conceivable man-
ner in which the evidence might be relevant."3 7 The Court thus implied
that a state could limit the consideration of mitigating factors as long as the
factors could be considered in at least one way.31 '
308 See id.
309 See id.
310 See id. at 350.
311 Id. at 367.
312 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 329 (1989) (holding that Texas's special
issues of deliberateness and future danger did not give the capital jury the ability to
give effect to mitigating evidence of the defendant's mental retardation); Franklin v.
Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 178 (1988) (holding by a plurality that the future dangerous-
ness special issue allowed the jury to give effect to the mitigating circumstance of the
defendant's good prison disciplinary record); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976)
(finding by a plurality that Texas's statute did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments). In none of these prior cases, however, did a majority of the Court hold
that a state could constitutionally limit a sentencer's ability to give effect to mitigating
evidence. See Johnson, 509 U.S. at 383-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
313 Johnson, 509 U.S. at 368.
3 See id. at 369.
315 See id. at 371-72.
316 Id. at 372.
317 Id.
318 The majority opinion in Johnson, however, contains some language implying that
the statute is constitutional because juries will use their own good sense and give full
consideration to mitigating evidence despite the limiting jury instruction.
The crucial term employed in the second special issue--"continuing threat to soci-
ety"--affords the jury room for independent judgment in reaching its decision.
Indeed, we cannot forget that "a Texas capital jury deliberating over the Special
Issues is aware of the consequences of its answers, and is likely to weigh mitigat-
ing evidence as it formulates these answers in a manner similar to that employed
1998]
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This holding is contrary to the rule developed from Lockett and
Eddings.319 In Eddings, the Court had specifically noted how a defendant's
youth may be mitigating in more than one way. 2 In Johnson, however,
the Court indicated a willingness to permit states to limit the consideration
of mitigating factors, thus giving jurors less ability to sentence a defendant
to life imprisonment instead of death.32'
The Court has put other limits on the consideration of mitigating evi-
dence. 22 As this Article was being prepared for publication, the Court de-
by capital juries in 'pure balancing' states."
Id. at 370-71 (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 182 n.12 (1988)). It seems
somewhat odd that the Court justified its opinion in upholding a jury instruction, in
part, by concluding that the jury would disregard its limitations anyway.
319 In Johnson, Justice O'Connor wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Jus-
tices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter, stressing the "considerable support in our early
cases for the proposition that the sentencer in a capital case must be able to give full
effect to all mitigating evidence concerning the defendant's character and record and the
circumstances of the crime." Id. at 379 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
320 In Eddings, the Court noted:
The trial judge recognized that youth must be considered a relevant mitigating
factor. But youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of
life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological
damage. Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors,
especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible than
adults. Particularly "during the formative years of childhood and adolescence,
minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment" expected of adults.
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982) (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622, 635 (1979)) (footnotes omitted). Furthermore, the Court quoted the Twentieth
Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young Offenders:
"Crimes committed by youths ... deserve less punishment because adolescents
may have less capacity to control their conduct and to think in long-range terms
than adults. Moreover, youth crime as such is not exclusively the offender's fault;
offenses by the young also represent a failure of family, school, and the social
system, which share responsibility for the development of America's youth."
Id. at 115 n.11 (quoting FRANKLIN ZIMRING, TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE
ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME 7
(1978)).
After Johnson, however, sentencers apparently are not constitutionally required to
consider all of these aspects of youth as mitigating circumstances in capital cases.
321 See generally Johnson, 509 U.S. 350 (1993).
For example, in Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1988), the Court
implied that a capital defendant does not have a constitutional right to an instruction
telling the jury to consider as mitigating evidence any "residual doubt" it had about the
defendant's guilt. The Court reasoned that "[s]uch lingering doubts are not over any
aspect of petitioner's 'character,' 'record,' or a 'circumstance of the offense."' Id. at
174. The Court concluded, however, that even if the petitioner in that case had a consti-
tutional right to have the jury consider "residual doubts," the rejection of the
petitioner's proffered jury instructions did not impair that right. See id. at 175.
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cided Buchanan v. Angelone,323 holding that the Eighth Amendment does
not require the trial court "to instruct the jury on its obligation and authority
to consider mitigating evidence, and on particular mitigating factors deemed
relevant by the State."324 Thus, arguably, under Johnson and Buchanan,
the Court today permits states to put limitations on the consideration of
mitigating evidence while at the same time it does not require states to give
clear instructions to jurors regarding their responsibility to consider mitigat-
ing evidence.
B. Broad Death Penalty Statutes
Another way that the death penalty has moved closer to a mandatory
scheme is through broad statutes that make it more likely that all murderers
will be sentenced to death. States have created death penalty statutes that are
broad in three ways. First, the statutes contain specific aggravating factors
that are vague and overbroad.3" Second, many statutes permit arbitrary
factors that make it more likely that the death penalty will be imposed.3"
Third, most death penalty statutes include a long list of aggravating factors
that include such a broad range of circumstances that they cover almost
every first-degree murder case. 27 These trends are discussed below.
1. Broad Individual Aggravating Circumstances Cover a Broad Range of
Murders
As discussed in the previous section on arbitrariness,32 vague aggravat-
ing circumstances permit a sentencer to consider arbitrary factors. Many of
these aggravating circumstances, however, are so broad that they can apply
to almost any situation. While one aggravating circumstance by itself may
not necessarily create a mandatory death penalty scheme, a statute contain-
ing several broad aggravating circumstances makes a broad sentencing stat-
ute even broader. For example, as discussed above, the "heinous, atrocious,
or cruel" aggravating factor is used to cover a broad set of circumstances
118 S. Ct. 757 (1998).
324 Id. at 761. The Court reasoned that by instructing the jury to consider "all the
evidence," the instruction was adequate to allow jurors to consider mitigating evidence.
See id. at 762. However, reviewing the context of the entire jury instruction, the jury
instruction could be read by a reasonable juror to mean that the jury is only to consider"all the evidence" relating to the aggravating circumstance. See id. 763-64 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
" See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
3216 See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
327 See discussion infra Part 111.B.3.
31 See discussion supra Part ll.B.
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and applies to a very large number of murders. 29 The "future danger" ag-
gravating circumstance--either as a statutory or nonstatutory factor-also
may be interpreted broadly by the sentencing body.33 Arguably, almost
anyone just found guilty of murder is a future danger.
Another aggravating circumstance that has been applied broadly is the
pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance. Although this aggravating factor
applies to murder-for-hire situations,' it also applies in situations where
part of the motive for the murder was to take anything of value, as in the
typical robbery-murder situation.332 The pecuniary gain aggravating cir-
cumstance covers such a broad range of activity that it substantially increas-
es the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty.
Individually, many of these factors apply to a large percentage of mur-
ders. When combined, it is difficult to imagine a murder that would not sat-
isfy one or more of the factors.
2. Nonstatutory Aggravating Factors and Victim Impact Evidence Make It
More Likely That Death Sentences Will Be Imposed
The list of statutory aggravating factors in some states is expanded fur-
ther by the admission into evidence of nonstatutory aggravating factors and
victim impact information. As discussed above, although nonstatutory aggra-
vating factors do not play a role in determining eligibility for the death
penalty, once a statutory aggravating factor is found, the nonstatutory factors
are considered in the decision to impose the death penalty. States that permit
the use of a broad range of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances and
victim impact evidence, added at the discretion of the prosecutor and the
court, thus increase the number of cases in which the sentencer is likely to
impose the death penalty.333
329 See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
330 See discussion supra Part II.B.2..
... See, e.g., Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 507 (1995) (upholding the trial
judge's reliance upon the pecuniary gain aggravating factor to override the jury's rec-
ommendation of life where the defendant offered her lover a share of death benefits to
have her husband killed).
332 See, e.g., State v. Dickens, 926 P.2d 468, 491 (Ariz. '1996) (finding the defendant
death eligible in a robbery-murder conviction based on the pecuniary gain aggravating
factor).
311 See discussion supra Parts II.C-D. Also, jury instructions that list nonstatutory
aggravating circumstances but not nonstatutory mitigating circumstances further tilt the
balancing toward the imposition of more death sentences by emphasizing nonstatutory
aggravating circumstances over mitigating circumstances. See State v. Wacaser, 794
S.W.2d 190, 195 (Mo. 1990) (stating that a trial court "should not list any nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances in the instructions, because the inclusion of some might lead
the jury to believe that it may not consider others").
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3. Capital Sentencing Statutes Contain a Broad Range of Aggravating
Circumstances That Cover a Broad Range of Murders
The trend in various states is to add aggravating factors to already long
lists of factors. In recent years, several states have expanded the coverage of
their death penalty statutes,334 and politicians have attempted to boost their
political standing by calling for further expansion.33 ' The United States
334 See, e.g., Rate of Executions Escalating Sharply/Congress, States Limiting Ap-
peals, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 5, 1996, at 8.
Congress and more than a dozen state legislatures in recent months have limited
legal appeals for those under sentences of death, or have added "aggravating fac-
tors" allowing more convicted felons to be executed .... Tracy Snell, a Justice
Department statistician, said Delaware, Illinois, Connecticut, New Jersey and
Nevada are among states last year that expanded the crimes or special circum-
stances of a crime that could lead to capital punishment.
Id.
Another recent article reported:
In 1994, Congress expanded the federal death penalty to include 60 additional
crimes, and since then two more states-Kansas and New York-have drafted
death penalty statutes. In Virginia last year, legislators added multiple murders to
the state's list of crimes punishable by death. This year, they added murders by
drug kingpins and murders of pregnant women.
Laura LaFay, Virginia Ignores Outcry: Death Penalty Cases Prompt International Inter-
vention, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS (Va.), July 6, 1997, at Cl; see also James
A. Gillaspy, Newman Offers Bill to Justify High Bail: County Prosecutor Seeks to Keep
Violent Defendants Jailed While They Are Awaiting Trial, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov.
26, 1995, at C01 (reporting that the Indiana prosecutor's office backed a bill expanding
the death penalty statute to allow victim impact testimony in capital cases); Frank Green
& Jeff E. Schapiro, Execution Protesters Speak Out But Senate Passes Measure to Ex-
pand Death Statute, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Va.), Jan. 30, 1996, at BI (reporting
that the Virginia Senate approved the "first of several measures creating additional capi-
tal crimes" allowing prosecutors to seek the death penalty against guardians of children
who murder and abduct their wards); John Marelius, Wilson Comes Down Hard on
Crime-Again Signs Death Penalty Bill in Hope of Bringing His Campaign to Life, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 28, 1995, at A3 (reporting that California Governor Pete
Wilson signed two bills expanding the coverage of the death penalty statute, one regard-
ing drive-by murders and another regarding murders committed during carjackings and
retaliatory killings of jurors).
... See, e.g., States News Briefs: Kansas, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 6, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File (reporting that the Kansas Attorney Gen-
eral said she supported expanding the coverage of the Kansas death penalty statute to
include virtually all types of premeditated first-degree murder); John DiStaso, Frank,
Kathie Lee Gifford Aiding Swett's War Chest, UNION LEADER (Manchester, N.H.), Oct.
17, 1996, at Al (reporting that New Hampshire governor candidate Jeanne Shaheen
held a news conference to proclaim that she would be tough on crime and would ex-
pand the coverage of the New Hampshire death penalty statute); Marelius, supra note
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Department of Justice reported that in 1995, in addition to New York's
enactment of a capital punishment statute, ten states expanded the coverage
of their death penalty statutes by adding aggravating circumstances, expand-
ing existing aggravating circumstances, adding to the definition of capital
murder, or allowing victim impact evidence.336 In 1996, six states added
new aggravating circumstances, expanded existing aggravating circum-
stances, or added to the definition of capital murder.337 Conversely, legisla-
tures have not deleted unclear and vague aggravating circumstances.
While this expansion of aggravating factors has occurred, legislatures
have not expanded the number of statutory mitigating factors. For example,
despite an increased understanding of how abuse as a child can affect a
capital defendant's psychological development, legislators "have declined to
codify a significant childhood history of abuse (sexual, emotional, or physi-
cal) as a statutory mitigating factor., 38 Although states still must allow a
sentencer to consider nonstatutory mitigating factors, there is a potential
discrepancy in the weight that a sentencer may give to nonstatutory factors
334, at A3 (reporting that in signing a bill to expand the death penalty in California,
"Gov[ernor] Pete Wilson returned to a tried-and-true formula this week to try to breathe
some life into a gasping presidential campaign: the gas chamber strategy").
336 See Tracy L. Snell, Capital Punishment 1995, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL.,
Dec. 1996, at 2-4. In 1995, death penalty statutes were expanded in Arkansas, Dela-
ware, Illinois, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, and Tennessee. See id. A recent study revealed that the 1990 state legislative
sessions created over 185 death-penalty-related bills in 43 states, and that "most bills
have favored the expansion, expedition or reinstatement of capital punishment." Leigh
Dingerson, Reclaiming the Gavel: Making Sense Out of the Death Penalty Debate in
State Legislatures, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 873, 876 (1991).
"3 See Tracy L. Snell, Capital Punishment 1996, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL.,
Dec. 1997, at 2-4. In 1996, death penalty statutes were expanded in Florida, Indiana,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. See id.
338 J. Vincent Aprile II, Childhood Abuse: Statutory Mitigation in Death Cases?,
CRIM. JUST., Summer 1997, at 42. Perhaps the reason legislators have not made abuse a
statutory mitigating factor is because they are hesitant to appear soft on crime. This
result is unfortunate, given the clear relevance of a history of abuse to capital sentenc-
ing.
Childhood victimization, the research continues to reveal, places individuals at
risk of future psychological problems. ...
Obviously, physical abuse to a child can result in physical damage to the
child's brain or nervous system, which can be detected by neurological examina-
tions. But recent brain research reveals that cortisol, a steroid hormone released
by the brain when physical or psychological trauma occurs, can in chronically
high levels also inflict physical damage on a child's brain, resulting in a loss of
neurons and fewer synapses. These physical changes are not simply speculated by
theorists; brain scans reveal the marked physical differences between the brains of
the abused and the nonabused.
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as opposed to statutory factors."' To ensure that proper weight is given to
significant mitigating factors, legislatures could add to existing lists of statu-
tory mitigating factors, as they do to lists of statutory aggravating factors.
Legislatures, however, consistently fail to do so.
Many states have a large number of aggravating factors. Arizona has
ten,"4 South Carolina has eleven,3" Nevada has twelve, 2 Illinois has
fifteen, 4'3 and Pennsylvania has seventeen aggravating circumstances."
In California, if a capital jury finds one or more of twenty-one statutory
special circumstances, 5 the case proceeds to the penalty phase and the
jury then is instructed to consider eleven other factors in deciding whether
to impose death." The range of aggravating factors for capital murder
used in the United States can be seen by the following compiled list of
aggravating factors that make a defendant eligible for the death penalty.4 7
... See generally id.
340 See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F) (West Supp. 1997).
341 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(c) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996).
342 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.033 (Michie 1997).
343 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b) (West Supp. 1997).
3" See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d) (West Supp. 1997).
341 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (Deering Supp. 1997).
346 See id. § 190.3 (Deering Supp. 1997). These factors are broad, including "[a]ny
other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a
legal excuse for the crime." Id. § 190.3(k) (Deering Supp. 1997).
34 Although not all states have enacted a strict list of aggravating circumstances, this
Article has attempted to incorporate into its compiled list the circumstances that serve
the purpose of aggravating factors. For example, New York performs the constitutional
narrowing at the conviction stage. Thus, its "aggravating factors" are listed as part of
the definition of first-degree murder. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney Supp.
1997) (defining murder in the first degree); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(7)
(McKinney Supp. 1997) (listing two additional aggravating factors-not listed here
because they do not relate to death eligibility-that also may be considered during the
sentencing of a person convicted of murder in the first degree). Also, some states, such
as Oregon and Texas, submit specific questions to the jury instead of a list of aggravat-
ing factors. See OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(b) (Supp. 1996); TEX. CRIM. P. CODE ANN.
§ 37.071(b) (West Supp. 1997).
Note that some states may combine some of these listed factors into one factor or
divide one of these factors in two. This Article has attempted to categorize the factors
to avoid repetition, though one could categorize some of these factors differently than
was done here. This list focuses on aggravating factors for capital murder, although
some jurisdictions have arguably unconstitutional statutes that make some nonhomicide
offenders eligible for the death penalty. See infra notes 396-97 and accompanying text.
For example, the federal government's list of death penalty aggravating factors for drug
offenses, espionage, or treason are not included because they diverge from the scope of
the ones listed for murder. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(b), (d) (1994). The aggravating factors
used by the military also are not listed here. See RULES FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 1004(c)
(listing 11 categories of aggravating factors); see also Loving v. United States, 116 S.
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a. Facts Surrounding the Murder
(1) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or depraved (or
involved torture).3 8
Ct. 1737 (1996) (holding that it is constitutional for Congress to delegate the role of
defining aggravating circumstances to the President).
348 See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(6) (West Supp. 1997) ("The defendant committed the
offense in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner in that it involved torture or
serious physical abuse to the victim."); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(8) (1994) ("The capital
offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel compared to other capital offenses.");
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(6) (West Supp. 1997) ("The defendant committed
the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner."); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-4-604(8)(A) (Michie Supp. 1995) ("The capital murder was committed in an espe-
cially cruel or depraved manner."); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(14) (Deering Supp.
1997) ("The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional
depravity."); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-802(5)0) (West Supp. 1996) ("The de-
fendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.");
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(i)(4) (West Supp. 1997) ("The defendant committed
the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 4209(e)(1)() (1995) ("The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, use of an explosive device or
poison or the defendant used such means on the victim prior to murdering the victim.");
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(h) (West Supp. 1997) ("The capital felony was espe-
cially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(7) (1997) ("The
offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravat-
ed battery to the victim."); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(h)(5) (1997) ("The murder was
especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity."); id. § 19-
2515(h)(6) ("By the murder, or circumstances surrounding its commission, the defen-
dant exhibited utter disregard for human life."); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(14)
(West Supp. 1997) ("[T]he murder was intentional and involved the infliction of tor-
ture."); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(11) (Michie Supp. 1997) ("The defendant
burned, mutilated, or tortured the victim while the victim was alive."); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-4625(6) (1995) ("The defendant committed the crime in an especially hei-
nous, atrocious or cruel manner."); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(A)(7) (West
1997) ("The offense was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel man-
ner."); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5)(h) (1994) ("The capital offense was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel."); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.2(7) (West Supp. 1997)
("The murder in the first degree was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman
in that it involved torture, or depravity of mind."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303(3)
(1997) ("The offense was deliberate homicide and was committed by means of tor-
ture."); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2523(1)(d) (Michie 1995) ("The murder was espe-
cially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or manifested exceptional depravity by ordinary stan-
dards of morality and intelligence."); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.033(8) (Michie
1995) ("The murder involved torture or the mutilation of the victim."); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 630:5(Vll)(h) (1996) ("The defendant committed the offense in an especially
heinous, cruel or depraved manner in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse
to the victim."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(4)(c) (West Supp. 1997) ("The murder was
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(2) The defendant dismembered or mutilated the victim after death. 9
(3) The capital offense was committed during the commission of, attempt of,
or escape from a specified felony (such as robbery, kidnapping, rape, sod-
omy, arson, oral copulation, train wrecking, carjacking, criminal gang activi-
ty, drug dealing, or aircraft piracy). 5 °
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity
of mind, or an aggravated assault to the victim."); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(x)
(McKinney Supp. 1997) ("[T]he defendant acted in an especially cruel and wanton
manner pursuant to a course of conduct intended to inflict and inflicting torture upon
the victim prior to the victim's death .... "); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(9) (1988)
("The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 701.12(4) (West 1983) ("The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel."); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(8) (West Supp. 1997) ("The offense was
committed by means of torture."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1(6) (Michie Supp.
1997) ("The offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it
involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim. Any murder
is wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman if the victim is less than thirteen years of
age."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(5) (1997) ("The murder was especially hei-
nous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that
necessary to produce death"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(q) (Supp. 1997) ("[T]he
homicide was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally
depraved manner, any of which must be demonstrated by physical torture, serious phys-
ical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the victim before death."); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-264.2(1) (Michie 1995) ("[H]is conduct in committing the offense for which he
stands charged was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it in-
volved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim."); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(vii) (Michie 1997) ("The murder was especially atrocious or cruel,
being unnecessarily torturous to the victim."); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(10)
(Michie Supp. 1997) ("The defendant dismembered the victim.").
149 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(10) (Michie Supp. 1997) ("The defendant dismem-
bered the victim."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(13) (1997) ("The defendant
knowingly mutilated the body of the victim after death."). This aggravating circum-
stance is similar to the "heinous, atrocious, cruel, or depraved" category of aggravating
factors because in most of those states, if not all, dismembering the victim would con-
stitute depravity.
330 See 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (c)(1) (1994) (listing as an aggravating factor that death
occurred "during the commission or attempted commission of, or during the immediate
flight from the commission of," several enumerated crimes); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(4)
(1994) ("The capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged or was an
accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing,
or attempting to commit, rape, robbery, burglary or kidnapping."); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.2(a)(17) (Deering Supp. 1997):
The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was an ac-
complice in, the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate flight
after committing, or attempting to commit, the following felonies: (A) Rob-
bery .... (B) Kidnapping .... (C) Rape .... (D) Sodomy .... (E) The per-
formance of a lewd or lascivious act upon the person of a child under the age of
14 .... (F) Oral copulation .... (G) Burglary in the first or second degree ....
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(H) Arson .... (I) Train wrecking .... (J) Mayhem .... (K) Rape by instru-
ment .... (L) Carjacking ... ;
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-802(5)(g) (West Supp. 1996) ("The defendant commit-
ted or attempted to commit a class 1, 2, or 3 felony and, in the course of or in further-
ance of such or immediate flight therefrom, the defendant intentionally caused the death
of a person other than one of the participants."); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
46a(i)(1) (West Supp. 1997) ("The defendant committed the offense during the commis-
sion or attempted commission of, or during the immediate flight from the commission
or attempted commission of, a felony and he had previously been convicted of the same
felony."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(j) (1995) ("The murder was committed
while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or attempt to commit, or flight
after committing or attempting to commit any degree of rape, unlawful sexual inter-
course, arson, kidnapping, robbery, sodomy or burglary."); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141(5)(d) (West Supp. 1997):
The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an
accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after com-
mitting or attempting to commit, any: robbery; sexual battery; aggravated child
abuse; abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult resulting in great bodily harm,
permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement; arson; burglary; kidnapping;
aircraft piracy; or unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive
device or bomb;
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(2) (1997) ("The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery,
or kidnapping was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of
another capital felony or aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was committed
while the offender was engaged in the commission of burglary or arson in the first de-
gree."); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(h)(7) (1997) ("The murder was committed in the per-
petration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnapping or may-
hem and the defendant killed, intended a killing, or acted with reckless indifference to
human life."); 720 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b)(6) (West Supp. 1997) (describing a
very long aggravating circumstance that requires that the defendant killed the vic-
tim--or that the defendant is legally accountable for the victim's death-and that the
murder was committed during the course of one of a long list of felonies); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(1) (Michie Supp. 1997) ("The defendant committed the murder by
intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit any of the
following: (A) Arson. (B) Burglary. (C) Child molesting. (D) Criminal deviate conduct.
(E) Kidnapping. (F) Rape. (G) Robbery. (H) Carjacking. (I) Criminal gang activity. (J)
Dealing in cocaine or a narcotic drug."); id. § 35-50-2-9(b)(13) ("The victim was a
victim of any of the following offenses for which the defendant was convicted: (A) Bat-
tery .... (B) Kidnapping .... (C) Criminal confinement .... (D) A sex
crime . . . ."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(a)(2) (Banks-Baldwin 1990) ("The
offense of murder or kidnapping was committed while the offender was engaged in the
commission of arson in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, burglary in the first
degree, rape in the first degree, or sodomy in the first degree."); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 905.4(A)(1) (West 1997) ("The offender was engaged in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, forcible rape, aggravated kidnapping, second
degree kidnapping, aggravated burglary, aggravated arson, aggravated escape, assault by
drive-by shooting, armed robbery, first degree robbery, or simple robbery."); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 413(d)(10) (1996) ("The defendant committed the murder while com-
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mitting or attempting to commit a carjacking, armed carjacking, robbery, arson in the
first degree, rape or sexual offense in the first degree."); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-
101(5)(d) (1994):
The capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an
accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after com-
mitting or attempting to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping,
aircraft piracy, sexual battery, unnatural intercourse with any child under the age
of twelve (12), or nonconsensual unnatural intercourse with mankind, or felonious
abuse and/or battery of a child ... or the unlawful use or detonation of a bomb
or explosive device;
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.2(11) (West Supp. 1997) ("The murder in the first degree
was committed while the defendant was engaged in the perpetration or was aiding or
encouraging another person to perpetrate or attempt to perpetrate a felony of any degree
of rape, sodomy, burglary, robbery, kidnapping, or any felony offense . . . ."); id.
§ 565.032.2(15) ("The murder was committed for the purpose of concealing or attempt-
ing to conceal any felony offense . . . ."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303(7) (1997)
("The offense was aggravated kidnapping that resulted in the death of the victim or the
death by direct action of the defendant of a person who rescued or attempted to rescue
the victim."); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.033(4) (Michie 1997):
The murder was committed while the person was engaged, alone or with others,
in the commission of or an attempt to commit or flight after committing or at-
tempting to commit, any robbery, sexual assault, arson in the first degree, bur-
glary, invasion of the home or kidnapping in the first degree, and the person
charged: (a) Killed or attempted to kill the person murdered; or (b) Knew or had
reason to know that life would be taken or lethal force used;
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(4)(g) (West Supp. 1997) ("The offense was committed
while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or
flight after committing or attempting to commit murder, robbery, sexual assault, arson,
burglary or kidnapping."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-5(B) (Michie 1994) ("[T]he
murder was committed with intent to kill in the commission of or attempt to commit
kidnaping, criminal sexual contact of a minor or criminal sexual penetration."); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(vii) (McKinney Supp. 1997):
[T]he victim was killed while the defendant was in the course of committing or
attempting to commit and in furtherance of robbery, burglary in the first degree or
second degree, kidnapping in the first degree, arson in the first degree or second
degree, rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the
first degree, aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree or escape in the first de-
gree, or in the course of and furtherance of immediate flight after committing or
attempting to commit any such crime or in the course of and furtherance of im-
mediate flight after attempting to commit the crime of murder in the second de-
gree... ;
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(5) (1988):
The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an
aider or abettor, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit, any homicide, robbery, rape or a sex of-
fense, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing,
placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb;
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(7) (Banks-Baldwin 1997):
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The offense was committed while the offender was committing, attempting to
commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnap-
ping, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, or aggravated burglary, and
either the offender was the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated
murder or, if not the principal offender, committed the aggravated murder with
prior calculation and design;
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(6) (West Supp. 1997) ("The defendant committed
a killing while in the perpetration of a felony."); id. § 9711(d)(13) ("The defendant
committed the killing or was an accomplice in the killing ... while in the perpetration
of a felony under the provisions of. . . The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and
Cosmetic Act .... ."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996):
The murder was committed while in the commission of the following crimes or
acts: (a) criminal sexual conduct in any degree; (b) kidnapping; (c) burglary in
any degree; (d) robbery while armed with a deadly weapon; (e) larceny with use
of a deadly weapon; (f) killing by poison; (g) drug trafficking ... ; (h) physical
torture; or (i) dismemberment of a person;
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1(10) (Michie Supp. 1997) ("The offense was com-
mitted in the course of manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing substances listed in
Schedules I and II."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(7) (1997):
The murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defen-
dant, while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to
commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing or attempting
to commit, any first degree murder, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, theft, kidnap-
ping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive
device or bomb;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(d) (Supp. 1997):
[T]he homicide was committed while the actor was engaged in the commission
of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit,
aggravated robbery, robbery, rape, rape of a child, object rape, object rape of a
child, forcible sodomy, sodomy upon a child, forcible sexual abuse, sexual abuse
of a child, aggravated sexual abuse of a child, child abuse of a child under the
age of 14 years, . . . or aggravated sexual assault, aggravated arson, arson, aggra-
vated burglary, burglary, aggravated kidnaping, kidnaping, or child kidnaping;
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020(11) (West Supp. 1997):
The murder was committed in the course of, in furtherance of, or in immediate
flight from one of the following crimes: (a) Robbery in the first or second degree;
(b) Rape in the first or second degree; (c) Burglary in the first or second degree
or residential burglary; (d) Kidnapping in the first degree; or (e) Arson in the first
degree;
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(iv) (Michie 1997) ("The murder was committed while
the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt
to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any aircraft piracy or the
unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb."); id. § 6-2-
102(h)(xii) ("The defendant killed another human being purposely and with premeditat-
ed malice and while engaged in, or as an accomplice in the commission of, or an at-
tempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, sexu-
al assault, arson, burglary or kidnapping."); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 19.03(a)(2) (West 1994) (including as part of the definition of capital murder: "the
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(4) The murder was part of a course of conduct in which the defendant
engaged."'
(5) The defendant committed "mass murder." '352
(6) The murder was committed incident to a hijacking. 53
(7) The murder was committed from a motor vehicle or near a motor vehi-
cle that transported the defendant. 4
(8) The murder was committed by intentionally discharging a firearm into
an inhabited dwelling. 55
(9) The defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death for one or more
persons in addition to the victim of the offense.356
person intentionally commits the murder in the course of committing or attempting to
commit kidnapping, burglary, robbery, aggravated sexual assault, arson, or obstruction
or retaliation").
351 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(11) (1988) ("The murder for which the de-
fendant stands convicted was part of a course of conduct in which the defendant en-
gaged and which included the commission by the defendant of other crimes of violence
against another person or persons.").
352 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(12) (1997) ("The defendant committed
'mass murder,' which is defined as the murder of three (3) or more persons whether
committed during a single criminal episode or at different times within a forty-eight
month period.").
3.3 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b)(4) (West Supp. 1997) ("[T]he murdered
individual was killed as a result of the hijacking of an airplane, train, ship, bus or other
public conveyance."); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.2(14) (West Supp. 1997) ("The mur-
dered individual was killed as a result of the hijacking of an airplane, train, ship, bus or
other public conveyance."); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(4) (West Supp. 1997)
("The death of the victim occurred while defendant was engaged in the hijacking of an
aircraft."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(m) (Supp. 1997):
[T]he homicide was committed during the act of unlawfully assuming control of
any aircraft, train, or other public conveyance by use of threats or force with
intent to obtain any valuable consideration for the release of the public convey-
ance or any passenger, crew member, or any other person aboard, or to direct the
route or movement of the public conveyance or otherwise exert control over the
public conveyance.
114 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(21) (Deering Supp. 1997) ("The murder was
intentional and perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle,
intentionally at another person or persons outside the vehicle with the intent to inflict
death."); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(15) (Michie Supp. 1997) ("The defendant
committed the murder by intentionally discharging a firearm ... (B) from a vehicle.");
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020(7) (West Supp. 1997):
The murder was committed during the course of or as a result of a shooting
where the discharge of the firearm ... is either from a motor vehicle or from the
immediate area of a motor vehicle that was used to transport the shooter or the
firearm, or both, to the scene of the discharge.
351 See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(15) (Michie Supp. 1997) ("The defendant
committed the murder by intentionally discharging a firearm ... (A) into an inhabited
dwelling . . ").
356 See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(5) (1994)' ("The defendant, in the commission of the
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offense, or in escaping apprehension for the violation of the offense, knowingly created
a grave risk of death to 1 or more persons in addition to the victim of the offense.");
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(3) (1994) ("The defendant knowingly created a great risk of
death to many persons."); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(3) (West Supp. 1997)
("In the commission of the offense the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of
death to another person or persons in addition to the victim of the offense."); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-4-604(4) (Michie Supp. 1995) ("The person in the commission of the
capital murder knowingly created a great risk of death to a person other than the victim
or caused the death of more than one (1) person in the same criminal episode."); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-802(5)(i) (West Supp. 1996) ("In the commission of the
offense, the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in
addition to the victim of the offense."); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(i)(3) (West
Supp. 1997) ("[T]he defendant committed the offense and in such commission knowing-
ly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim of the of-
fense."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(c) (West Supp. 1997) ("The defendant know-
ingly created a great risk of death to many persons."); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(3)
(1997) ("The offender, by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping, knowingly
created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of a
weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one
person."); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(h)(3) (1997) ("The defendant knowingly created a
great risk of death to many persons."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4625(2) (1995) ("The
defendant knowingly or purposely killed or created a great risk of death to more than
one person."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(a)(3) (Banks-Baldwin 1990):
The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping knowingly cre-
ated a great risk of death to more than one (1) person in a public place by means
of a destructive device, weapon, or other device which would normally be hazard-
ous to the lives of more than one (1) person;
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(A)(4) (West 1997) ("The offender knowingly
created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person."); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 99-19-101(5)(c) (1994) ("The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death
to many persons."); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.2(3) (West Supp. 1997) ("The offender
by his act of murder in the first degree knowingly created a great risk of death to more
than one person by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous
to the lives of more than one person."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303(5) (1997)
("The offense was deliberate homicide and was committed as a part of a scheme or
operation that, if completed, would result in the death of more than one person."); NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2523(1)( 0 (Michie 1995) ("The offender knowingly created a
great risk of death to at least several persons."); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.033(3)
(Michie 1997) ("The murder was committed by a person who knowingly created a great
risk of death to more than one person by means of a weapon, device or course of action
which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person."); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 630:5(Vll)(e) (1996) ("In the commission of the offense of capital mur-
der, the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death to one or more persons in
addition to the victims of the offense."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(4)(b) (West Supp.
1997) ("In the commission of the murder, the defendant purposely or knowingly created
a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim."); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-2000(e)(10) (1988) ("The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to
more than one person by means of a weapon or device which would normally be haz-
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(10) The defendant committed or attempted to commit more than one mur-
der at the same time.357
ardous to the lives of more than one person."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(5)
(Banks-Baldwin 1997) ("[T]he offense at bar was part of a course of conduct involving
the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons by the offender.");
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(2) (West 1983) ("The defendant knowingly created
a great risk of death to more than one person."); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 9711(d)(7) (West Supp. 1997) ("In the commission of the offense the defendant
knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim of
the offense."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(3) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996) ("The
offender by his act of murder knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one
person in a public place by means of a weapon or device which normally would be
hazardous to the lives of more than one person."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-
•1(2) (Michie Supp. 1997) ("The defendant by the defendant's act knowingly created a
great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon or
device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person.");
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(3) (1997) ("The defendant knowingly created a great
risk of death to two (2) or more persons, other than the victim murdered, during the act
of murder."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(c) (Supp. 1997) ("[T]he actor knowingly
created a great risk of death to a person other than the victim and the actor."); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(iii) (Michie 1997) ("The defendant knowingly created a great
risk of death to two (2) or more persons.").
"5 See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(16) (1994) ("The defendant intentionally killed or at-
tempted to kill more than one person in a single criminal episode."); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-703(F)(8) (West Supp. 1997) ("The defendant has been convicted of one or
more other homicides ... which were committed during the commission of the of-
fense."); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(3) (Deering Supp. 1997) ("The defendant, in this
proceeding, has been convicted of more than one offense of murder in the first or sec-
ond degree."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(k) (1995) ("The defendant's course
of conduct resulted in the deaths of 2 or more persons where the deaths are a probable
consequence of the defendant's conduct."); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(h)(2) (1997) ("At
the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed another murder.");
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(b)(3) (West Supp. 1997):
The defendant has been convicted of murdering two or more individu-
als ... regardless of whether the deaths occurred as the result of the same act or
of several related or unrelated acts so long as the deaths were the result of either
an intent to kill more than one person or of separate acts which the defendant
knew would cause death or create a strong probability of death or great bodily
harm to the murdered individual or another;
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(a)(6) (Banks-Baldwin 1990) ("The offender's act or
acts of killing were intentional and resulted in multiple deaths."); MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 413(d)(9) (1996) ("The defendant committed more than one offense of murder in
the first degree arising out of the same incident."); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.2(2)
(West Supp. 1997) ("The murder in the first degree offense was committed while the
offender was engaged in' the commission or attempted commission of another unlawful
homicide."); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2523(1)(e) (Michie 1995) ("At the time the
murder was committed, the offender also committed another murder."); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 200.033(12) (Michie 1997) ("The defendant has, in the immediate pro-
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(11) The defendant committed the murder after substantial planning and
premeditation.35
(12) The defendant killed the victim while lying in wait.359
(13) The defendant purposely killed the victim.3 60
(14) The defendant committed the offense while engaged in a "[c]ontinuing
ceeding, been convicted of more than one offense of murder in the first or second de-
gree . . . ,); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(viii) (McKinney Supp. 1997) ("[A]s part
of the same criminal transaction, the defendant, with intent to cause serious physical
injury to or the death of an additional person or persons, causes the death of an addi-
tional person or persons; provided, however, the victim is not a participant in the crimi-
nal transaction."); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(11) (West Supp. 1997) ("The
defendant has been convicted of another murder committed in any jurisdiction and com-
mitted either before or at the time of the offense at issue."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
20(C)(a)(9) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996) ("Two or more persons were murdered by the
defendant by one act or pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct."); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(b) (Supp. 1997) ("The homicide was committed incident to one act,
scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during which two or more persons were
killed, or during which the actor attempted to kill one or more persons in addition to
the victim who was killed."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020(10) (West Supp.
1997) ("There was more than one victim and the murders were part of a common
scheme or plan or the result of a single act of the person."); see also TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 19.03(a)(7) (West 1994) (including as part of the definition of capital murder:
"the person murders more than one person: (A) during the same criminal transaction; or
(B) during different criminal transactions but the murders are committed pursuant to the
same scheme or course of conduct").
358 See 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (c)(9) (1994) ("The defendant committed the offense after
substantial planning and premeditation to cause the death of a person or commit an act
of terrorism."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(u) (Supp. 1996) ("The murder
was premeditated and the result of substantial planning [as to the commission of the
murder itself]."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(i) (West Supp. 1997) ("The capital
felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated man-
ner without any pretense of moral or legal justification."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630.5 (VII)(f) (1996) ("The defendant committed the offense after substantial plan-
ning and premeditation.").
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(15) (Deering 1997) ("The defendant intentional-
ly killed the victim while lying in wait."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-802(5)(f) (Supp.
1996) ("The defendant committed the offense while lying in wait, from ambush ....");
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(3) (Michie Supp. 1997) ("The defendant committed the
murder by lying in wait."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303(4) (1997) ("The offense
was deliberate homicide and was committed by a person lying in wait or ambush.").
360 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630.5(Vll)(a) (1996):
The defendant: (1) purposely killed the victim; (2) purposely inflicted serious
bodily injury which resulted in the death of the victim; (3) purposely engaged in
conduct which: (A) the defendant knew would create a grave risk of death to a
person, other than one of the participants in the offense; and (B) resulted in the
death of the victim.
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criminal enterprise involving drug sales to minors.""36
(15) The murder was committed by means of a bomb, destructive device,
explosive, or similar device. 2
(16) The murder was committed by means of poison or a lethal sub-
stance.363
(17) The defendant committed the offense with an assault weapon.
361 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(13) (1994).
362 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-604(9) (Michie Supp. 1995):
The capital murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, ex-
plosive, or similar device which the person planted, hid, or concealed in any
place, area, dwelling, building, or structure, or mailed or delivered, or caused to
be planted, hidden, concealed, mailed, or delivered, and the person knew that his
act or acts would create a great risk of death to human life;
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(4) (Deering 1997):
The murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or explosive
planted, hidden, or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building, or structure,
and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that his or her act or
acts would create a great risk of death to one or more human beings;
id. § 190.2(a)(6):
The murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or explosive
that the defendant mailed or delivered, attempted to mail or deliver, or caused to
be mailed or delivered, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have
known, that his or her act or acts would create a great risk of death to one or
more human beings;
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-802(5)(f) (Supp. 1996) ("The defendant committed the of-
fense ... by use of an explosive or incendiary device."); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-
9(b)(2) (Michie Supp. 1997) ("The defendant committed the murder by the unlawful
detonation of an explosive with intent to injure person or damage property."); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(4)(j) (West Supp. 1997) ("The homicidal act that the defendant
committed or procured . . . " violated another statute regarding causing or risking wide-
spread damage through the use of an explosion, flood, avalanche, or similar means
listed.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(7) (1997):
The murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defen-
dant, while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to
commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing or attempting
to commit, any ... unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive
device or bomb;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(i) (Supp. 1997) ("[T]he homicide was committed by
means of a destructive device, bomb, explosive, incendiary device, or similar device
which was planted, hidden, or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building, or struc-
ture, or was mailed or delivered.").
363 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(n) (Supp. 1997) ("[T]he homicide was com-
mitted by means of the administration of a poison or of any lethal substance or of any
substance administered in a lethal amount, dosage, or quantity.").
36 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(i)(7) (1997) ("[T]he defendant committed the
offense with an assault weapon .... ).
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(18) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in "ritual-
istic acts.,1 65
b. Motivation for the Murder66
(1) The murder was committed for pecuniary gain or pursuant to an agree-
ment that the defendant would receive something of value.367
365 See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(A)(12) (West 1997) ("The offender
was engaged in the activities prohibited by [a statute dealing with 'ritualistic acts'].").
'66 This Article has divided the groups of aggravating factors into categories for orga-
nizational purposes and has tried to place them where they fit the best. Some factors,
however, could be grouped into more than one category. For example, some of the
"victim status" category aggravating factors also fall under the category of "motivation
for murder." One such aggravating factor is the killing of an informant because that
person is an informant.
367 Many jurisdictions use a variation of this aggravating factor, which generally
includes defendants whose murders involved some type of robbery and defendants who
murdered for hire. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(7), (8) (1994) ("The defendant committed
the offense as consideration of the receipt, or in the expectation of the receipt, of any-
thing of pecuniary value."); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(6) (1994) ("The capital offense was
committed for pecuniary gain."); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(5) (West Supp.
1996) ("The defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in
expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value."); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-
604(6) (Michie Supp. 1995) ("The capital murder was committed for pecuniary gain.");
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(1) (Deering 1997) ("The murder was intentional and
carried out for financial gain."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-802(5)(h) (Supp. 1996)
("The class 1 felony was committed for pecuniary gain."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 4209(e)(1)(h) (Supp. 1996) ("The defendant paid or was paid by another person or
had agreed to pay or be paid by another person or had conspired to pay or be paid by
another person for the killing of the victim."); id. § 4209(e)(1)(o) ("The murder was
committed for pecuniary gain."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.1.41(5)(f) (West Supp. 1997)
("The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain."); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-
30(b)(4) (1997) ("The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another,
for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value."); IDAHO
CODE § 19-2515(h)(4) (1997) ("The murder was committed for remuneration or the
promise of remuneration or the defendant employed another to commit the murder for
remuneration or the promise of remuneration."); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(b)(5)
(West Supp. 1997) ("[T]he defendant committed the murder pursuant to a contract,
agreement or understanding by which he was. to receive money or anything of value in
return for committing the murder .... "); KN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4625(3) (1996) ("The
defendant committed the crime for the defendant's self or another for the purpose of
receiving money or any other thing of monetary value."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.025(2)(a)(4) (Michie 1996) ("The offender committed the offense of murder for
himself or another, for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary
value, or for other profit."); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(A)(5) (West 1997)
("The offender offered or has been offered or has given or received anything of value
for the commission of the offense."); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d)(6) (1996) ("The
1998] ARBITRARY AND MANDATORY CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 411
(2) The defendant caused or directed another to commit murder, or the de-
fendant procured the commission of the offense by payment, promise of
payment, or anything of pecuniary value.36
defendant committed the murder pursuant to an agreement or contract for remuneration
or the promise of remuneration to commit the murder."); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-
101(5)(f) (Supp. 1997) ("The capital offense was committed for pecuniary gain."); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 565.032.2(4) (West Supp. 1997) ("The offender committed the offense of
murder in the first degree for himself or another, for the purpose of receiving money or
any other thing of monetary value from the victim of the murder or another."); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 29-2523(1)(c) (1995) ("The murder was committed for hire, or for pecu-
niary gain . . . ."); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.033(6) (Michie 1997) ("The murder
was committed by a person, for himself or another, to receive money or any other thing
of monetary value."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630.5(VII)(i) (1996) ("The murder was
committed for pecuniary gain."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(4)(d) (West Supp. 1997)
("The defendant committed the murder as consideration for the receipt, or in expecta-
tion of the receipt of anything of pecuniary value."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-5(F)
(Michie Supp. 1997) ("[T]he capital felony was committed for hire."); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(vi) (McKinney Supp. 1997):
[T]he defendant committed the killing ... pursuant to an agreement with a person
other than the intended victim to commit the same for the receipt, or in expecta-
tion of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value from a party to the agreement
or from a person other than the intended victim acting at the direction of a party
to such agreement;
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(6) (Supp. 1996) ("The capital felony was committed
for pecuniary gain."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(2) (Banks-Baldwin 1997)
("The offense was committed for hire."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(3) (West
1983) ("The person committed the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuner-
ation . . . ."); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(2) (West Supp. 1997) ("The defen-
dant paid or was paid by another person or had contracted to pay or be paid by another
person or had conspired to pay or be paid by another person for the killing of the vic-
tim."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(4) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996) ("The offender
committed the murder for himself or another for the purpose of receiving money or a
thing of monetary value."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1(3) (Michie Supp. 1997)
("The defendant committed the offense for the benefit of the defendant or another, for
the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value."); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(4) (1997) ("The defendant committed the murder for remuneration
or the promise of remuneration . . . ."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(f) (Supp.
1997) ("The homicide was committed for pecuniary or other personal gain."); id. § 76-
5-202(1)(g) ("The defendant committed ... the homicide pursuant to an agreement or
contract for remuneration or the promise of remuneration for commission of the homi-
cide."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020(4) (West Supp. 1997) ("The person com-
mitted the murder pursuant to an agreement that he or she would receive money or any
other thing of value for committing the murder."); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(vi)
(Michie 1997) ("The murder was committed for compensation, the collection of insur-
ance benefits or other similar pecuniary gain."); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 19.03(a)(3) (West Supp. 1997) (including as part of the definition of capital murder:
"the person commits the murder for remuneration or the promise of remunera-
tion . . ").
... This aggravating circumstance includes defendants who paid for the commission
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of murder. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(7) (1994) ("The defendant procured the commission
of the offense by payment, or promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value.");
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(4) (West Supp. 1996) ("The defendant procured
the commission of the offense by payment, or promise of payment, of anything of pecu-
niary value."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-802(5)(e) (Supp. 1996) ("The defendant has
been a party to an agreement to kill another person in furtherance of which a person
has been intentionally killed."); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(i)(5) (1997) ("[T]he de-
fendant procured the commission of the offense by payment, or promise of payment, of
anything of pecuniary value."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(h) (Supp. 1996)
("The defendant paid ... another person or had agreed to pay ... another person or
had conspired to pay . . . another person for the killing of the victim."); id.
§ 4209(e)(1)(m) ("The defendant caused or directed another to commit murder or com-
mitted murder as an agent or employee of another person."); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-
30(b)(6) (1997) ("The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or com-
mitted murder as an agent or employee of another person."); IDAHO CODE § 19-
2515(h)(4) (1997) ("[Trhe defendant employed another to commit the murder for remu-
neration or the promise of remuneration."); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(b)(5) (West
Supp. 1997) ("[T]he defendant ... procured another to commit the murder for money
or anything of value."); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(5) (Michie Supp. 1997) ("The
defendant committed the murder by hiring another person to kill."); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-4625(4) (1995) ("The defendant authorized or employed aiother person to commit
the crime."); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(A)(5) (West 1997) ("The offender
offered ... or has given ... anything of value for the commission of the offense.");
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d)(7) (1996) ("The defendant engaged or employed
another person to commit the murder and the murder was committed pursuant to an
agreement or contract for remuneration or the promise of remuneration."); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 565.032.2(6) (West Supp. 1997) ("The offender caused or directed another to
commit murder in the first degree or committed murder in the first degree as an agent
or employee of another person."); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2523(1)(c) (Michie
1995) ("The murder was committed for hire, or for pecuniary gain, or the defendant
hired another to commit the murder for the defendant."); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 200.033.6 (Michie 1997) ("The murder was committed by a person, for himself or
another, to receive money or any other thing of monetary value."); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:11-3(4)(e) (West Supp. 1997) ("The defendant procured the commission of the
offense by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value."); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-5(F) (Michie Supp. 1997) ("[T]he capital felony was committed
for hire"); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27(1)(a)(vi) (McKinney Supp. 1997):
[T]he defendant ... procured commission of the killing pursuant to an agreement
with a person other than the intended victim to commit the same for the receipt,
or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value from a party to the
agreement or from a person other than the intended victim acting at the direction
of a party to such agreement;
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(2) (Banks-Baldwin 1997) ("The offense was com-
mitted for hire."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(3) (West 1983) ("The per-
son ... employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of
remuneration."); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(2) (West Supp. 1997) ("The
defendant paid ... another person or had contracted to pay ... another person or had
conspired to pay ... another person for the killing of the victim."); S.C. CODE ANN.
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(3) The murder was committed to avoid or prevent arrest, to effect an es-
cape, or to conceal the commission of a crime.369
§ 16-3-20(C)(a)(6) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996) ("The offender caused or directed another
to commit murder or committed murder as an agent or employee of another person.");
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1(5) (Michie Supp. 1997) ("The defendant caused or
directed another to commit murder or committed murder as an agent or employee of
another person."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(4) (1997) ("The defen-
dant ... employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of
remuneration."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(g) (Supp. 1997) ("the defendant com-
mitted, or engaged or employed another person to commit the homicide pursuant to an
agreement or contract for remuneration or the promise of remuneration for commission
of the homicide."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020(5) (West Supp. 1997) ("The
person solicited another person to commit the murder and had paid or had agreed to
pay money or any other thing of value for committing the murder."); see also TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(3) (West Supp. 1997) (including as part of the definition
of capital murder: "the person ... employs another to commit the murder for remuner-
ation or the promise of remuneration").
369 See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(5) (1994) ("The capital offense was committed for
the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custo-
dy."); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(7) (West Supp. 1996) ("The defendant com-
mitted the offense while in the custody of or on authorized or unauthorized release from
the state department of corrections, a law enforcement agency or a county or city jail.");
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-604(5) (Michie Supp. 1995) ("The capital murder was commit-
ted for the purpose of avoiding or preventing an arrest or effecting an escape from
custody."); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(5) (Deering 1997) ("The murder was commit-
ted for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or perfecting or attempting
to perfect an escape -from lawful custody."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-802(5)(k)
(Supp. 1996) ("The class 1 felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or pre-
venting a lawful arrest or prosecution or effecting an escape from custody."); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(b) (Supp. 1996) ("The murder was committed for the
purpose of avoiding or preventing an arrest or for the purpose of effecting an escape
from custody."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(e) (West Supp. 1997) ("The capital
felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or ef-
fecting an escape from custody."); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(10) (1997) ("The
murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a
lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself or another.");
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4625(5) (1995) ("The defendant committed the crime in order to
avoid or prevent a lawful arrest or prosecution."); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d)(3)
(1996) ("The defendant committed the murder in furtherance of an escape or an attempt
to escape from or evade the lawful custody, arrest, or detention of or by an officer or
guard of a correctional institution or by a law enforcement officer."); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 99-19-101(5)(e) (Supp. 1997) ("The capital offense was committed for the purpose of
avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody."); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 565.032.2(10) (West Supp. 1997) ("The murder in the first degree was commit-
ted for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or custo-
dy in a place of lawful confinement, of himself or another."); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 29-2523(1)(b) (Michie 1995) ("The murder was committed in an apparent effort to
conceal the commission of a crime, or to conceal the identity of the perpetrator of a
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(4) The capital offense was committed to interfere with the lawful exercise
of any government function or the enforcement of the laws.37 °
crime."); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.033.5 (Michie 1997) ("The murder was commit-
ted to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest or to effect an escape from custody."); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 630.5(VII)(j) (1996) ("The murder was committed for the purpose of
avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from lawful custody.");
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(4)(f) (West Supp. 1997) ("The murder was committed for
the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, punishment or confinement for
another offense committed by the defendant or another."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-
5(c) (Michie Supp. 1997) ("[T]he murder was committed with the intent to kill by the
defendant while attempting to escape from a penal institution of New Mexico."); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(4) (Supp. 1996) ("The capital felony was committed for the
purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custo-
dy."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(5) (West 1983) ("The murder was committed
for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution."); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1(8) (Michie Supp. 1997) ("The offense was committed by a
person in, or who has escaped from, the lawful custody of a law enforcement officer or
place of lawful confinement."); id. § 23A-27A-1(9) ("The offense was committed for
the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a
place of lawful confinement, of the defendant or another."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
204(i)(8) (1997) ("The murder was committed by the defendant while the defendant
was in lawful custody or in a place of lawful confinement or during the defendant's
escape from lawful custody or from a place of lawful confinement."); id. § 39-13-
204(i)(6) ("The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or
preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another."); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(e) (Supp. 1997) ("[T]he homicide was committed for the purpose
of avoiding or preventing an arrest of the defendant or another by a peace officer acting
under color of legal authority or for the purpose of effecting the defendant's or
another's escape from lawful custody."); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(v) (Michie
1997) ("The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful
arrest or effecting an escape from custody."); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 19.03(a)(4) (West Supp. 1997) (including as part of the definition of capital murder:
"the person commits the murder while escaping or attempting to escape from a penal
institution").
370 See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(7) (1994) ("The capital offense was committed to
disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement
of laws."); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-604(7) (Michie Supp. 1995) ("The capital murder
was committed for the purpose of disrupting or hindering the lawful exercise of any
government or political function."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(g) (West Supp.
1997) ("The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of
any governmental function or the enforcement of laws."); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-
101(5)(g) (Supp. 1997) ("The capital offense was committed to disrupt or hinder the
lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws"); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 565.032.2(16) (West Supp. 1997) ("The murder was committed for the purpose
of causing or attempting to cause a person to refrain from initiating or aiding in the
prosecution of a felony offense . . . ."); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2523(1)(h) (Michie
1995) ("The crime was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any gov-
ernmental function or the enforcement of the laws."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
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(5) The defendant committed the murder as part of a gang activity or to
obtain or maintain membership or to advance his or her position in an orga-
nization or group.37'
(6) The defendant had no apparent motive.372
c. Defendant's Status
(1) The defendant is a future danger.373
(2) The defendant has been convicted of, or committed, a prior murder, a
felony involving violence, or other serious felony.374
2000(e)(7) (Supp. 1996) ("The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the
lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws."); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(i)(iv) (Supp. 1997) ("[T]he homicide was committed for the
purpose of ... (iv) disrupting or hindering any lawful governmental function or en-
forcement of laws.").
371 See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.2(17) (West Supp. 1997) ("The murder was com-
mitted during the commission of a crime which is part of a pattern of criminal street
gang activity . . . ."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020 (6) (West Supp. 1997)
("The person committed the murder to obtain or maintain his or her membership or to
advance his or her position in the hierarchy of an organization, association, or identifi-
able group.").
372 See NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.033(9) (Michie 1997) ("The murder was com-
mitted upon one or more persons at random and without apparent motive.").
373 See IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(h)(8) (1997) ("The defendant, by prior conduct or
conduct in the commission of the murder at hand, has exhibited a propensity to commit
murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat to society."); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(7) (West 1983) ("The existence of a probability that the defen-
dant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a .continuing threat to
society."); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(b)(B) (1996) ("Whether there is a probability that
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
threat to society."); TEX. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. § 37.071(b)(1) (West Supp. 1997)
("[W]hether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society."); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
264.2(1) (Michie 1995) ("[T]here is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society.");
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(xi) (Michie 1997) ("The defendant poses a substantial
and continuing threat of future dangerousness or is likely to commit continued acts of
criminal violence.").
In Washington, this factor is considered only after a defendant is convicted of ag-
gravated first-degree murder by a finding of at least one aggravating circumstance. See
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020 (West Supp. 1997) (listing aggravating circum-
stances for aggravated first degree murder); id. § 1095.070(8) ("Whether there is a
likelihood that the defendant will pose a danger to others in the future.").
311 See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c) (1994) ("Previous conviction of violent felony involving
firearm," "Previous conviction of offense for which a sentence of death or life impris-
onment was authorized," "Previous conviction of other serious offenses," "Conviction
for two felony drug offenses," "Conviction for serious Federal drug offenses," or "Prior
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conviction of sexual assault or child molestation"); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(2) (1994)
("The defendant was previously convicted of another capital offense or a felony involv-
ing the use or threat of violence to the person."); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
703(F)(1) (West Supp. 1996) ("The defendant has been convicted of another offense in
the United States for which under Arizona law a sentence of life imprisonment or death
was imposable."); id. § 13-703(F)(2) (West 1989) ("The defendant was previously con-
victed of a serious offense, whether preparatory or completed."); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-
4-604(3) (Michie Supp. 1995) ("The person previously committed another felony, an
element of which was the use or threat of violence to another person or the creation of
a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another person."); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190.2(a)(2) (Deering 1997) ("The defendant was convicted previously of mur-
der in the first or second degree."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-802(5)(b) (Supp. 1996)
("The defendant was previously convicted in this state of a class 1 or 2 felony involving
violence ... or was previously convicted by another state or the United States of an
offense which would constitute a class 1 or 2 felony involving violence . . . ."); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(i)(2) (1997):
[T]he defendant committed the offense after having been convicted of two or
more state offenses or two or more federal offenses or of one or more state of-
fenses and one or more federal offenses for each of which a penalty of more than
one year imprisonment may be imposed, which offenses were committed on dif-
ferent occasions and which involved the infliction of serious bodily injury upon
another person;
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(i) (Supp. 1996) ("The defendant was previously
convicted of another murder or manslaughter or of a felony involving the use of, or
threat of, force or violence upon another person."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(b)
(West Supp. 1997) ("The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony
or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person."); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-10-30(b)(1) (1997) ("The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping
was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony.");
IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(h)(1) (1997) ("The defendant was previously convicted of an-
other murder."); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(b)(3) (West Supp. 1997):
The defendant has been convicted of murdering two or more individu-
als ... regardless of whether the deaths occurred as the result of the same act or
of several related or unrelated acts so long as the deaths were the result of either
an intent to kill more than one person or of separate acts which the defendant
knew would cause death or create a strong probability of death or great bodily
harm to the murdered individual or another;
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(7) (Michie Supp. 1997) ("The defendant has been
convicted of another murder."); id. § 35-50-2-9(b)(8) ("The defendant has committed
another murder, at any time, regardless of whether the defendant has been convicted of
that other murder."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4625(1) (1995) ("The defendant was previ-
ously convicted of a felony in which the defendant inflicted great bodily harm, disfig-
urement, dismemberment or death on another."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(a)(1)
(Michie Supp. 1996) ("The offense of murder or kidnapping was committed by a person
with a prior record of conviction for a capital offense, or the offense of murder was
committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal con-
victions."); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(3) (West 1997) ("The offender has
been previously convicted of an unrelated murder, aggravated rape, aggravated burglary,
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aggravated arson, aggravated escape, armed robbery, or aggravated kidnapping."); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5)(b) (Supp. 1997) ("The defendant was previously convicted
of another capital offense or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the
person."); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.2(1) (West Supp. 1997) ("The offense was com-
mitted by a person with a prior record of conviction for murder in the first degree, or
the offense was committed by a person who has one or more serious assaultive criminal
convictions."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303(2) (1997) ("The offense was deliberate
homicide and was committed by a defendant who had been previously convicted of
another deliberate homicide."); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(1)(a) (1995) ("The offender
was previously convicted of another murder or a crime involving the use or threat of
violence to the person, or has a substantial history of serious assaultive or terrorizing
criminal activity."); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.033(2) (Michie 1997) ("The murder
was committed by a person who, at any time before a penalty hearing is conducted for
the murder ... is or has been convicted of: (a) Another murder ... or (b) A felony
involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another . . . ."); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 630.5(VII)(b) (1996) ("The defendant has been convicted of another state
or federal offense resulting in the death of a person, for which a sentence of life impris-
onment or a sentence of death was authorized by law" ); id § 630.5(VII)(c) ("The de-
fendant has previously been convicted of 2 or more state or federal offenses punishable
by a term of imprisonment of more than one year, committed on different occasions,
involving the infliction of, or attempted infliction of, serious bodily injury upon another
person."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(4)(a) (West Supp. 1997) ("The defendant has
been convicted, at any time, of another murder."); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(ix)
(McKinney Supp. 1997) ("[P]rior to committing the killing, the defendant had been
convicted of murder . . . "); id. § 125.27(1)(a)(xi) ("[T]he defendant intentionally
caused the death of two or more additional persons within the state in separate criminal
transactions within a period of twenty-four months when committed in a similar fashion
or pursuant to a common scheme or plan."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(2) (Supp.
1996) ("The defendant had been previously convicted of another capital felony or had
been previously adjudicated delinquent in a juvenile proceeding for committing an of-
fense that would be a capital felony if committed by an adult."); id. § 15A-2000(e)(3):
The defendant had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or
threat of violence to the person or had been previously adjudicated delinquent in a
juvenile proceeding for committing an offense that would be a Class A, B1, B2,
C, D, or E felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person if the of-
fense had been committed by an adult;
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(5) (Baldwin-Banks 1997):
Prior to the offense at bar, the offender was convicted of an offense an essential
element of which was the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill another, or the
offense at bar was part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful killing of
or attempt to kill two or more persons by the offender;
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12 (1) (West 1983) ("The defendant was previously
convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person."); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(9) (West Supp. 1997) ("The defendant has a significant
history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person."); id.
§ 9711(d)(10):
The defendant has been convicted of another Federal or State offense, committed
either before or at the time of the offense at issue, for which a sentence of life
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(3) The capital offense was committed by a person who is incarcerated, has
escaped, is on probation, is in jail, or is under a sentence of imprisonment.375
imprisonment or death was imposable or the defendant was undergoing a sentence
of life imprisonment for any reason at the time of the commission of the offense;
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(12) (West Supp. 1997) ("The defendant has been
convicted of voluntary manslaughter ... or a substantially equivalent crime in any other
jurisdiction, committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue."); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(2) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996) ("The murder was committed by a
person with a prior conviction for murder."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1(1)
(Michie Supp. 1997) ("The offense was committed by a person with a prior record of
conviction for a Class A or Class B felony, or the offense of murder was committed by
a person who has a felony conviction for a crime of violence . . . ."); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(2) (1997) ("The defendant was previously convicted of one (1) or
more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use
of violence to the person."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(h) (Supp. 1997) ("[T]he
actor was previously convicted of aggravated murder, murder, or of a felony involving
the use or threat of violence to a person."); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(ii) (Michie
1997) ("The defendant was previously convicted of another murder in the first degree
or a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.").
Note that several jurisdictions have more than one aggravating circumstance that is
a variation on this factor.
... See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(1) (1994) ("The capital offense was committed by a
person under sentence of imprisonment."); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(7)
(West Supp. 1996) ("The defendant committed the offense while in the custody of or on
authorized or unauthorized release from the state department of corrections, a law en-
forcement agency or a county or city jail."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-802(5)(a)
(Supp. 1996) ("The class 1 felony was committed by a person under sentence of impris-
onment for a class 1, 2, or 3 felony . . . ."); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(a)
(Supp. 1996) ("The murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from,
the custody of a law-enforcement officer or place of confinement."); id. § 4209(e)(1)(n)
("The defendant was under a sentence of life imprisonment, whether for natural life or
otherwise, at the time of the commission of the murder."); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141(5)(a) (West Supp. 1997) ("The capital felony was committed by a per-
son ... under sentence of imprisonment or placed on community control or on felony
probation."); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(9) (1997) ("The offense of murder was
committed by a person in, or who has escaped from, the lawful custody of a peace
officer or place of lawful confinement."); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(b)(10) (West
Supp. 1997):
[T]he defendant was incarcerated in an institution or facility of the Department of
Corrections at the time of the murder, and while committing an offense punish-
able as a felony under Illinois law, or while engaged in a conspiracy or solicita-
tion to commit such offense, intentionally killed an individual or counseled, com-
manded, induced, procured or caused the intentional killing of the murdered indi-
vidual;
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(9) (Michie Supp. 1997) ("The defendant was: (A)
under the custody of the department of correction; (B) under the custody of a county
sheriff; (C) on probation after receiving a sentence for the commission of a felony; or
(D) on parole; at the time the murder was committed."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4625(7)
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(1995) ("The defendant committed the crime while serving a sentence of imprisonment
on conviction of a felony."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(a)(5) (Michie 1996)
("The offense of murder was committed by a person who was a prisoner and the victim
was a prison employee engaged at the time of the act in the performance of his du-
ties."); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(6) (West 1997) ("The offender at the
time of the commission of the offense was imprisoned after sentence for the commis-
sion of an unrelated forcible felony."); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d)(2) (1996)
("The defendant committed the murder at a time when he was confined in any correc-
tional institution."); MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5)(a) (Supp. 1997) ("The capital
offense was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment."); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 565.032.2(9) (West Supp. 1997) ("The murder in the first degree was commit-
ted by a person in, or who has escaped from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or
place of lawful confinement."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303(1) (1997) ("The of-
fense was deliberate homicide and was committed by a person serving a sentence of
imprisonment in the state prison."); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.033(1) (Michie 1997)
("The murder was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment."); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-5(D) (Michie Supp. 1997) ("[W]hile incarcerated in a penal insti-
tution in New Mexico, the defendant, with the intent to kill, murdered a person who
was at the time incarcerated in or lawfully on the premises of a penal institution in New
Mexico"); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(iv) (McKinney Supp. 1997):
[T]he defendant was confined in a state correctional institution or was otherwise
in custody upon a sentence for the term of his natural life, or upon a sentence
commuted to one of natural life, or upon a sentence for an indeterminate term the
minimum of which was at least fifteen years and the maximum of which was
natural life, or at the time of the commission of the killing, the defendant had es-
caped from such confinement or custody while serving such a sentence and had
not yet been returned to such confinement or custody;
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(1) (1996) ("The capital felony was committed by a
person lawfully incarcerated."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(4) (Banks-
Baldwin 1997) ("The offense was committed while the offender was a prisoner in a
detention facility . . . ."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(6) (West Supp. 1997)
("The murder was committed by a person while serving a sentence of imprisonment on
conviction of a felony."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1(8) (Michie Supp. 1997)
("The offense was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from, the lawful cus-
tody of a law enforcement officer or place of lawful confinement."); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-13-204(i)(8) (Supp. 1997) ("The murder was committed by the defendant while the
defendant was in lawful custody or in a place of lawful confinement or during the
defendant's escape from lawful custody or from a place of lawful confinement."); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(a) (Supp. 1997) ("[T]he homicide was committed by a per-
son who is confined in a jail or other correctional institution."); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10.95.020(2) (West Supp. 1997) ("[T]he person was serving a term of imprison-
ment, had escaped, or was on authorized or unauthorized leave in or from a state facili-
ty or program for the incarceration or treatment of persons adjudicated guilty of
crimes."); id. § 10.95.020(3) ("[T]he person was in custody in a county or county-city
jail as a consequence of having been adjudicated guilty of a felony."); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(i) (Michie 1997) ("The murder was committed by a person: (A)
Confined in a jail or correctional facility; (B) On parole or on probation for a felony;
(C) After escaping detention or incarceration; or (D) Released on bail pending appeal of
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(4) The defendant was a criminal street gang member.37 6
(5) The defendant was a drug dealer or has prior convictions involving the
distribution of a controlled substance.3'
d. Victim's Status
(1) The victim was under a certain age.37
his conviction."); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(5) (West Supp. 1997)
(including as part of the definition of capital murder: "the person, while incarcerated in
a penal institution, murders another: (A) who is employed in the operation of the penal
institution; or (B) with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination
or in the profits of a combination"); id § 19.03(a)(6) (including as part of the definition
of capital murder: "the person: (A) while incarcerated for an offense under this section
or Section 19.02, murders another; or (B) while serving a sentence of life imprisonment
or a term of 99 years for an offense under Section 20.04, 22.021, or 29.03, murders
another"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(l)(p) (Supp. 1996) ("[T]he actor was under a
sentence of life imprisonment or a sentence of death at the time of the commission of
the homicide."); cf MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303(8) (1997) (listing incarceration as a
capital aggravating factor for nonhomicide offenses of attempted deliberate homicide,
aggravated assault, or aggravated kidnapping).
376 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(n) (West Supp. 1997) ("The capital felony was
committed by a criminal street gang member.").
377 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(b)(9) (West Supp. 1997) ("[Tlhe defendant, while
committing an offense punishable under [several sections] of the Illinois Controlled
Substances Act, or while engaged in a conspiracy or solicitation to commit such of-
fense, intentionally killed an individual or counseled, commanded, induced, procured or
caused the intentional killing of the murdered individual"); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 905.4(A)(11) (West 1997) ("The offender was engaged in the distribution,
exchange, sale, or purchase, or any attempt thereof, of a controlled dangerous sub-
stance . ... "); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VII)(d) (1996) ("The defendant has
previously been convicted of 2 or more state or federal offenses punishable by a term
of imprisonment of more than one year, committed on different occasions, involving the
distribution of a controlled substance."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3c(4)(i) (West Supp.
1997):
The defendant: (i) as a leader of a narcotics trafficking network.., and in fur-
therance of a conspiracy ... committed, commanded or by threat or promise
solicited the commission of the offense or (ii) committed the offense at the direc-
tion of a leader of a narcotics trafficking network ... in furtherance of a conspir-
acy ....
37 See 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (c)(11) (1994) ("The victim was particularly vulnerable due
to old age, youth, or infirmity."); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(9) (West Supp.
1997) ("The defendant was an adult at the time the offense was committed or was tried
as an adult and the victim was under fifteen years of age . . . ."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 4209(e)(1)(s) (Supp. 1997) ("The victim was a child 14 years of age or younger,
and the murder was committed by an individual who is at least 4 years older than the
victim."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(1) (West Supp. 1997) ("The victim of the
capital felony was a person less than 12 years of age."); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-
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(2) The victim was over a certain age." 9
(3) The victim was especially vulnerable due to mental or physical disability
1(b)(7) (West Supp. 1997) ("[T]he murdered individual was under 12 years of age and
the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton
cruelty."); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(12) (Michie Supp. 1997) ("The victim of the
murder was less than twelve (12) years of age."); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
905.4(10) (West 1997) ("The victim was under the age of twelve years .... ."); NEv.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.033(10) (Michie 1997) ("The murder was committed upon a
person less than 14 years of age."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VlI)(g) (1996)
("The victim was particularly vulnerable due to old age, youth, or infirmity."); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3c(4)(k) (West Supp. 1997) ("The victim was less than 14 years
old."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(9) (Banks-Baldwin 1997):
The offender, in the commission of the offense, purposefully caused the death of
another who was under thirteen years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense, and either the offender was the principal offender in the commission of
the offense or, if not the principal offender, committed the offense with prior
calculation and design;
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(16) (West Supp. 1997) ("The victim was a child
under 12 years of age."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(10) (Law Co-op. Supp.
1996) ("The murder of a child eleven years of age or under."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 23A-27A-1(6) (Michie Supp. 1997) ("Any murder is wantonly vile, horrible, and
inhuman if the victim is less than thirteen years of age."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
204(i)(1) (Supp. 1997) ("The murder was committed against a person less than twelve
(12) years of age and the defendant was eighteen (18) years of age, or older."); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(ix) (Michie 1997) ("The defendant knew or reasonably should
have known the victim was less than seventeen (17) years of age . . . ."); see also TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(8) (West Supp. 1997) (including as part of the definition
of capital murder: "the person murders an individual under six years of age").
Some statutes contain aggravating circumstances for the case of a defendant who
was in the process of committing a felony that involves a child. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.2(a)(17)(E) (West 1997); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d)(5) (1997); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5)(d) (Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303(9) (1997).
171 See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(11) (1994) ("The victim was particularly vulnerable due
to old age, youth, or infirmity."); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(9) (West Supp.
1997) ("The defendant was an adult at the time the offense was committed or was tried
as an adult and the victim was.., seventy years of age or older."); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(r) (Supp. 1997) ("The victim was 62 years of age or older."); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(m) (West Supp. 1997) ("The victim of the capital felony was
particularly vulnerable due to advanced age or disability . . . ."); LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(A)(10) (West 1997) ("The victim was... sixty-five years of age
or older."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VII)(g) (1996) ("The victim was particularly
vulnerable due to old age, youth, or infirmity."); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(ix)
(Michie 1997) ("The defendant knew or reasonably should have known the victim
was . . . older than sixty-five (65) years of age."). A bill making it an aggravating fac-
tor if the victim is at least 70 years old presently awaits the signature of Tennessee's
governor. See Tom Sharp, 'Lottie's Law' OK's Age Factor for Crimes, COMMERCIAL
APPEAL (Memphis, TN), March 31, 1998, at A13.
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or because the defendant was in a position of familial or custodial authority
over the victim."'
(4) The victim was pregnant.381
(5) The victim was a government employee, including peace officers, police
officers, federal agents, firefighters, judges, jurors, defense attorneys, and
prosecutors, in the course of his or her duties.3"2
0 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(q) (Supp. 1997) ("The victim was
severely handicapped or severely disabled."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(m) (West
Supp. 1997) ("The victim of the capital felony was particularly vulnerable due
to ... disability, or because the defendant stood in a position of familial or custodial
authority over the victim."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VII)(g) (1996) ("The vic-
tim was particularly vulnerable due to old age, youth, or infirmity."); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-13-204(i)(14) (Supp. 1997) ("The victim of the murder was particularly vulnerable
due to a significant handicap or significant disability, whether mental or physical, and at
the time of the murder the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of such
handicap or disability."); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(x) (Michie 1997) ("The defen-
dant knew or reasonably should have known the victim was especially vulnerable due to
significant mental or physical disability.").
381 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(p) (Supp. 1.997) ("The victim was preg-
nant."); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(17) (West Supp. 1997) ("At the time of
the killing, the victim was in her third trimester of pregnancy or the defendant had
knowledge of the victim's pregnancy.").
382 See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(14) (1994) ("The defendant committed the offense
against .. .(D) a Federal public servant who is a judge [or] a law enforcement offi-
cer . . . " during official duties or because of his or her status); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-703(F)(10) (West Supp. 1996) ("The murdered individual was an on duty peace
officer who was killed in the course of performing his official duties and the defendant
knew, or should have known, that the victim was a peace officer."); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.2(a)(7)-(9), (11)-(13), (20) (Deering 1997) (listing aggravating factors for when
the victim was a peace officer, a federal law enforcement officer or agent, a firefighter,
a prosecutor, assistant prosecutor, a former prosecutor, a former assistant prosecutor, a
judge, a former judge, a juror, or an elected or appointed official, and the killing relates
to the victim's duties); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-802(5)(c)(I)-(IV) (Supp. 1996) (pro-
viding for an aggravating factor when the victim was a peace officer, former peace
officer, firefighter, judge, referee, former judge, former referee, elected official, federal
law enforcement officer or agent, or former federal law enforcement officer or agent,
and the killing relates to the victim's duties); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(d)
(Supp. 1997):
The murder was committed against a judicial officer, a former judicial officer,
Attorney General, former Attorney General, Assistant or Deputy Attorney General
or former Assistant or Deputy Attorney General, State Detective or former State
Detective, Special Investigator or former Special Investigator, during, or because
of, the exercise of an official duty;
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(j) (West Supp. 1997) ("The victim of the capital felony
was a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his or her official du-
ties."); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(5) (1997) ("The murder of a judicial officer,
former judicial officer, district attorney or solicitor-general, or former district attorney,
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solicitor, or solicitor-general was committed during or because of the exercise of his or
her official duties."); id. § 17-10-30(b)(8) (1997) ("The offense of murder was commit-
ted against any peace officer ... or fireman while engaged in the performance of his
official duties."); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(h)(9) (1997) ("The murder was committed
against a former or present peace officer, executive officer, officer of the court, judicial
officer or prosecuting attorney because of the exercise of official duty."); 720 ILL.
CoMP. STAT. 5/9-1(b)(1) (West Supp. 1997):
[T]he murdered individual was a peace officer or fireman killed in the course of
performing his official duties, to prevent the performance of his official duties, or
in retaliation for performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or should
have known that the murdered individual was a peace officer or fireman;
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(6) (Michie Supp. 1997) ("The victim of the murder
was a corrections employee, probation officer, parole officer, community corrections
worker, home detention officer, fireman, judge, or law enforcement officer" and the
murder related to the victim's duties); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(a)(7) (Michie
1996) ("The offender's act of killing was intentional and the victim was a state or local
public official or police officer, sheriff, or deputy sheriff engaged at the time of the act
in the lawful performance of his duties."); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
905.4(A)(2) (West 1997) ("The victim was a fireman or peace officer engaged in his
lawful duties."); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d)(1) (1997) ("The victim was a law
enforcement officer who was murdered while in the performance of his duties."); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 565.032.2(5) (West Supp. 1997):
The murder in the first degree was committed against a judicial officer, former
judicial officer, prosecuting attorney or former prosecuting attorney, circuit attor-
ney or former circuit attorney, assistant prosecuting attorney or former assistant
prosecuting attorney, assistant circuit attorney or former assistant circuit attorney,
peace officer or former peace officer ... during or because of the exercise of his
official duty;
id. § 565.032.2(8) ("The murder in the first degree was committed against any peace
officer, or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duty."); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-18-303(6) (1997) ("The offense was deliberate homicide ... and the
victim was a peace officer killed while performing the officer's duty."); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-2523(1)(g) (1995) ("The victim was a law enforcement officer or a public
servant having custody of the offender or another."); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 200.033(7) (Michie 1997):
The murder was committed upon a peace officer or fireman who was killed while
engaged in the performance of his official duty or because of an act performed in
his official capacity, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known
that the victim was a peace officer or fireman;
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3c(4)(h) (West Supp. 1997) ("The defendant murdered a pub-
lic servant ... while the victim was engaged in the performance of his official duties,
or because of the victim's status as a public servant."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-
5(A) (Michie Supp. 1997) ("[T]he victim was a peace officer who was acting in the
lawful discharge of an official duty when he was murdered."); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.27(1)(a)(i), (ii) (Consol. Supp. 1997) (providing an aggravating factor for when
the intended victim was a police officer or a peace officer "who was at the time of the
killing engaged in the course of performing his official duties, and the defendant knew
or reasonably should have known that the intended victim was such [an officer] .... 71;
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id. § 125.27(1)(a)(xii) ("[T]he intended victim was a judge ... and the defendant killed
such victim because such victim was, at the time of the killing, a judge."); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(8) (1996):
The capital felony was committed against a law-enforcement officer, employee of
the Department of Correction, jailer, fireman, judge or justice, former judge or
justice, prosecutor or former prosecutor, juror or former juror, or witness or for-
mer witness against the defendant, while engaged in the performance of his offi-
cial duties or because of the exercise of his official duty;
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(6) (Banks-Baldwin 1997):
The victim of the offense was a peace officer.., whom the offender had rea-
sonable cause to know or knew to be such, and either the victim, at the time of
the commission of the offense, was engaged in the victim's duties, or it was the
offender's specific purpose to kill a peace officer;
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(8) (West Supp. 1997) ("The victim of the murder
was a peace officer ... and such person was killed while in performance of official
duty."); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(1) (West Supp. 1997):
The victim was a firefighter, peace officer, public servant concerned in official
detention ... judge of any court in the unified judicial system, the Attorney Gen-
eral of Pennsylvania, a deputy attorney general, district attorney, assistant district
attorney ... State law enforcement official, local law enforcement official, Fed-
eral law enforcement official or person employed to assist or assisting any law
enforcement official in the performance of his duties, who was killed in the per-
formance of his duties or as a result of his official position;
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(5), (7) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996) (providing as an
aggravating factor a murder that occurs during or because of the performance of official
duties of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, solicitor, former solicitor, other offi-
cer of the court, peace officer, former peace officer, fireman, former fireman or federal,
state, or local law enforcement officer); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1(4) (Michie
Supp. 1997):
The defendant committed the offense on a judicial officer, former judicial officer,
prosecutor, or former prosecutor while such prosecutor, former prosecutor, judicial
officer, or former judicial officer was engaged in the performance of such
person's official duties or where a major part of the motivation for the offense
came from the official actions of such judicial officer, former judicial officer,
prosecutor, or former prosecutor;
id. § 23A-27A-1(7) ("The offense was committed against a law enforcement offi-
cer ... or fire fighter while engaged in the performance of such person's official du-
ties."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(9) (Supp. 1997) ("The murder was committed
against any law enforcement officer ... or firefighter, who was engaged in the perfor-
mance of official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that
such victim was a law enforcement officer.., or firefighter engaged in the perfor-
mance of official duties."); id. § 39-13-204(i)(10):
The murder was committed against any present or former judge, district attorney
general or state attorney general, assistant district attorney general or assistant
state attorney general due to or because of the exercise of the victim's official
duty or status and the defendant knew that the victim occupied such office;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(k) (Supp. 1997):
[T]he victim is or has been a peace officer, law enforcement officer, executive
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(6) The victim was a correctional officer.3"3
officer, prosecuting officer, jailer, prison official, firefighter, judge or other court
official, juror, probation officer, or parole officer, and the victim is either on duty
or the homicide is based on, is caused by, or is related to that official position,
and the actor knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim holds or
has held that official position;
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020(1) (West Supp. 1997):
The victim was a law enforcement officer, corrections officer, or fire fighter who
was performing his or her official duties at the time of the act resulting in death
and the victim was known or reasonably should have been known by the person
to be such at the time of the killing;
id. § 10.95.020(8):
The victim was: (a) A judge; juror or former juror; prospective, current, or former
witness in an adjudicative proceeding; prosecuting attorney; deputy prosecuting
attorney; defense attorney; a member of the indeterminate sentence review board;
or a probation or parole officer; and (b) The murder was related to the exercise of
official duties performed or to be performed by the victim;
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(viii) (Michie 1997) ("The murder of a judicial officer,
former judicial officer, district attorney, former district attorney, defending attorney,
peace officer, juror or witness, during or because of the exercise of his official duty.");
see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997) (including as part of
the definition of capital murder: "the person murders a peace officer or fireman who is
acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty and who the person knows is a peace
officer or fireman").
... See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(14) (1994) ("The defendant committed the offense
against ... (D) ... an employee of a United States penal or correctional institution" in
the course of his or her duties or "because of his or her status as a public servant");
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(8) (1997) ("The offense of murder was committed
against any ... corrections employee ... while engaged in the performance of his
official duties."); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(b)(2) (West Supp. 1997):
[T]he murdered individual was an employee of an institution or facility of the
Department of Corrections, or any similar local correctional agency, killed in the
course of performing his official duties, to prevent the performance of his official
duties, or in retaliation for performing his official duties ... or the murdered
individual was [not an employee or inmate and was] otherwise present in such
institution or facility with the knowledge and approval of the chief administrative
officer thereof;
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(a)(5) (Michie 1996) ("The offense of murder was
committed by a person who was a prisoner and the victim was a prison employee en-
gaged at the time of the act in the performance of his duties."); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 905.4(A)(9) (West 1997):
The victim was a correctional officer or any employee of the Department of Pub-
lic Safety and Corrections who, in the normal course of his employment was
required to come in close contact with persons incarcerated in a state prison facili-
ty, and the victim was engaged in his lawful duties at the time of the offense;
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.2(13) (West Supp. 1997) ("The murdered individual was an
employee of an institution or facility of the department of corrections of this state or
local correction agency and was killed in the course of performing his official du-
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(7) The victim was an inmate of a correction facility."
(8) The victim was an elected official, a candidate for elected office, or in
line of succession to the presidency.385
ties . . . ."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-5(E) (Michie Supp. 1997) ("[W]hile incarcerat-
ed in a penal institution in New Mexico, the defendant, with the intent to kill, murdered
an employee of the corrections and criminal rehabilitation department."); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(iii) (Consol. Supp. 1997):
[T]he intended victim was an employee of a state correctional institution or was
an employee of a local correctional facility ... who was at the time of the killing
engaged in the course of performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or
reasonably should have known that the intended victim was an employee of a
state correctional institution or a local correctional facility;
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(8) (West Supp. 1997) ("The victim of the murder
was a ... guard of an institution under the control of the Department of Corrections,
and such person was killed while in performance of official duty."); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(1) (West Supp. 1997) ("The victim was a ... public servant
concerned in official detention ... who was killed in the performance of his duties or
as a result of his official position."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(c)(a)(7) (Law Co-op.
Supp. 1996) ("The murder of a ... corrections employee or former corrections employ-
ee ... during or because of the performance of his official duties."); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 23A-27A-1(7) (Michie Supp. 1997) ("The offense was committed against
a[n] ... employee of a corrections institution ... while engaged in the performance of
such person's official duties."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(9) (Supp. 1997)
("The murder was committed against any ... corrections official, corrections employ-
ee . . . who was engaged in the performance of official duties, and the defendant knew
or reasonably should have known that such victim was a ... corrections official, cor-
rections employee ... engaged in the performance of official duties.").
4 See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.2(13) (West Supp. 1997) ("[T]he murdered indi-
vidual was an inmate of such institution or facility.").
385 See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(14) (1994) (listing the President of the United States,
Vice-President, chief of state, head of government, foreign official, and so forth); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(13) (West 1997) ("The victim was an elected or appointed
official or former official of the federal government, or of any local or state government
of this or any other state, and the killing was intentionally carried out in retaliation for,
or to prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties."); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 16-11-802(5)(c)(IV) (Supp. 1996) (providing an aggravating factor for when the vic-
tim was "[a]n elected state, county, or municipal official" and the killing relates to the
victim's duties); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(k) (West Supp. 1997) ("The victim of
the capital felony was an elected or appointed public official engaged in the perfor-
mance of his or her official duties if the motive for the capital felony was related, in
whole or in part, to the victim's official capacity."); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.2(5)
(West Supp. 1997) ("The murder in the first degree was committed against
a[n] ... elected official or former elected official during or because of the exercise of
his official duty."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3c(4)(h) (West Supp. 1997) ("The defen-
dant murdered a public servant ... while the victim was engaged in the performance of
his official duties, or because of the victim's status as a public servant."); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2929.04(a)(1) (Banks-Baldwin 1997):
The offense was the assassination of the president of the United States or person
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(9) The victim was a family member of a government official.386
(10) The murder was committed against a person held as a shield, as a hos-
tage, or for ransom. 7
(11) The murder was committed against a witness, a potential witness, or a
family member of a witness in a criminal or civil proceeding to prevent the
witness from appearing, or for revenge.3 8
in line of succession to the presidency, or of the governor or lieutenant governor
of this state, or of the president-elect or vice president-elect of the United States,
or of the governor-elect or lieutenant governor-elect of this state, or of a candidate
for any of the foregoing offices;
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(1) (West Supp. 1997) ("The victim was ... the
Attorney General of Pennsylvania, a deputy attorney general, district attorney, assistant
district attorney, member of the General Assembly, Governor, Lieutenant Governor,
Auditor General, State Treasurer ... who was killed in the performance of his duties or
as a result of his official position."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(11) (Supp.
1997) ("The murder was committed against a national, state, or local popularly elected
official, due to or because of the official's lawful duties or status, and the defendant
knew that the victim was such an official."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(j) (Supp.
1997) ("[T]he victim is or has been a local, state, or federal public official, or a can-
didate for public office, and the homicide is based on, is caused by, or is related to that
official position, act, capacity, or candidacy.").
3816 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(8) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996) ("The murder
of a family member of an official [listed above] with the intent to impede or retaliate
against the official.").
387 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-802(5)(d) (Supp. 1996) ("The defendant intention-
ally killed a person kidnapped or being held as a hostage by the defendant or by anyone
associated with the defendant."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(3)(1)(e) (Supp. 1997)
("The murder was committed against a person who was held or otherwise detained as a
shield or hostage."); id. § 4209(3)(1)(f) ("The murder was committed against a person
who was held or detained by the' defendant for ransom or reward."); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 413(d)(4) (1997) ("The victim was taken or attempted to be taken in the
course of a kidnapping or abduction or an attempt to kidnap or abduct."); id.
§ 413(d)(5) ("The victim was a child abducted . . . ."); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 9711(d)(3) (West Supp. 1997) ("The victim was being held by the defendant for ran-
som or reward, or as a shield or hostage."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(o) (Supp.
1997) ("[T]he victim was a person held or otherwise detained as a shield, hostage, or
for ransom.").
381 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(10) (West 1997):
The victim was a witness to a crime who was intentionally killed for the purpose
of preventing his or her testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding, and the
killing was not committed during the commission or attempted commission, of the
crime to which he or she was a witness; or the victim was a witness to a crime
and was intentionally killed in retaliation for his or her testimony in any criminal
or juvenile proceeding;
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-802(5)(k) (Supp. 1996) ("The class 1 felony was committed
for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution or effecting an
escape from custody. This factor shall include the intentional killing of a witness to a
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criminal offense."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(g) (Supp. 1997) ("The mur-
der was committed against a person who was a witness to a crime and who was killed
for the purpose of preventing the witness's appearance or testimony in any grand jury,
criminal or civil proceeding involving such crime."); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(h)(10)
(1997) ("The murder was committed against a witness or potential witness in a criminal
or civil legal proceeding because of such proceeding."); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-
1(b)(8) (West Supp. 1997):
[T]he defendant committed the murder with intent to prevent the murdered indi-
vidual from testifying in any criminal prosecution or giving material assistance to
the State in any investigation or prosecution, either against the defendant or anoth-
er; or the defendant committed the murder because the murdered individual was a
witness in any prosecution or gave material assistance to the State in any investi-
gation or prosecution, either against the defendant or another.;
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(14) (Michie Supp. 1996) ("The victim of the murder
was listed by the state or known by the defendant to be a witness against the defendant
and the defendant committed the murder with the intent to prevent the person from
testifying."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4625(8) (1996) ("The victim was killed while
engaging in, or because of the victim's performance or prospective performance of, the
victim's duties as a witness in a criminal proceeding."); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 905.4(A)(8) (West 1997) ("The victim was a witness in a prosecution against the
defendant, gave material assistance to the state in any investigation or prosecution of
the defendant, or was an eye witness to a crime alleged to have been committed by the
defendant or possessed other material evidence against the defendant."); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 565.032.2(12) (West Supp. 1997) ("The murdered individual was a witness or
potential witness in any past or pending investigation or past or pending prosecution,
and was killed as a result of his status as a witness or potential witness."); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-20A-5(G) (Michie Supp. 1997) ("[T]he capital felony was murder of a wit-
ness to a crime or any person likely to become a witness to a crime, for the purpose of
preventing report of the crime or testimony in any criminal proceeding, or for retaliation
for the victim having testified in any criminal proceeding."); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27
(1)(a)(v) (Consol. Supp. 1997):
[T]he intended victim was a witness to a crime committed on a prior occasion and
the death was caused for the purpose of preventing the intended victim's testimo-
ny ... or the intended victim had previously testified ... and the killing was
committed for the purpose of exacting retribution for such prior testimony, or the
intended victim was an immediate family member of a witness ... ;
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(8) (1996) ("The capital felony was committed against
a ... witness or former witness against the defendant, while engaged in the perfor-
mance of his official duties or because of the exercise of his official duty."); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(8) (Banks-Baldwin 1997):
The victim of the aggravated murder was witness to an offense who was purpose-
ly killed to prevent the victim's testimony in any criminal proceeding and the
aggravated murder was not committed during the commission, attempted commis-
sion, or flight immediately after the commission or attempted commission of the
offense to which the victim was a witness, or the victim of the aggravated murder
was a witness to an offense and was purposely killed in retaliation for the
victim's testimony in any criminal proceeding;
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(5) (West Supp. 1997) ("The victim was a prosecu-
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(12) The victim was a nongovernmental informant. 9
(13) The murder was committed to interfere with the victim's First Amend-
ment rights.3
tion witness to a murder or other felony committed by the defendant and was killed for
the purpose of preventing his testimony against the defendant in any grand jury or crim-
inal proceeding involving such offenses."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(11) (Law
Co-op. Supp. 1996) ("The murder of a witness or potential witness committed at any
time during the criminal process for the purpose of impeding or deterring prosecution of
any crime."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(i) (Supp. 1997) ("[T]he homicide was
committed for the purpose of: (i) preventing a witness from testifying; (ii) preventing a
person from providing evidence or participating in any legal proceedings or official
investigation; (iii) retaliating against a person for testifying, providing evidence, or
participating in any legal proceedings or official investigation .... ."); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 10.95.020(8) (West Supp. 1997) ("The victim was: (a) A ... current, or
former witness in an adjudicative proceeding; ... and (b) The murder was related to
the exercise of official duties performed or to be performed by the victim."); id.
§ 10.95.020(9) ("The person committed the murder to conceal the commission of a
crime or to protect or conceal the identity of any person committing a crime, including,
but specifically not limited to, any attempt to avoid prosecution as a persistent offend-
er .... I.
The aggravating circumstance that the offense is related to a felony may also apply.
See supra note 350. Also, arguably, aggravating factors dealing with offenses commit-
ted to effect an escape from prosecution could also apply to the murder of a witness.
See supra note 369.
389 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(t) (Supp. 1997):
At the time of the killing, the victim was or had been a nongovernmental infor-
mant or had otherwise provided any investigative, law enforcement or police
agency with information concerning criminal activity, and the killing was in retali-
ation for the victim's activities as a nongovernmental informant or in providing
information concerning criminal activity to an investigative, law enforcement or
police agency;
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(A)(8) (West 1997) ("The victim.., gave ma-
terial assistance to the state in any investigation or prosecution of the defendant . . .
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(15) (West Supp. 1997):
At the time of the killing, the victim was or had been a nongovernmental infor-
mant or had otherwise provided any investigative, law enforcement or police
agency with information concerning criminal activity and the defendant committed
the killing or was an accomplice to the killing ... and the killing was in retalia-
tion for the victim's activities as a nongovernmental informant or in providing in-
formation concerning criminal activity to an investigative, law enforcement or
police agency.;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(i) (Supp. 1997) ("IT]he homicide was committed for
the purpose of ... (ii) preventing a person from providing evidence or participating in
any legal proceedings or official investigation; (iii) retaliating against a person for testi-
fying, providing evidence, or participating in any legal proceedings or official investiga-
tion.").
390 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(v) (Supp. 1997) ("The murder was
committed for the purpose of interfering with the victim's free exercise or enjoyment of
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(14) The victim was killed because of his or her race, color, religion, dis-
ability, sexual orientation, nationality, or country of origin.391
(15) The victim was a newsreporter and the murder was committed to ob-
struct reporting activities of the victim.392
(16) The victim was involved, associated, or in competition with the defen-
dant in the sale, manufacture, distribution, or delivery of any controlled
substance or counterfeit controlled substance.393
Additionally, some jurisdictions have a list of further factors to be con-
s.idered when at least one of the above factors has been found.394 The list
in this Article reflects the range of aggravating factors used in the United
States. No single jurisdiction has the complete list of forty-five statutory
aggravating factors, but most jurisdictions incorporate many of these factors.
As noted above, many states' death penalty statutes include a large number
of these factors. To some extent, the large number of aggravating factors
reflects a continuing genuine attempt by legislatures to define the "worst"
crimes. Legislators want to protect all citizens from murder, and many be-
lieve that they can do so by making more defendants eligible for the death
penalty. The result of this growing list of aggravating factors, however, is a
broad range of factors that can make almost every first-degree murder de-
any right, privilege or immunity protected by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, or because the victim has exercised or enjoyed said rights . . ").
391 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(16) (West 1997) ("The victim was intentionally
killed because of his or her race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin.");
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(v) (Supp. 1997) ("The murder was commit-
ted ... because of the victim's race, religion, color, disability, national origin or ances-
try."); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.033(11) (Michie 1995) ("The murder was commit-
ted upon a person because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national ori-
gin, physical or mental disability or sexual orientation of that person.").
392 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020(12) (West Supp. 1997) ("The victim
was regularly employed or self-employed as a newsreporter and the murder was com-
mitted to obstruct or hinder the investigative, research, or reporting activities of the vic-
tim.").
'93 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(14) (West Supp. 1997):
At the time of the killing, the victim was or had been involved, associated or in
competition with the defendant in the sale, manufacture, distribution or delivery of
any controlled substance or counterfeit controlled substance ... and the defendant
committed the killing or was an accomplice to the killing ... and the killing
resulted from or was related to that association, involvement or competition to
promote the defendant's activities ....
31 California has an additional list of factors that are considered once certain "special
circumstances" are found. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1997) (listing special
circumstances); id. § 190.3 (listing factors to be considered once at least one special
circumstance has been found); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 1095.020 (West
Supp. 1997) (listing aggravating circumstances for aggravated first-degree murder); id.
§ 1095.070 (listing other factors that may be considered in sentencing).
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fendant eligible for the death penalty. In many states, in order not to be
eligible for the death penalty, the murder must not be "cruel," must not be
"heinous or depraved," must not be motivated by anything of value, must
not endanger anyone else, and so on. Additionally, the victim must not be
too old, too young, a government employee, and so forth. Finally, the defen-
dant must not have a record, be incarcerated, be a future danger, et cetera.
Thus, under the present death penalty scheme, an extremely broad range of
murder scenarios make defendants eligible for the death penalty.
C. Conclusion
By broadening the death penalty and allowing limitations upon mitiga-
tion evidence, the courts and legislatures have continued a trend toward a
mandatory death penalty scheme. Although the Court has increased its toler-
ance for arbitrariness, this tolerance has made the imposition of death sen-
tences more likely.395 For example, the use of victim impact evidence, as
well as other nonstatutory aggravating circumstances, simultaneously broad-
ens the application of the death penalty and allows arbitrary factors to be
considered. The increased arbitrariness has contributed to the progression
toward mandatory death sentences.
Meanwhile, legislatures have continued to expand their death penalty
statutes to cover new crimes. Some jurisdictions have even expanded their
death penalty statutes to cover crimes in addition to murder,396 despite the
9 Other commentators have argued that the Court's capital jurisprudence is "pro-
death." See Anthony G. Amsterdam, In Favorem Mortis: The Supreme Court and Capi-
tal Punishment, 1987 A.B.A. SEC. INDIVIDUAL RTS. & RESP. J. 14; Susan Raeker-Jor-
dan, A Pro-Death, Self-Fulfilling Constitutional Construct: The Supreme Court's Evolv-
ing Standard of Decency for the Death Penalty, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 455 (1996).
" See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3591(b)(1) (1994) (drug crimes); 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1994)
(capital punishment for treason); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-51-201(c) (Michie 1997) (capital
punishment for treason); CAL. PENAL CODE § 37 (West Supp. 1997) (capital punish-
ment for treason); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-301(c)(2) (1997) (kidnapping where victim
suffered bodily injury is class 1 felony); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.142 (1996) (capital
punishment for capital drug trafficking felonies); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1 (1996) (cap-
ital punishment for rape); id. § 17-10-30 (capital punishment for aircraft hijacking or
treason); IDAHO CODE § 18-4504 (1997) (capital punishment for kidnapping); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:42(D)(1) (West Supp. 1998) (capital punishment for aggravated rape if
the victim is under the age of twelve years); id. § 14:113 (1986) (capital punishment for
treason); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-25-55(1) (1994) (capital punishment for aircraft pira-
cy); id. § 97-7-67 (capital punishment for treason); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-220
(1997) (capital punishment where defendant is convicted of attempted deliberate homi-
cide, aggravated assault, or aggravated kidnapping, while incarcerated); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §20-12-42 (1978) (capital punishment for espionage); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.82.010 (1988) (capital punishment for treason); see also State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d
1063 (La. 1996) (upholding the application of the death penalty for the rape of a victim
19981
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Court's conclusion in Coker v. Georgia3"7 that the Eighth Amendment pro-
hibited the death penalty in a nonmurder case.
As discussed earlier, the Court has moved away from its concerns about
arbitrariness and instead has focused only on the "narrowing" aspect of
aggravating factors. Under the Court's present scheme, aggravating factors
have a lesser role both in eliminating arbitrariness and in narrowing the
application of the death penalty. Arguably, as long as there is one first-de-
gree murderer who is not eligible for a death sentence under the statute, a
constitutional narrowing has occurred.398 Of course, not every murder de-
fendant receives a death sentence. The net is growing, however, and those
who escape a death sentence are increasingly spared only by the arbitrary
nature of the system.
The argument that today's death penalty system is becoming mandatory
is supported by a recent study of North Carolina capital jurors.399 In this
study, psychology Professor James Luginbuhl and doctoral student Julie
Howe noted several factors that push jurors toward imposing death sentenc-
es. These factors include the fact that jurors begin a sentencing phase with a
who is under twelve years old), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2425 (1997) (denying the peti-
tion for writ of certiorari with a statement by three Justices noting that such a denial is
not made on the merits and that the judgment of the lower court may not have been
final); John Q. Barrett, Death for Child Rapists May Not Save Children, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 18, 1997, at A21 (noting progress in Georgia, Montana, and Pennsylvania to ex-
pand death penalty to rape crimes); Michael Higgins, Is Capital Punishment for Killers
Only?, A.B.A. J., August 1997, at 30 (noting that fourteen jurisdictions impose the
death penalty for crimes other than homicides).
'- 433 U.S. 584 (1977). In Coker, the Court struck down the application of
Georgia's death penalty to defendants convicted of raping an adult woman. See id. at
600. Recently, the Utah Supreme Court followed Coker in applying the Eighth Amend-
ment to strike down as excessive a statute providing for the application of the death
penalty in situations of aggravated assault. See State v. Gardner, Nos. 950330, 950344,
1997 WL 597437, at *26 (Utah Sept. 30, 1997) (holding that section 76-5-103.5(2)(b)
of the Utah Code violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution).
398 In a recent article, Professors Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker noted that the
Court has repudiated "channeling" as a separate constitutional requirement while instead
focusing on "narrowing." See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 98, at 382. In other words,
through cases such as Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984) (holding that appellate pro-
portionality review is not constitutionally required), the Court in recent years has
stressed only that the class of those receiving death sentences must be narrower than the
class of all murderers. Professors Steiker and Steiker conclude, "Under current doctrine,
a state could choose to limit death-eligibility through its definition of capital murder (as
several states have), and then simply ask the sentencer to decide punishment in light of
any aggravating or mitigating factors that the sentencer deems significant." Steiker &
Steiker, supra note 98, at 384. Indeed, New York later created a similar system. See
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (Consol. 1996).
... See James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instruc-
tions: Guided or Misguided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161 (1995).
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substantial bias in favor of death, 4°° the fact that aggravating circumstances
may be easier to prove than mitigating circumstances, 4 1 and confusing ju-
ry instructions."c The authors noted that "it is disturbing that roughly one-
fourth of the jurors felt that death was mandatory when it was not and ap-
proximately one-half of the jurors failed to appreciate those situations which
mandated life .... [T]hat translates into three out of twelve jurors who feel
that death is mandated." 3 The authors also noted several other miscon-
ceptions held by capital jurors that weighed on the side of imposing a death
sentence 4
The Court's initial rejection of mandatory death sentences in Woodson
took place during a time when the Court was increasing its regulation of the
death penalty. Since then, the Court has backed away from regulating the
system while tolerating more vagueness and arbitrariness that broaden the
group of defendants eligible for the death penalty. Also during this time,
legislatures have been expanding their death penalty statutes.
40 5
'o See id. at 1180. "[TIhe tilt towards death suggests that a defendant with a con-
fused jury may receive a death sentence by default, without having a chance to benefit
from legal standards designed to give him a chance for life." Id.; see also William J.
Bowers, Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1093 tbl.
9 (1995) (reporting that a significant number of jurors made up their minds about the
punishment before the penalty phase began).
"o See Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 399, at 1180.
If aggravating factors are either true or false on their face, then proving to the
jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of an aggravating factor (such as
the defendant's having been previously arrested for a violent crime) imposes no
particular burden on the prosecution. However, just "satisfying" jurors that a par-
ticular quality of the crime or the defendant has mitigating value may be quite
difficult for the defense.
Id.
' See id.
3 Id. at 1173.
' See id. at 1180. They concluded
that (a) only three-fifths of the jurors are likely to consider all the appropriate
mitigating factors; (b) less than one-half will require the appropriate burden of
proof for mitigating factors; (c) less than one-half will understand that unanimity
is not required to find a mitigating factor; and (d) only one-third will understand
that a sentence of life is required if the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravat-
ing factors.
Id.
o In addition to the expansion of individual statutes, the trend is further illustrated
by New York's recent adoption of a death penalty statute that has been criticized as
being aimed at obtaining a large number of death sentences. See Mary R. Falk & Eve
Cary, Death-Defying Feats: State Constitutional Challenges to New York's Death Pen-
alty, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 161, 223-26 (1995). Professors Falk and Cary argue that because
New York's statute accomplishes the narrowing function at the guilt phase of a capital
trial, it is a "capital sentencing scheme [that] is designed to result in the imposition of
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Similarly, during this same time period, the Court has made several
rulings that decrease federal review of state capital cases in spite of the
increasing likelihood that defendants with meritorious claims of federal
constitutional violations will be executed.4" Following this trend, Congress
recently passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which
substantially limits federal review of capital cases.4 7 The Court's habeas
corpus decisions and Congress's recent Act have contributed to the manda-
tory nature of today's death penalty scheme. Thus several factors have ac-
celerated the drive toward a mandatory death penalty scheme.
IV. CAN TODAY'S ARBITRARY MANDATORY DEATH SENTENCING SCHEME
OF AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS BE FIXED?-FIVE VIEWS
I have no objection to giving them [juries] this dispensing
power, but it should be given to them directly and not in a
mystifying cloud of words.4 8
the death penalty by a jury that does not understand the implications of its actions or by
one that is organized to impose a sentence of death." Id. at 223.
406 See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992) (creating a strict "actually
innocent of the death penalty" exception to successive habeas petitions); Keeney v.
Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992) (holding that federal courts are no longer required to
grant a hearing on a state prisoner's habeas corpus challenge, even if the prisoner can
show that the defense lawyer did not properly present crucial facts of the case in a state
court appeal); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (holding that because there
is no right to effective assistance of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings, an
attorney's error in filing a petition late was not "cause" for Coleman's procedural de-
fault, and that the federal courts would not hear his claims); McCleskey v. Zant, 499
U.S. 467 (1991) (adopting a stricter rule for defendants who did not raise a claim in a
first habeas petition); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (holding that "new rules"
will not apply to benefit a defendant if that defendant was in post-conviction proceed-
ings at the time the Court announced the rule); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977) (creating a stricter rule for defendants bringing claims that were procedural de-
faulted in state court).
Recently, in O'Dell v. Netherland, 117 S. Ct. 1969 (1997), the Court addressed the
application to habeas petitioner O'Dell of a Supreme Court decision that allowed a
capital defendant to inform his jury that he is not eligible for parole if the prosecution
argues the defendant's future dangerousness. The Court in O'Dell held that the previous
decision was a new rule under Teague and could not apply to habeas petitioner O'Dell.
O'Dell thus was executed despite the constitutional violation in his case. See Associated
Press, Man Executed Despite Protest From the Pope, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1997, at
A18.
"' See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214.
408 BENJAMIN CARDOZO, What Medicine Can Do For Law, in LAW AND LITERATURE
70, 100 (1931) (criticizing the system of vague degrees of murder to determine which
murders were capital), quoted in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 199 (1971).
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In attempting to serve the two goals of (1) individualized sentencing 4°9
and (2) eliminating arbitrariness by channeling discretion and narrowing the
group eligible for the death penalty,4 10 the Court has attempted to walk a
fine line between mandatory death sentences and total discretionary capital
sentencing. In doing so, the Court has created a system of aggravating and
mitigating factors that retains many of the evils of both mandatory sentenc-
ing and discretionary sentencing. In order to provide for individualized sen-
tencing, the Court has had to allow a certain level of arbitrariness; and, in
order to try to curb the arbitrariness, the Court has attempted to limit some
of the discretion.
Various developments, probably unseen by the Furman Justices, have
resulted in a capital sentencing scheme that in many ways is both mandatory
and arbitrary. Through the Court's tolerance of nonstatutory aggravating
circumstances and broad statutory aggravating circumstances, as well as
state legislatures' roles in broadening the death penalty, death penalty stat-
utes have progressed toward being mandatory. Although the death penalty is
not imposed on all death-eligible defendants, the trend since the early 1980s,
however, has been toward making such situations less likely. The result is a
progression toward mandatory death sentences-a trend that is openly em-
braced by some of the Supreme Court Justices."
As the Court has moved toward mandatory capital sentencing, it also has
moved toward a more arbitrary scheme. The Court's initial concerns about
the arbitrary use of the death penalty have evolved into a single concern of
narrowing, that is, a concern that some murderers are eliminated from the
death-eligible pool at some point. Once some murderers are eliminated from
that pool, the Court is less concerned about arbitrariness. Recent decisions
by the Court permit more arbitrariness than the early post-Furman cases
appeared to tolerate.
Therefore, the Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence, after reject-
ing both total discretionary and mandatory sentencing schemes, paradox-
ically has created a system of aggravating and mitigating factors that has the
problems of both schemes. In an attempt to establish a fair sentencing
scheme for individually unique defendants and unlimited types of murder,
perhaps such a result is inevitable. In McGautha, Justice Harlan recognized
that fact: "To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homi-
cides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express
409 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (holding that the Eighth Amend-
ment requires that the sentencer "not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of
the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death").
410 See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (striking down the vague
application of an aggravating factor).
411 See discussion infra Part IV.D.
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these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and applied
by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present
human ability."4"" If the Constitution still requires that the death penalty be
imposed in a fair manner, however, the Court should be examining ways to
mend the constitutional infirmity of today's arbitrary mandatory death sen-
tencing scheme.
Five main options address the concerns expressed in this Article. One
option is to keep the current system. At least one commentator has declared
the Court's jurisprudence in this area a mild success.413 A federal judge
has proposed a legislative solution to limit the application of the death pen-
alty,414 while other commentators have proposed a judicial solution along
the same lines.415 Another option is to return to the pre-Furman days of
unguided discretion.416 Some of the commentators, as well as some Su-
preme Court Justices, have addressed inconsistencies in the Court's reason-
ing regarding the dilemma of individualized sentencing and arbitrariness.
Because of this dilemma, two Justices have abandoned the notion of individ-
ualized sentencing," 7 while two others have given up altogether on the
constitutionality of the death penalty.4 " These analyses are discussed be-
low.
A. The View That the Court's Capital Punishment Jurisprudence Works
As discussed throughout this Article, the Court's attempt to walk the
line between mandatory death sentences and total discretionary sentences
has been a failure. Although few would argue that the Court has created an
ideal capital sentencing scheme, perhaps there are some benefits to it. De-
spite the problems, the present system attempts to combine the
evenhandedness of a mandatory death penalty with the individualized justice
of an unguided discretion scheme. While not the ideal system, perhaps it is
the best possible system.
In a recent article, Professor David McCord took the rare position that
the Court's decisions in this area have created a scheme that works to some
extent. Professor McCord discussed the Court's concerns with"overinclusiveness," meaning "the imposition of death sentences on defen-
dants who are not among the 'worst' murderers,"4 9  and
412 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971).
415 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
414 See infra notes 451-57 and accompanying text.
415 See infra notes 458-60 and accompanying text.
416 See discussion infra Part IV.C.
417 See discussion infra Part IV.D.
418 See discussion infra Part IV.E.
419 McCord, supra note 295, at 546.
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"underinclusiveness," meaning "the imposition of death sentences on only
some, rather than all, equally culpable murderers."4" His article contained
three conclusions that are relevant to the scope of this Article. First, he
concluded that the Court is concerned only with narrowing, or
overinclusiveness, and not general arbitrariness.42 Professor McCord ar-
gued that "the Court has had only one primary goal for its regulation of
capital punishment: decreasing overinclusion, with particular interest in
minimizing invidious overinclusion due to racial bias." 22 Second, Profes-
sor McCord concluded,
The best available evidence shows that the Court's regulatory
death penalty jurisprudence has been successful in decreas-
ing overinclusion, which is the primary vice that the Court
has seen in death penalty systems for the last quarter of a
century.... [LIet's give credit where credit is due--the
populations of death rows since 1972 very likely comprise a
more carefully selected and "worse" collection of malefactors
than before 1972. This is not an insignificant achieve-
ment.4
Third, Professor McCord concluded that this improvement is a result of the
Court's present death penalty jurisprudence. 4' Each of these arguments is
addressed below.
1. The Court Has Expressed Concern with General Arbitrariness
The main problem with Professor McCord's conclusion that the Court is
not concerned with underinclusiveness is that he redefines the Court's goal
to fit with the result. Professor McCord concluded that because the Court
was not successful in eliminating arbitrariness, then that must not have been
its goal.4 2 Professor McCord cited several other instances in which the
Court has expressed concern with arbitrariness, 4  yet he argued that be-
420 Id.
421 See id. at 548.
422 Id.
41 Id. at 593; cf Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 315 (1976) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion in Woodson, Justice Rehnquist stated that the
concern in Furman "arose not from the perception that so many capital sentences were
being imposed but from the perception that so few were being imposed." Id. (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
424 See McCord, supra note 295 at 591-93.
41 See id. at 593.
42 See id. at 554-56.
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cause the Court set up various procedural protections for defendants, the
Court was not concerned about general arbitrariness or underinclusion.427
However, the Court-at least the plurality Justices in Furman-would not
agree that the sole goal was to decrease the number of people sentenced to
death.4' The Court, at least initially, was concerned about arbitrari-
ness.429 As the Court explained, states "must administer [the death] penalty
in a way that can rationally distinguish between those individuals for whom
death is an appropriate sanction and those for whom it is not."43 As Jus-
tice Scalia noted in his concurrence in Walton, "[W]e have repeatedly
incanted the principle that 'unbridled discretion' is unacceptable."4 3' In a
1987 decision, the Court noted that Furman struck down the absolute discre-
tion statutes because they "resulted in the death penalty's being arbitrarily
and capriciously imposed, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. 432
427 See id. at 567-72. Professor McCord argued that the Court's decisions holding
that jurors with scruples against capital punishment cannot be struck for cause, rejecting
a mandatory death penalty, requiring individualized sentencing, and requiring lesser-in-
cluded offense instructions, as well as the Court's refusal to limit prosecutorial discre-
tion, show that the Court was not concerned with underinclusion in general. See id.
More likely, however, these decisions reflect the Court's attempts to develop a more
accurate system, rather than indicate a lack of concern about arbitrariness. Such a con-
clusion would be more consistent with the Court's expression of concern about arbi-
trariness in other cases.
Professor McCord also pointed to McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), in
which the Court held that McCleskey's death sentence did not violate the Eighth
Amendment when Georgia's sentencing procedures focused discretion on the aspects of
the crime and on the defendant. See McCord, supra note 295, at 571. As discussed
earlier, McCleskey to some extent is illustrative of a Court that has realized that it has
developed a capital punishment system that cannot combat arbitrariness. The Court,
however, has not always envisioned that the system it helped develop would permit so
much arbitrariness. Indeed, had the Justices been able to foresee the capital punishment
scheme that would result, the outcome of McCleskey would have been different. See
supra note 10 (noting Justice Powell's change of view).
428 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
42 See supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
430 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 (1984). In Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976), the Court noted:
By providing prompt judicial review of the jury's decision in a court with state-
wide jurisdiction, Texas has provided a means to promote the evenhanded, ratio-
nal, and consistent imposition of death sentences under law. Because this system
serves to assure that sentences of death will not be "wantonly" or "freakishly"
imposed, it does not violate the Constitution.
Id. at 276 (emphasis added).
411 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 660 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
432 Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 70 (1987) (striking down Nevada's mandatory
death penalty statute).
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Professor McCord is correct that the Court's recent cases taken together
lead to the conclusion that the Court is mainly concerned about narrowing,
not arbitrariness.43 In fact, the authors of the article that Professor
McCord was criticizing, Professors Carol and Jordan Steiker, would agree
with him on this point.4" McCord's conclusion thus has merit with regard
to the direction in which the Court is headed. Arbitrariness has become less
of a concern for the Court-but only because the Court has come to the
apparent conclusion that it cannot fix it.435 If Furman, Gregg, and other
cases still have any significance, however, arbitrariness should remain a
constitutional concern. Today, the selection of who dies among eligible
defendants is still like being struck by lightning. Professor McCord and the
Steikers seem to agree that the Court in practice does not care about wheth-
er the death penalty is arbitrary but does care that some sort of narrowing of
those eligible for the death penalty occurs.436 Because of the direction tak-
en by the Court in this regard, the death penalty remains arbitrary.
2. Today's Mandatory Death Penalty is Overinclusive
Although Professor McCord correctly concluded that the Court is con-
cerned with overinclusiveness,437 the Court has not solved that problem. It
is impossible to accurately define who are the "worst murderers." While
some murderers more easily fall into this category than others, there is still
a point where it becomes difficult to define who are the "worst murderers."
In trying to do so, the Court and legislatures have substantially broadened
that definition. Thus, the progression by the Court and legislatures toward a
mandatory death penalty, by expanding its application, has resulted in
today's overinclusive death penalty.
Professor McCord evaluated twenty-five capital cases to support his
conclusion that Georgia's system is not overinclusive, i.e., that based upon
various factors, all of those defendants deserved death sentences. In making
his determination, McCord listed a broad range of aggravating factors, or"exacerbating motifs," to conclude that the twenty-five defendants deserved
433 See McCord, supra note 295, at 573-79.
""4 See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 98, at 384 (noting "[t]he Court's focus on nar-
rowing as the sole constitutionally required means of addressing arbitrariness in capital
sentencing-to the exclusion of both channeling and proportionality review").
431 Professor McCord agrees that the Court has determined that it cannot regulate
general arbitrariness. "As to mundane underinclusion, I believe the Court has recognized
that it is beyond the Court's power to regulate, short of complete abolition of the death
penalty, a step the Court has never been willing to take." McCord, supra note 295, at
547-48.
... See id. at 548; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 98, at 384.
131 See McCord, supra note 295, at 548.
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death sentences.438  His analysis is a good attempt at defining"overinclusiveness," but it further illustrates the problems of defining who
are the worst murderers. By roughly setting the bounds of"overinclusiveness" by using the present scheme's aggravating factors, it is
no surprise that the scheme is within those bounds. The problem, as dis-
cussed above in Part III, is that the bounds themselves are too broad, which
has resulted in an overinclusive death penalty.
3. The Improvements in Modern Capital Sentencing Are Not Necessarily Due
to the Court's Present Capital Sentencing Scheme
Professor McCord attributed any improvements to capital sentencing in
the last twenty years to the Court's guided discretion scheme.439 It is un-
clear, however, the degree to which the death penalty sentencing scheme
developed after Furman directly created any improvements in the sys-
tem.44 As the Fund lawyers and other defense attorneys began to special-
ize in the complexities of capital defense litigation around the time of the
Furman decision, the quality of the representation of defendants on death
row increased, peaking with the creation of the death penalty resource cen-
ters in the 1980s.44' The resource centers were staffed by qualified attor-
neys who represented indigent defendants and who trained other capital
defense attorneys. Although in 1995 Congress eliminated funding for the
resource centers and despite numerous examples of poor capital representa-
tion,"2 the representation and training given by the resource center lawyers
and other capital defense attorneys, among other factors, has contributed to
a higher awareness of the type of evidence defense attorneys should present
at sentencing hearings. True, part of this awareness was an indirect result of
the litigation surrounding Furman and Gregg, but that result does not mean
438 Id. at 582-90.
411 See id. at 579-90, 593.
41 See, e.g., Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 399, at 1181 (concluding from a study
of North Carolina jurors that their comprehension of sentencing criteria is "mediocre,"
reducing "the likelihood that capital defendants will benefit from the safeguards against
arbitrariness").
41 See Kimbalu R. Anderson & Bruce R. Braun, Capital Pro Bono Demand Is Up,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 19, 1996, at B9; Mark Hansen, With Federally Funded Appeals from
Capital Punishment on the Way Out, Lawyers are Wrestling with Questions About Who
Will Pursue the Arguments to Keep Condemned Inmates From Death's Door, A.B.A. J.,
June 1996, at 58.
442 See Bob Herbert, The Hanging Tree, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 6, 1997, at A5; see also
supra note 300; cf. Bilionis & Rosen, supra note 300, at 1370 ("As mounting criticism
from virtually every relevant quarter attests, the basic post-Gideon model for providing
court-appointed lawyers to indigent defendants is failing to supply attorneys who can
fulfill the more trying and more specialized demands of modern capital litigation.").
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that the system itself was better. Further, many of the procedural safeguards
the Court instituted, such as bifurcated trials" 3 and no limits on mitigation
evidence,' are not inconsistent with a pre-Furman unguided discretion
system. Therefore, improvements over the pre-Furman system are not neces-
sarily a result of the Court's creation of a guided discretion scheme.
4. Although Professor McCord May Be Correct That the Present System Has
Benefits over the Unguided Discretion System, It Is Far from Being a Success
A more recent and broader statistical sampling than the ones used by
Professor McCord might lend more support to his claim that the present
system works better than an unguided discretion system. Yet, statistics such
as the ones used in McCleskey v. Kemp-that defendants who kill white
victims are 4.3 times more likely to receive the death penalty than those
who kill black victims" -- raise serious questions. Still, Professor McCord
is probably to some extent correct that today's overall capital punishment
system is fairer than the unguided discretion system.
The system, however, is not much better, and many of the improvements
are not necessarily a result of the guided discretion system. Although the
present system has made some small progress toward achieving a fairer
sentencing system, it has not come close to the Eighth Amendment goals
envisioned by the Court in Furman. Under the Court's jurisprudence, the
constitutional problems of the present arbitrary and mandatory system render
it a failure.
B. The View That the Application of the Death Penalty Should Be Limited
Defendants who are sentenced to death in the United States have been
convicted of a broad range of types of murder. On June 13, 1997, a jury
voted to sentence Timothy McVeigh to death for the 1995 Oklahoma City
bombing that killed 168 people and injured 850 others.446 Three days later,
with almost no publicity, David Stoker was executed in Huntsville, Texas,
for the 1986 murder of a convenience store clerk during a robbery of nine-
ty-six dollars."' On the same day as Mr. Stoker's execution, an Ohio
4 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
" See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978).
"5 See McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287 (1987); see also supra notes 399-404
and accompanying text (discussing a study of North Carolina jurors that concluded that
one-fourth of those jurors felt that the death penalty was mandatory when it was not).
"6 See Jo Thomas, The Oklahoma City Bombing: The Verdict; McVeigh Jury De-
cides on Sentence of Death in Oklahoma Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1997, at 1.
447 See Texas carries out its 22nd execution of the year, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
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judge ruled that Wilford Berry, who was also condemned for killing a per-
son during a robbery, was competent to waive his appeals and seek his own
execution." 8 Also on the same day, Jonathan Bunton pleaded guilty to
murdering a person during a robbery in Texas and received a life sen-
tence.449 Similarly, three days later, Giang Van Tran was convicted in Cal-
ifornia of capital murder and received a life sentence for killing a business
owner during a robbery attempt.45
Certainly, each crime was a tragedy, as all murders result in lost lives,
cause great grief to the families of the victims, and harm society. Because
the Court has rejected mandatory death sentences for all murderers, howev-
er, the problem arises as to where to draw the line between capital murder
and noncapital murder.
In a recent article, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Alex Kozinski
and Sean Gallagher proposed a solution to the time delay between sentence
and execution, 45 1 the economic costs of the death penalty, 42 and the
"lack of finality" 453 associated with the capital punishment system. This
AGENTUR, June 17, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Dpa File; Associated
Press, W. Texas Man Executed for Killing Store Clerk, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June
17, 1997, at A19.
448 See James Bradshaw, Judge: Killer May Choose Execution, COLUMBUS DISPATCH
(Ohio), June 17, 1997, at B1.
"" See Dave Harmon, Plea Gets Killer Life Sentence, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATES-
MAN, June 17, 1997, at B1.
41 See Eric Garcia, Man Gets Life Term In '95 Murder of Jeweler, DALLAS MORN-
ING NEWS, June 20, 1997, at A38.
451 See Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1995).
Putting aside the relatively few cases in which a death row inmate simply gives
up, a case that comes to its conclusion within seven years of the crime is relative-
ly rare. Ten years is about the average, and cases like that of Duncan Peder
McKenzie, whose case took over two decades to shuttle its way repeatedly be-
tween the state and federal courts, are not all that atypical.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
412 See id. at 11-16.
California reportedly spends $90,000,000 each year on the death penalty. With
395 death row inmates, that is over $200,000 per inmate per year. Using that
number as a benchmark, that means California has already spent over
$450,000,000 on the death penalty this decade. What can California show for its
efforts? It's had all of two executions since it passed its post-Furman death statute
in 1972.
Id. at 13-14 (footnotes omitted).
411 Id. at 17-20.
While only a tiny percentage of state and federal criminal cases are reversed on
direct appeal, the rate of reversal in death cases approaches 50%. In federal
courts, habeas petitions are granted in less than 7% of cases, but the figure for
death cases peaked in 1982 at 80% and averaged around 40% between 1978 and
442 [Vol. 6:2
ARBITRARY AND MANDATORY CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
solution would also address some of the problems discussed in this Article.
In order to create a more economical and efficient capital punishment
scheme, Judge Kozinski and Mr. Gallagher propose limiting the number of
people sentenced to death to a smaller number of the worst offenders.4
They reasoned:
Increasing the number of crimes punishable by death, widen-
ing the circumstances under which death may be imposed,
obtaining more guilty verdicts, and expanding the population
of death rows will not do a single thing to accomplish the
objective, namely to ensure that the very worst members of
our society-those who, by their heinous and depraved con-
duct have relinquished all claim to human compassion-are
put to death.55
Thus, contrary to the current trend in the states of expanding the application
of the death penalty, the solution of Mr. Gallagher and Judge Kozinski is to
narrow the application of the death penalty to a smaller group of defendants.
Judge Kozinski and Mr. Gallagher, however, did not see the problem
they were addressing as a constitutional problem and were only making a
suggestion as to how to make the system more efficient.456 Such a solution"means that the people, through their elected representatives, will reassert
meaningful control over this process, rather than letting the courts and
chance perform the accommodation on an ad hoc, entirely irrational ba-
sis. '1
457
Other commentators, however, have seen the problem of broad statutes
and have proposed a similar, court-imposed solution. In another recent arti-
cle, Professors Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker noted that one way the
Court could address the problem of capital sentencing arbitrariness would be
1991.
Id. at 17 (footnotes omitted).
4s See id. at 29-32.
Id. at 29 (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of heinous and depraved conduct as
an aggravating factor, see supra notes 127-62 and accompanying text.
456 The view of Judge Kozinski and Mr. Gallagher has been echoed in the media. In
a recent newspaper editorial, Waldo Proffitt, after stating that he supports the use of the
death penalty, noted that
Americans and Floridians are over-using the death penalty. We invoke it too of-
ten, too-hastily, too sloppily, and then we warehouse condemned prisoners on
death rows for an average of 10 years, thus assuring that we will lose whatever
we might hope to gain from the deterrent value of swift and certain punishment.
Waldo Proffitt, Death Penalty Debate Off Target, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB. (Fla.), Aug.
3, 1997, at 3F.
417 Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 451, at 32.
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to limit the number of individuals eligible for the death penalty.458 One
way that the Court could regulate the selection of those sentenced to death
would be to "require states to genuinely narrow the class of the death-eligi-
ble by adopting more limited definitions of capital murder and by restricting
both the number and breadth of aggravating circumstances." '459 In other
words, the Court could impose a requirement that the number of death-eligi-
ble defendants somehow corresponds to the number of people who receive
death sentences.46°
Perhaps a narrower selection of capital defendants would result in a
more efficient death penalty, as Judge Kozinski and Mr. Gallagher suggest.
Unfortunately, they did not explain exactly how the selection of capital
defendants could be narrowed in a fair way. Further, their solution still
would not address many of the other problems discussed in this Article.
Other problems still would exist if the Court were to continue to allow non-
statutory aggravating circumstances, vague aggravating circumstances, and
victim impact statements.
As a practical matter, the political solution Judge Kozinski and Mr.
Gallagher proposed is unlikely to occur unless the present political climate
changes drastically. The trend in legislatures is to expand the death penalty
and to add aggravating circumstances instead of deleting them.461 Even
judges have felt political pressure to impose death sentences, and in some
instances, state supreme court justices have been voted off the bench where
they have been perceived as being too lax in enforcing the death penal-
ty.462 Legislators and other politicians are also aware of and respond to
458 See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 98, at 414.
419 Id. at 415.
41 Professors Steiker and Steiker explain:
The Court need not specify what kinds of offenses or offenders are most deserv-
ing of the death penalty so much as insist that the absolute number of death-eligi-
ble offenders corresponds in some meaningful sense to the proportion of offenders
who will actually receive the death penalty. Thus, if experience over the past two
decades reflects that one percent of all murders results in a death sentence, the
class of the death-eligible should not be tremendously greater than, say, five or
ten percent of all murderers.
Id.
461 See supra notes 334-37 (discussing several instances of the death penalty as a
political issue); see also Rod Allee, A Voice is Raised Against Capital Punishment,
RECORD, June 25, 1997, at L01 (noting that New Jersey assemblyman Al Steele criti-
cized a bill that would extend New Jersey's death penalty to 16- and 17-year olds as a
"'knee-jerk, just-to-get-elected' proposal"); Scott Graham, Want Quicker Executions?
Bring Fewer Death Cases, RECORDER, July 11, 1997, at 4 (stating that the death penal-
ty should be reserved for the worst offenders and that "[i]nstead, legislators in Sacra-
mento this week proposed making even more criminals eligible for execution").
462 See generally Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of
Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75
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this political pressure." 3 Thus, while such a political solution would ad-
dress many of the problems discussed in this Article, such a solution is
unlikely to occur.
The judicial version Professors Steiker and Steiker discuss is somewhat
more feasible, although it would require that the Court take a new direc-
tion."4 The practical problem with the solution, however, is the difficulty
B.U. L. REv. 759 (1995) (discussing the effects of political pressure in capital cases).
For example, in 1996, in Tennessee, state supreme court Justice Penny J. White was
voted off the bench in a retention election after a number of groups campaigned against
her because of one decision whereby she voted for a new death sentencing hearing for a
defendant. See John Gibeaut, Taking Aim, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1996, at 50, 51. During the
campaign, the Republican Party sent a brochure to voters with the slogan, "'Vote for
Capital Punishment by Voting NO on August 1 for Supreme Court Justice Penny
White."' Stephen B. Bright, Hanging the Judge; Demagogues, Politicians Chip Away at
U.S. Court System, ARIz. REPUBLIC, June 8, 1997, at H1. After Justice White was re-
moved from the court, several legislative candidates spoke out to let voters know that
they favor capital punishment. Associated Press, White Fall Has Hopefuls Boosting
Death Penalty, CHATTANOOGA FREE PRESS, Oct. 8, 1996, at A7.
In 1986, Chief Justice Rose Bird, along with two other California Supreme Court
justices, was overwhelmingly voted out of office following a campaign that focused on
her votes to reverse death sentences. See Maura Dolan, Rose Bird's Quest for Obscuri-
ty, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1995, at Al; Adam Pertman, Judge's Obscurity After Vote a
'Tragedy,' BOSTON GLOBE, May 19, 1996, at 2. Also, in 1994, Texas voters swept
Judge Charles Campbell, a conservative former prosecutor with twelve years as a judge,
off the Court of Criminal Appeals and elected an obscure lawyer who vowed to uphold
more death sentences-even though the lawyer had been caught misrepresenting his
background prior to the election. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Politics of Hanging Judges,
LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 30, 1995, at 25.
13 See David Yepsen, Democrats and Death Penalty, DES MOINES REG., Feb. 10,
1997, at 7 (noting that the death penalty issue has been used in political campaigns to
defeat those opposed to the death penalty); Editorial, Polly Klaas and the Pols, WASH.
POST, Oct. 24, 1996, at A20 (noting that Republican congressional candidates in Cali-
fornia have used the Polly Klaas murder case to attack opponents who are against the
death penalty, including the use of one advertisement in which the face of a Democratic
candidate is morphed into the face of the murderer).
41 Judge Kozinski and Mr. Gallagher note:
The judicial solution would require a wholesale repudiation of the Eighth Amend-
ment case law developed by the Supreme Court over the last quarter century. This
is not nearly as easy to accomplish as it might seem, even when seven of the
current Justices were appointed by fairly conservative Republican Presidents. The
essential teaching of Furman is that death really is different, and that the Consti-
tution calls for an extraordinary measure of caution before the state may take
human life. While this conclusion may not be required by the constitutional text,
it surely is permitted and as we learned a few terms back in Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, conservative Justices are reluctant to revisit major constitutional
judgments reached by earlier Courts.
Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 451, at 28-29 (footnotes omitted).
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in arriving at a certain limit on the number of aggravating circumstances re-
quired by the Constitution. It seems impossible to draw a line and conclude
that five aggravating factors are too many or that the Constitution requires
the execution of a specific percentage of murderers. The Court's jurispru-
dence gives no guidance as to how the Court could arrive at such a resolu-
tion.
Also, such a solution.would not address the broad application of individ-
ual aggravating factors. As the Steikers noted, it is difficult to narrowly
predict, in advance, which crimes should be subject to the death penalty.465
For example, in theory, the aggravating factors that seem to most satisfy the
retributive and deterrent goals of the death penalty are the "future danger"
and "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating factors. As discussed
above,466 however, those factors are so sweeping, vague, and broad that
they potentially include almost every murder.
Another problem with narrowing the present scheme is the arbitrariness
that would remain from the use of nonstatutory aggravating factors, victim
impact statements, and the broad range of mitigating factors. Thus, although
the narrowing proposals potentially limit the mandatory nature of the present
scheme, they are unworkable and do not address the arbitrary nature of
today's scheme of aggravating and mitigating factors. 67
C. The View That the Court Should Return to the Days of Unguided
Discretion
One option that perhaps would eliminate the problems of today's
mandatory death penalty would be for the Court to once again sanction
unguided discretion sentencing statutes as it did in McGautha.468 Arguably,
returning to such a system would eradicate the mandatory nature of today's
system by resulting in fewer situations in which jurors feel that they have
no choice but to impose a death sentence because of a finding of several
vague aggravating circumstances and little mitigation.469 Under the present
scheme, jurors may feel compelled to return a verdict of death when they
are instructed that they should not be swayed by sympathy.47 On the other
46 "The central drawback to such forced narrowing is that it might force states to
exclude factors from their definitions of capital murder that actually do capture the
worst offenses and offenders." Steiker & Steiker, supra note 98, at 416.
46 See supra notes 127-99 and accompanying text.
"' Nor does forced narrowing "resolve the inevitable difficulties associated with
prosecutorial and sentencer discretion to choose who receives death within that nar-
rowed group." Steiker & Steiker, supra note 98, at 417.
468 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 221 (1971).
469 See supra notes 399-404 and accompanying text (discussing a study that found a
number of jurors believed the death penalty was mandatory).
470 See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 540 (1987) (upholding the constitutional-
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hand, in the case of some horrible homicides that would not fall within any
typical aggravating factor, the sentencer would still have the option to im-
pose a death sentence.
Further, returning to unguided discretion in capital sentencing would be
more honest in acknowledging the arbitrary nature of the process of select-
ing who dies and who is sentenced to life in prison. Under today's system,
there is the misleading appearance of a rational selection process. A return
to unguided discretion would be an acceptance of Justice Harlan's conclu-
sion that the task of identifying in clear language before the fact which
murderers deserve the death penalty is "beyond present human ability." '471
Of the options discussed here, the unguided discretion route would require
the Court to make the least change in direction. Indeed, the Court has never
overruled McGautha, which held that such a scheme does not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.472
Still, the return to unguided discretion has few, if any, champions. No
Supreme Court Justice currently argues for a return to the days of unguided
discretion, when the death penalty was "so wantonly and so freakishly im-
posed., 473 Lawyers generally acknowledge that today's system, which at-
tempts to give guidance, is at least marginally better than a system that
provides no guidance at all.474 A return to unguided discretion would not
solve the serious problems of the arbitrariness of today's system, but would
add further arbitrariness and discretion by expanding the sentencer's ability
to base the sentence on racial or other arbitrary factors.
D. The View That the Court Should Abandon the Individualized Sentencing
Requirement
A return to unguided discretion would not cure the arbitrariness prob-
lems of today's death penalty scheme, but perhaps a return to a mandatory
death penalty scheme would eliminate arbitrariness. Such an idea has gained
the support of some members of the Supreme Court.
As noted earlier in this Article, Justices Scalia and Thomas have noted
the inconsistency between the Court's dual concerns of individualized sen-
tencing, which derived from the Woodson/Lockett line of cases, and of chan-
ity of the jury instruction that the jury "must not be swayed by mere sentiment, con-
jecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling").
171 See McGautha, 402 U.S. at 204.
472 See id. at 196.
47' Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
414 See generally McCord, supra note 295. "1 doubt that there is one experienced
capital defense lawyer in this country who would rather return to the pre-Furman era.
Perhaps not even many prosecutors would want to return to the days before Furman,
when such an unguided power of life and death rested in their hands." Id. at 593.
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neled discretion, which derived from Furman.475 As Justice Scalia stated in
Walton, "to refer to the two lines as pursuing 'twin objectives' . . . is rather
like referring to the twin objectives of good and evil. They cannot be recon-
ciled. 47 6 Justice Scalia thus has concluded that the requirements regarding
mitigating evidence destroy any predictability in the capital punishment sys-
tem 477 and that a mandatory death sentencing scheme does not violate the
Eighth Amendment.478
Similarly, Justice Thomas has criticized the conflict that exists between
the Court's goal of preventing capricious death penalty decisions and the
requirement that juries consider mitigating evidence.479 In Graham v. Col-
lins,"° Justice Thomas asserted that the Court's rejection of mandatory
death sentences and the Court's mitigating evidence requirement both con-
tribute to racial discrimination .in capital sentencing. While Justice
Thomas did not go as far as Justice Scalia, he argued that states should be
permitted to limit the relevance of mitigating evidence in a reasonable man-
ner. 482
Justice Scalia's solution is logical: If two principles are inconsistent,
then one must go. Additionally, under Justice Scalia's originalist interpreta-
tion of the Bill of Rights, "a punishment can never be unusual if it existed
when the Bill of Rights was ratified or if it was approved by a legislature
71 See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 487-500 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).
476 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 664 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also
Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 373-74 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the
Furman principle and the Lockett/Eddings principle are incompatible).
7 See Walton, 497 U.S. at 664-65 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Sochor v. Flori-
da, 504 U.S. 527, 554 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("It
has been my view that the Eighth Amendment does not require any consideration of
mitigating evidence ... a view I am increasingly confirmed in, as the byzantine com-
plexity of the death penalty jurisprudence we are annually accreting becomes more and
more apparent.").
478 See Walton, 497 U.S. at 671 (Scalia, J., concurring).
471 See Johnson, 509 U.S. at 374 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that Penry
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), requiring mitigating factors to be considered, was
wrongly decided); Graham, 506 U.S. at 493-500 (Thomas, J., concurring).
480 506 U.S. 461 (1993).
41 See id. at 480-85 (Thomas, J., concurring). One commentator has criticized this
argument:
Justice Thomas is self-deluded to believe that mandatory death sentences would
reduce racial discrimination in capital sentencing. The formalistic view of the
criminal justice process evident in Justice Scalia's and Justice Thomas's argu-
ments about discretion blind these justices to the cumulative impact of discretion
and other factors on capital punishment decisions.
Christopher E. Smith, The Constitution and Criminal Punishment: The Emerging Vi-
sions of Justices Scalia and Thomas, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 593, 613 (1995).
482 See Graham, 506 U.S. at 498-99 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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body."4 3 Because the Fifth Amendment specifically refers to capital
crimes, the Eighth Amendment cannot prohibit capital punishment.8 4 Jus-
tice Scalia therefore reasons that the Constitution must permit the death
penalty and the only, solution is to eliminate arbitrariness by abandoning the
requirement of individualized sentencing.
As a practical matter, however, even if mitigating circumstances were to
be eliminated, the Court has failed to develop a jurisprudence around aggra-
vating circumstances that sufficiently eliminates arbitrariness.485 Thus, Jus-
tice Scalia's position regarding arbitrariness is inconsistent. While criticizing
arbitrariness in decisions not to impose the death penalty, Justice Scalia has
embraced arbitrariness in decisions to impose the death penalty. In Walton,
he announced that mitigating factors are not constitutionally necessary and
that he would no longer follow Lockett because of the arbitrariness resulting
from the use of unlimited mitigating factors.486 Since Walton, however,
Justice Scalia has voted to uphold some of the arbitrary factors discussed in
this Article. Specifically, he voted to uphold the use of victim impact state-
ments in Payne.87 Indeed, in Payne, Justice Scalia noted that he would
vote to allow consideration of victim impact evidence even if Lockett were
overruled. 88 As one commentator has noted, Scalia's vote in Payne to per-
mit victim impact statements "reveal Scalia's implicit rejection of the pre-
mises of Furman and Gregg and his insensitivity to the problem of arbi-
trariness that motivated the plurality opinions in those cases." '489
483 Smith, supra note 481, at 611.
" See Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1127 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
denial of the petition for writ of certiorari).
485 One commentator agrees:
First, even if the Court were to overrule the Woodson-Lockett line of cases, states
could still allow complete discretion to dispense mercy (although they could no
longer be forced to do so) .... Second, the remaining doctrine, guided discretion,
also fails to advance consistency in sentencing, at least as long as merely narrow-
ing the class of death-eligible offenders satisfies the guided discretion require-
ment .... For example, under the guided discretion law upheld in Gregg v.
Georgia, once the sentencer establishes one aggravating factor as a threshold re-
quirement, it can consider fully any aggravating evidence in determining whether
to impose a sentence of death. But allowing the sentencer to base its decision on
any aggravating factors whatsoever produces the same dilemma as permitting it to
rely on any mitigating evidence: There is then no consistent explanation why
some defendants receive the death sentence and others do not.
Srikanth Srinivasan, Note, Capital Sentencing Doctrine and the Weighing-Nonweighing
Distinction, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1347, 1356 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
486 See Walton, 497 U.S. at 673 (Scalia, J., concurring).
487 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 833 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
411 See id.
411 Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 67, 96
(1992). Justice Scalia's inconsistency regarding arbitrariness is somewhat explained by
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Perhaps, then, the solution is to have a true mandatory system. Over the
last twenty years, however, the Supreme Court consistently has held that
mandatory death penalty schemes violate the Eighth Amendment.490 Justice
Scalia's position would require a reversal of all of those decisions. As the
plurality noted in Woodson,491 "evolving standards of decency," show that
mandatory death sentences are not consistent with the Eighth Amendment
because they treat offenders "as members of a faceless, undifferentiated
mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death. 49 2 As
early as McGautha, in which the Court upheld total discretion, the Court has
recognized the undue harshness of a mandatory death penalty scheme. His-
tory has illustrated the problems with mandatory death sentences, including
the resulting use of jury nullification. "The consistent course charted by the
state legislatures and by Congress since the middle of the past century dem-
onstrates that the aversion of jurors to mandatory death penalty statutes is
shared by society at large. 493
Despite Justice Scalia's compelling arguments regarding the problems
with the present system, he has little support for a return to a mandatory
Professor Gey's discussion of Justice Scalia's philosophy regarding the death penalty:
In Scalia's universe, the trial serves only incidentally to mete out individual jus-
tice to a deserving defendant; its primary aim is to express society's sense of
moral outrage and reaffirm collective values about justice. The defendant's pun-
ishment is a means to satisfy a social end, rather than an end in itself. If the un-
anticipated harm caused by a defendant is egregious enough, and that harm out-
rages society to a sufficient degree, the social outrage itself will justify a death
sentence even though the defendant is no more morally guilty than other murder-
ers who do not receive death sentences. This explains Scalia's willingness to
abandon requirements that a judge or jury be required to consider any evidence
the defendant wishes to introduce during the penalty phase to mitigate the
defendant's moral culpability for a capital crime. In Scalia's universe, the
sentencer may consider the defendant's moral guilt irrelevant.
Id. at 124 (footnotes omitted).
41o Indeed, even prior to Woodson and Lockett, the Court noted society's aversion to
mandatory death sentences: "This whole country has traveled far from the period in
which the death sentence was an automatic and commonplace result of convic-
tions . .." Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949); see also Winston v.
United States, 172 U.S. 303 (1899) (construing the Act of January 15, 1897, which
permitted a jury to qualify a murder conviction by returning a guilty verdict "without
capital punishment," as extending to every case in which death would not be just, re-
gardless of the presence or absence of mitigating circumstances).
491 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976).
492 Id. at 304.
49 Id. at 295. In Walton, Justice Stevens noted that "this Nation's long experience
with mandatory death sentences-a history recounted at length in our opinion in
Woodson and entirely ignored by Justice Scalia today-has led us to reject such rules."
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 719 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omit-
ted).
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scheme.494 A mandatory scheme would eliminate most of the arbitrariness
of the present system. The only question remaining is whether, contrary to
history, the Constitution and society would embrace such a harsh solution.
E. The View That the Death Penalty Is Unconstitutional Because It Cannot
Be Administered Fairly
In 1993, Justice Blackmun, who was one of the original Justices to vote
to uphold the death penalty in Gregg and Furman, came to the conclusion,
as had Justices Scalia and Thomas, that the principles of individualized
sentencing and eliminating arbitrariness are incompatible.495  Justice
Blackmun, in contrast to Justice Scalia, believed that both principles are
constitutionally required.496 Thus, in Callins v. Collins,497 dissenting from
the denial of a petition for writ of certiorari, Justice Blackmun concluded
that because the Court's effort to balance those two constitutional require-
ments is a "futile effort,"498 the death penalty violates the Constitution.499
In examining the Court's capital punishment cases, Justice Blackmun
noted that the Court "is retreating not only from the Furman promise of
9 As noted above, Justice Thomas has argued for a system that is less discretionary
than the present scheme, but it is unclear whether he would embrace a completely man-
datory system. See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 350, 498-99 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Rehnquist also has embraced some aspects of a mandatory scheme. See
Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 86 (1987) (White, J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined Justice White's dissenting opinion in Sumner that argued that it is
constitutional to have a mandatory death sentence for a prisoner who commits murder
while serving a life sentence. See id. Justice Scalia, however, is the only Justice taking
an extreme position on this issue.
" See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari).
" Justice Blackmun stated that a capital sentencing scheme must:
afford[] the sentencer the power and discretion to grant mercy in a particular case,
and provid[e] avenues for the consideration of any and all relevant mitigating
evidence that would justify a sentence less than death. Reasonable consistency, on
the other hand, requires that the death penalty be inflicted evenhandedly, in accor-
dance with reason and objective standards, rather than by whim, caprice, or preju-
dice.
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
510 U.S. 1141 (1994).
498 Id. at 1145 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
[O]ver the past two decades, efforts to balance these competing constitutional
commands have been to no avail. Experience has shown that the consistency and
rationality promised in Furman are inversely related to the fairness owed the
individual when considering a sentence of death. A step toward consistency is a
step away from fairness.
Id. at 1132 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
41 See id. at 1159 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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consistency and rationality, but from the requirement of individualized sen-
tencing as well."5" He noted that in addition to abandoning various sen-
tencing safeguards, such as by allowing the jury to consider vague aggravat-
ing circumstances and by allowing courts to limit the consideration of rele-
vant mitigating evidence, the Court has limited the role of the federal courts
in reviewing capital cases.5"' Not only is the system morally and constitu-
tionally unfair, Justice Blackmun reasoned, but it also increases the likeli-
hood that innocent defendants will be executed."°
Justice Blackmun criticized the Court for effectively conceding that
fairness and rationality cannot be achieved and for choosing "to deregulate
the entire enterprise, replacing, it would seem, substantive constitutional
requirements with mere aesthetics, and abdicating its statutorily and consti-
tutionally imposed duty to provide meaningful judicial oversight to the ad-
ministration of death by the States.""5 3 Proclaiming, "I no longer shall tin-
ker with the machinery of death,"5" Justice Blackmun stated that he would
no longer vote to uphold death sentences because the death penalty violates
the Constitution." After Justice Powell retired from the bench, he came to
Id. at 1129 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).5 See id. at 1138 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also SECTION OF INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 300 (calling on
jurisdictions to put a moratorium on executions until, inter alia, courts are able to prop-
erly review constitutional claims in state post-conviction and federal habeas corpus
proceedings).
502 See Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1138 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "The Court is unmoved
by this dilemma, however; it prefers 'finality' in death sentences to reliable determina-
tions of a capital defendant's guilt." Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
503 Id. at 1129 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
I ld. at 1130 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
305 See id. at 1138 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun explained that the
present system of guided discretion is doomed to failure.
Any statute or procedure that could effectively eliminate arbitrariness from the
administration of death would also restrict the sentencer's discretion to such an
extent that the sentencer would be unable to give full consideration to the unique
characteristics of each defendant and the circumstances of the offense. By the
same token, any statute or procedure that would provide the sentencer with suffi-
cient discretion to consider fully and act upon the unique circumstances of each
defendant would "thro[w] open the back door to arbitrary and irrational sentenc-
ing."
Id. at 1136 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 494
(1993) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
All efforts to strike an appropriate balance between these conflicting constitutional
commands are futile because there is a heightened need for both in the adminis-
tration of death.
But even if the constitutional requirements of consistency and fairness are
theoretically reconcilable in the context of capital punishment, it is clear that this
Court is not prepared to meet the challenge.
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a similar conclusion.5l
Like Justice Scalia's proposal, Justice Blackmun's proposal simply to
abandon the death penalty is logical. If the two principles are incompatible
and the two principles are constitutionally required, the death penalty is
unconstitutional.
Because the present system of aggravating and mitigating factors has
resulted in a system with the problems of both mandatory and arbitrary
death penalty schemes, Justice Blackmun's arguments, like Justice Scalia's,
are compelling. Justice Blackmun's solution, like Justice Scalia's, is extreme
because it requires that the Court abandon established constitutional doc-
trines. Perhaps, however, it is the only option if the death penalty cannot be
implemented with the fairness that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
command.
V. RESOLVING THE PARADOX
There is no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases
governmental authority should be used to impose death. 7
After rejecting capital sentencing statutes that gave sentencers complete
discretion and after rejecting mandatory capital sentencing statutes, the
Court has developed an Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that has embraced
the evils of both of those systems. Over twenty years after Furman,58
death penalty statutes continue to be broadened to increase the likelihood
that defendants will be sentenced to death, resulting in a death penalty that
contains many similarities to harsh mandatory death penalty schemes."l At
the same time, the Court has permitted a system of sentencing factors that
tolerates a substantial amount of arbitrary discretion, including the systemic
factors discussed above,"' as well as prosecutorial discretion and racial
bias.
Although it may seem paradoxical to claim that a system is both manda-
tory and arbitrary, that is the system we currently have. While obviously it
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
506 See JEFFRIES, supra note 10, at 451.
In truth, it was not a change of heart, but a change of mind-not an emotional
conversion to the view that execution is never justified, but a reasoned interpreta-
tion of experience. Justice Powell's experience taught him that the death penalty
cannot be decently administered. As actually enforced, capital punishment brings.
the law itself into disrepute.
Jeffries, supra note 10, at A23.
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion).
508 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
See discussion supra Part III.
510 See discussion supra Part II.
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is not completely one or the other, the system has the constitutional faults of
both. We are left to wonder whether we would have only half of the consti-
tutional problems we now face if the Court were to embrace one or the
other completely.
None of the Justices or commentators suggest a return to the McGautha
days when juries had almost complete and unfettered discretion in determin-
ing who received a death sentence. As Professor McCord suggested, attor-
neys probably do not want to return to such a system either.5"' In many
ways, however, we now have that system. Perhaps the present system is
worse than the old system in the sense that the present system has the false
appearance of being a fair and nonarbitrary system. Although Professor
McCord argued that the present system works, Professors Steiker and
Steiker have argued that "the Supreme Court's detailed attention to death
penalty law has generated negligible improvements over the pre-Furman era,
but has helped people to accept without second thoughts-much less 'sober'
ones--our profoundly failed system of capital punishment." ' One may
ask who is correct. Do we have a better system or only a system that allows
the public to pretend that the system works?
The paradox is that McCord and the Steikers each are 'correct. Some
narrowing has occurred, but it has not occurred in a significant or rational
way. The system is better than the McGautha era because the present capital
sentencing statutes eliminate some first-degree murders from the capital
sentencing pool. The system is not better than the McGautha era because it
is arbitrary in selecting who is eliminated from the pool and because it elim-
inates only a few defendants before reopening the system to unlimited arbi-
trariness.
The two best alternatives to the constitutional paradox of today's arbi-
trary mandatory death sentencing scheme are the solutions that individual
Supreme Court Justices have suggested. In short, "Capital punishment
[must] be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all."513
One option is to impose it "fairly" by following the suggestion of Justices
Scalia and Thomas by completely embracing a mandatory death penalty.
511 See McCord, supra note 295, at 593.
So, while death penalty opponents rue the Court's failure to regulate death more
severely, I doubt that there is one experienced capital defense lawyer in this coun-
try who would rather return to the pre-Furman era. Perhaps not even many prose-
cutors would want to return to the days before Furman, when such an unguided
power of life and death rested in their hands.
Id.
512 Steiker & Steiker, supra note 98, at 438; see also Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct.
1127, 1130 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I have struggled-along with a majority
of this Court, to develop procedural and substantive rules that would lend more than the
mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor.")."' Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982).
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Such a system would need to go beyond Justice Scalia's upholding of arbi-
trary factors, like victim impact evidence, by requiring a mandatory death
sentence for all first-degree murderers. To permit the consideration of vague
aggravating factors would open the door to the arbitrariness discussed in this
Article, so under the proposed system every first-degree murderer or a clear-
ly defined group would need to receive a death sentence. Although such a
system would increase the harshness of today's death penalty, its arbitrari-
ness would be eliminated.
The other option is to follow Justices Blackmun and Powell, who both
originally voted to uphold today's death penalty scheme, and subsequently
concluded that the death penalty should be imposed "not at all."" 4 Hold-
ing the death penalty unconstitutional would acknowledge that all attempts
to impose the ultimate punishment in a fair manner have failed and that the
only constitutional alternative is to abandon the punishment altogether.
Instead of embracing one of these two options, the Court has left us
with a compromise and only the appearance of a fair process. In short, the
Court's constitutional interpretation is one that has neither the stomach for
the harshness of a mandatory death penalty nor the willingness to counter
public opinion.
The question is which of the two choices is the better option-a manda-
tory death penalty or no death penalty. Perhaps part of the answer lies in
examining the underlying reasoning for the positions taken by Justices
Scalia and Blackmun, who both recognize the same problems but come to
radically different conclusions.
Justice Scalia believes in the moral philosophies supporting capital pun-
ishment. For example, in one dissent Scalia argued that potential jurors who
state during voir dire that they always will vote for the death penalty should
be permitted to sit as jurors, while jurors who always will vote against the
death penalty should be struck for cause.515 In that opinion, Justice Scalia
quoted Immanuel Kant in what may be his own view regarding retribution
and the death penalty:
Even if a Civil Society resolved to dissolve itself with the
consent of all its members . . the last Murderer lying in the
prison ought to be executed before the resolution was carried
out. This ought to be done in order that every one may real-
ize the desert of his deeds ... 
514 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
s" See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 739 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
516 Id. at 752 n.6 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 198 (W.
Hastie trans., Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1974) (1887)); see also Gey, supra note
489, at 120-32 (discussing Justice Scalia's philosophies about the death penalty). "In
Scalia's universe, the trial serves only incidentally to mete out individual justice to a
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In contrast, before Justice Blackmun came to the conclusion that the
death penalty is unconstitutional, he noted his moral distaste for capital
punishment. Indeed, in his Furman dissent, even though he voted to uphold
the death penalty, he stated: "I yield to no one in the depth of my distaste,
antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for the death penalty, with all its aspects
of physical distress and fear and of moral judgment exercised by finite
minds."5 '7 He added that for him, "it violates childhood's training and
life's experiences, and is not compatible with the philosophical convictions I
have been able to develop., 518
Perhaps the decision of whether to eliminate today's death penalty
scheme altogether or to replace it with a mandatory death penalty scheme
depends upon the principles and philosophies underlying the constitutional-
ity of the death penalty per se and whether such principles justify the harsh-
ness of mandatory death sentences. In other words, if the death penalty is
absolutely necessary to American society, we must accept a mandatory
death penalty. If, however, it is not so necessary that it justifies such harsh-
ness, it must be abandoned. Other factors that must be evaluated include
aspects that undermine the constitutionality of the Court's capital punish-
ment system. Such factors include claims of racial bias, lack of federal
review, no constitutional right to state post-conviction review, inadequate
funding for capital defense, and poor representation by capital defense coun-
sel. 5 19
However, even without considering other factors affecting the constitu-
tionality of the death penalty per se, the logical correct path is evident mere-
ly from the evolution of the present system. This view is illustrated by the
conversion of Justice Powell, who wrote several opinions upholding the
death penalty, including the Court's opinion in McCleskey v. Kemp.52 Jus-
tice Powell did not believe that executions are never justified; however, his
experience on the Court in attempting to regulate the punishment "taught
him that the death penalty cannot be decently administered. 52'
deserving defendant; its primary aim is to express society's sense of moral outrage and
reaffirm collective values about justice." Id. at 124.51" Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
518 Id. at 405-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
511 See supra note 300 (briefly discussing these considerations); see also Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (implying there is no constitutional right to state post-
conviction proceedings or to effective assistance of counsel at that stage); Murray v.
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 13 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
51 In McCleskey, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty despite
the defendant's statistics indicating a general racial bias in the use of the punishment.
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 308 (1987). After retiring, Justice Powell stated
that he regretted his vote in McCleskey. See JEFFRIES, supra note 10, at 451.
521 JEFFRIES, supra note 10, at 451.
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Similarly, other judges have also concluded that the death penalty sys-
tem does not work in practice and should be abolished. In a recent opinion,
Judge Heaney of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
announced in his "view that this nation's administration of capital punish-
ment is simply irrational, arbitrary, and unfair."" Chief Justice Gerald
Kogan of the Florida Supreme Court, who is not morally opposed to the
death penalty, recently began speaking out against capital punishment be-
cause the cumbersome system does not work.5" Although Thomas Zlaket,
the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court, has stated that he will ap-
ply the death penalty as required, he has concluded that the system has
failed." In 1995, Justice Robert Utter resigned from the Washington Su-
preme Court because of his opposition to capital punishment and because he
could not be part of a death penalty system that "is fatally flawed. ' 525
Examining only the process used in implementing the death penalty, one
notes that the United States has tried mandatory sentencing, unguided sen-
tencing discretion, and guided sentencing discretion. The last two approach-
es clearly have been failures. Furthermore, mandatory death sentences have
not worked historically. 5' Additionally, as discussed above, scholars have
failed to create a workable alternative to the present system, which is both
mandatory and arbitrary in nature.
Because all attempts to impose the death penalty with a fair consistency
have failed, the only alternative, as the Court has stated, is to apply it "not
at all. ''527 The Court has never tried true abolition of the death penalty. Af-
ter twenty years, it is time to take a new direction away from the failed ex-
periment. Perhaps Justice Powell recognized the final paradox of today's
death penalty: By.attempting to save the constitutionality of the death penal-
ty by imposing guidelines and permitting discretion at the same time, the
" Singleton v. Norris, 108 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 1997) (Heaney, J., concurring).
Judge Heaney noted, "I am confident that no death penalty system can ever be adminis-
tered in a rational and consistent manner." Id. at 876.
"2 See Peter Wallsten, Florida's Chief Justice Questions Death Penalty, PRESS J.
(Vero Beach, Fla.), Jan. 2, 1998, at Al.
524 See Jenny Staletovich, Justice Raising Voice to Bury Death Penalty, PALM BEACH
POST, Jan. 19, 1998, at 1A. Chief Justice Zlaket has noted, "Most people don't have the
slightest clue how difficult it is to administer the death penalty in a consistent fashion.
." Editorial, Another Execution; This Shouldn't Be Easy, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Jan. 24,
1997, at B6.
12 Patti Epler, Revolt from the Bench; Utter Leaves Court Monday in Protest of
Death Penalty, NEWS TRIB., April 23, 1995, at Bi.
526 "[T]he 19th century movement away from mandatory death sentences marked an
enlightened introduction of flexibility into the sentencing process .... This change in
sentencing practice was greeted by the Court as a humanizing development." Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 402 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
527 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982).
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Court has doomed the process and the punishment to being the ultimate
failure in the United States criminal justice system.
VI. CONCLUSION
The modern era of the Court's evaluation of the constitutionality of the
death penalty began with a simple principle: While treating all defendants
equally, sentencers should fully and fairly consider each defendant and the
crime committed before deciding whether to execute or to imprison. The
Court's twenty-year struggle to attain this goal through regulating sentencing
criteria has taught us that the goal is impossible to attain and has left us
with an arbitrary mandatory death penalty system. As human beings, defen-
dants are too complex for legislatures to design clear and specific guidelines
for determining whether the accused should be destroyed. Thus, we are left
only with the choice of executing all first-degree murderers or executing
none.
The capital punishment system used in the United States consumes a
large amount of resources5" for little progress in trying to achieve a fair
use of the ultimate punishment. Presently, there are well over 3,000 people
on death rows around the country and, although the number of executions is
increasing, the number of those living on death row continues to climb. 29
The numbers are disturbing, but so is the process by which we have selected
these individuals among thousands of others convicted of murder. The fac-
tors distinguishing those sentenced to death from those not sentenced to
death are not well defined, resulting in a situation where among a large
group of convicted first-degree murderers it is impossible to distinguish
between those with life sentences and those with death sentences.53 "[T]he
inevitability of factual, legal, and moral error gives us a system that we
know must wrongly kill some defendants, a system that fails to deliver the
fair, consistent, and reliable sentences of death required by the Constitu-
tion.)53 1
The science of determining who should be executed is inexact. Maybe
the present arbitrary mandatory process by which defendants are selected for
the death penalty is the best compromise the Court can reach, and perhaps it
. See, e.g., Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, The Execution of Injustice: A Cost
and Lack-of-Benefit Analysis of the Death Penalty, 23 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 59, 135-36
(1989) (citing several studies that found that it is more expensive for states to use the
death penalty instead of life imprisonment).
529 See generally Snell, supra note 337 (documenting the status of the death penalty
in the United States in 1996).
53o See supra notes 446-50 and accompanying text (briefly discussing the use of the
death penalty in the United States at the time of Timothy McVeigh's sentencing).
131 Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari).
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is the only way to walk the line between a harsh mandatory system and an
arbitrary unguided discretion system. "Such, it will be said, is human jus-
tice .... But that sad evaluation is bearable only in connection with ordi-
nary penalties. It is scandalous in the face of verdicts of death. 532
After a failed twenty-year experiment, the Court should reexamine the
constitutionality of the death penalty and the overall process by which de-
fendants are selected for the gas chamber, electric chair, rope, firing squad,
or gurney. If the Court were to reexamine the system, its only logical con-
clusion would be that the paradox of the arbitrary mandatory death penalty
system can be eliminated only be eliminating the death penalty.
532 ALBERT CAMUS, Reflections on the Guillotine, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION AND
DEATH 131, 165 (Justin O'Brien trans., 1960).
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